Posted: October 20th, 2022

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED IMPLEMENTATION OF PORT STATE CONTROL IN NIGERIA

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED
IMPLEMENTATION OF PORT STATE
CONTROL IN NIGERIA

Abstract
This dissertation is an appraisal of Port State Control as the concept and practice of
maintaining the seaworthiness of ships calling at ports and focuses on the Nigerian as
a Port State.
The role of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in the development of
safety and pollution prevention regulations is highlighted. International legal
instruments promulgated by the IMO and ILO, which regulates Port State Control
practices, are enumerated and analysed.
The experiences of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and the US
Coast Guard on Port State Control in Europe and America are discussed and
documented. Differences and commonalties in Port State Control inspection
procedures and enforcement practices in both regions are identified and noted.
Port State Control practices in West Africa are also analysed using Nigeria as a case
study. To achieve this end, the composition of the Nigerian Maritime Administration
(MARAD) is scrutinised, the inspection procedures and international legal
instruments applied are reviewed and enforcement measures used in correcting
deficiencies or detaining ships are appraised.
Problems of finance, planning, training, communication network and corruption
which militates against an effective Port State Control programme in Nigeria are
identified and isolated. Appropriate recommendations are advanced to address the
problems and improve the implementation of Port State Control in Nigeria.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Declaration
Acknowledgement
Abstract
Table of Contents
Lists of Tables
List of Figures
List of Abbreviations
Introduction
International Instruments on Port State Control
2.1 International Maritime Organisation(IMO)
2.2 Port State Control in the IMO Conventions
2.2.1 SOLAS 1974/78
2.2.2 LOAD LINES(LL) 1966
2.2.3 COLREG 1972
2.2.4 MARPOL 1973/78
2.2.5 TONNAGE 1969
2.2.6 THE ILO NO. 147 CONVENTION
2.2.7 STCW 1978
2.2.8 UNCLOS 1982
2.3. IMO Resolution A. 481(xii) “Principles of Safe Manning”
2.4. IMO Resolution A. 787 (19) “Procedures for Port State Control”
2.5. ISM CODE 1998 (Res. A. 741 (18) )
2.6. The Application of International Instruments on Port State Control
3. The Port State Control in Europe and the concepts of Paris MOU on Port State Control
3.1. Why the Paris MOU?
3.1. The Scope and the Agreement of the Paris MOU
3.2. The Relevant Instruments of the Paris MOU
3.3. The “No More Favourable Treatment(NMFT) Clause
3.4. Who conducts Port State Control Inspection in European Countries?
3.5. Inspection Procedures, Rectification and Detention of sub-standard ships in Europe
3.6. Documentation and Port State Control Inspections Reporting system in Europe
3.7. The Aide Memoir for Surveyors
3.8. Operational Violations in European waters
4. Port State Control in the United States of America and the Role of Coast Guard on Safety
Standard Vessel Boarding Program
4.1. Introduction
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4.2. Definitions used by the Coast Guards in the USA
4.3. The Objectives of the Program
4.4. Types of Boarding Systems in the USA
4.5. Qualifications of Marine Inspectors in the USA
4.6. Port State Control Enforcement on non-Convention ships
4.7. Carrying the Certificate of Financial Responsibility on board
5. Port State Control in West Africa
5.1. Introduction
5.2. West and Central African States MOU
5.3. Port State Control Implementation and Enforcement in Nigeria
5.3.1. The Maritime Historical background of Nigeria
5.3.2. The Composition of the Nigerian MARADS
5.3.3. IMO Safety Conventions Ratified by Nigeria
5.3.4. Selecting ships for Inspection and the Inspection Procedures
5.3.5. Rectification and Detention of ships
5.3.6. Port State Control Inspections´ Reporting System
5.3.7. Treatment of Non-Convention ships
5.4. Problems of Port State Control Implementation and Enforcement in Nigeria
5.4.1. Inadequate finance
5.4.2. Inadequate Research and Planning
5.4.3. Inadequate Educated and trained personnel
5.4.4. Lack of Maritime Academics
5.4.5. Poor PSC Inspection Reporting System
5.4.6. Political Instability and Economic Uncertainty
5.4.7. Problem of bribery and corruption in the Shipping sector
5.4.8. Problem of Government intervention in the affairs of Nigerian MARADS
5.4.9. External forces intervention in the Nigerian Shipping Industry´s affairs
5.4.10. The roles of Nigerian Shippers and the mass media in Nigerian shipping
policy decisions
6. Conclusion and Recommendations
Bibliography
Appendices
Appendix 1 Map of Nigeria
Appendix 2 IMO, Resolution A. 481(ix) adopted on 19 November 1981 “Principles of
Safe Manning”
Appendix 3 IMO, Resolution A. 787(19) adopted on 23 November 1995 “Procedures
for Port State Control”
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Appendix 4 “Meddelelse om tilbageholdelse af skib-DANMARK”-Format: Notice of
Detention of a ship in Denmark
Appendix 5 Format: Report of inspection in accordance with Paris MOU on Port State
Control (FORM A) Danish Maritime Authority
Appendix 6 Format: Report of inspection in accordance with Paris MOU on Port State
Control (FORM B) Danish Maritime Authority
Appendix 7 Codes of Action taken on ships after Survey or Inspection
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 Mean fleet age for selected flags 1973-1980 12
Table 2 Mean fleet age for selected flags for 1984 11
Table 3 List of flag States with outstanding comments on Deficiency
Reports as at 1987 16
Table 4 Changes in loss rate fir each Member State pre/post 12 December
1982 38
Table 5 Ship Deficiencies from 1979-1988 38
Table 6 Loss rate for all Member States 1968-1986 39
Table 7 Status of Conventions (1-3) 70
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 Organisational structure of Paris MOU on Port State Control 43
Figure 2 Organisational chart: Nigerian Maritime Administration 57
Figure 3 Organisational chart: Nigerian MARAD-Policy and Operational
principles 58
Figure4 Organisational chart: National Maritime Authority 59
Figure 5 Organisational chart: Maritime Safety Department under NMA 63
Figure 6 Port State Control vicious circle chart 86
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CEMAC The Communa´aute econmique et mone´taire de I´Afrique Centrale
COC Certificate of Competency
COPO Captain of the Port Office in USA
COTP Coast Guard Captain of the Port in USA
DOC Document of Compliance
ECA Economic Commission for Africa
FFA Fire Fighting Appliances
FOC Flag of Convenience
FSI Flag States Implementation Sub-Committee of the IMO
GIS Government Inspectors of Shipping
GRT Gross Tonnage
IACS International Association of Classification Societies
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMO International Maritime Organisation
IOPP International Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate
ISID International Ship Information Database
ISM International Safety Management Code
LSA Life Saving Appliances
MARADS Maritime Administration(s)
MID Maritime Inspectorate Division
MINCOMAR Ministerial Conference of West and Central African States on
Maritime Transport
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MSA Maritime Safety Administration
MSIS Marine Safety Information System of the US
MSO Marine Safety Office of the US
NMA National Maritime Authority, Nigeria
NMFT No More Favourable Treatment Clause
NPA Nigerian Ports Authority, Plc
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PSC Port State Control
PSCO Port State Control Officer
PSCI Port State Control Implementation
SAR Search and Rescue
SMC Safety Management Certificate
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
VLCC Very Large Crude Oil Carrier Vessel
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
In the 1960s, and 1970s, world shipping underwent a period of near unlimited growth.
New maritime nations emerged and existing ones grew. Tonnage shifted between
hemispheres and when all this activity finally settled, a number of side effects were left.
One of the most damaging side effects of this spur of activity in the shipping industry
was that of marine pollution and marine casualties involving loss of life, numerous
international conventions dictating the responsibilities of Flag States in maritime law
applications were in force. However, these conventions has solved the problems of
marine pollution and safety of life at sea as required, because some Maritime
Administrations (MARADs) had not efficiently and effectively obliged their
responsibilities in this regard.
The development of the concept of port state control occurred at the time when world
shipping, particularly the oil transport trade, was at its lowest social regards. This study
traces the historical development of port state control, identifies current applications
and problems, and proposes the rationalisation of port state control enforcement under
the auspices of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in addition to the legal
basis of port state control and also port state control as a complementary part of flag
state control.
Administrations are responsible for taking the necessary measures to ensure that ships
flying their state flags comply with the relevant provisions of the safety conventions
such as surveys and certification.
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The Historical Development of Port State Control.
In 1967, the world was shocked when the Torrey Canyon spilled 100,000 tons of oil into
the sea. The world governments came together and two years later in 1969 signed the
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage. This Convention
only sought to make amends for disasters, not to correct them. Consequently, on
March 17, 1978, the world was shocked again when the 123,680 dwt Amoco Cadiz
spilled 230,000 tons of oil off the coast of Brittany, thereby polluting some 400
kilometres of coastline.
The total economic loss because of the Amoco Cadiz disaster was estimated at about
290 million US dollars in 1978. This amount is divided into several parts:
(a) the loss of the vessel and cargo, loss of recreational amenities, legal and research
costs, and damage to human hearth;
(b) emergency response, clean-up and environmental restoration costs, loss of noncommercial bio-mass and seabirds, loss of income from the business industry, loss
of personal property; and
(c) Reduced income for local government, secondary effects of reduced outputs in
various industries, and compensation paid by the national government to claimants for
the costs and losses incurred. There is no doubt that such massive spills have an even
greater impact on the entire world. Consequently, it is not surprising to see remedial
actions taken by international bodies, such as the IMO, to avert subsequent
occurrences in the future.
Another most damaging side effect of the flurry of activity in the shipping industry
concerns loss of life at sea. This is quantified by the fact that governments ratified the
International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea as far back as 1948. The problem of
loss of the life or safety of life in general is not deeply rooted in the maritime tradition of
all established maritime nations. It is a problem, which has always cut across flags,
and consequently all maritime nations have to bear some responsibility for alleviating
the problem. Nevertheless, in order to act, the scope of the problem must be first
identified.
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Substantive consideration of questions relating to the scope and nature of port state
control in connection with IMO conventions was first undertaken in IMO in 1974,
following the submission by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) of a document relating to control of flag-of-convenience ships. At
the time, the Maritime Safety Committee noted that IMO concerns with the control of
ships was primarily to prevent the operation of substandard ships, regardless of the
Flag under which such ships might be sailing. As a first step, the Maritime Safety
Committee developed recommended procedures for the control of ships under the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960 (SOLAS 1960) and the
International Convention on Load Lines (LL1966). The Assembly adopted these
procedures at its ninth regular session in 1975 by Resolution A.321 (IX) dated 16
December 1975.
These conventions in respect of combating the phenomenon of substandard ships
gave the right of contracting parties to inspect all foreign flag ships calling at their ports
and to take all measures necessary to eliminate any deficiency aboard posing a clear
hazard to safety or health. The convention implies that this right also included ships,
the flag states of which have not ratified the convention.
Definition of the Port State Control.
The port state control is the law, which provides the port state with jurisdiction over
foreign vessels in its internal waters. The specific port state power includes: –
1. The inspection of ships certificates,
2. Physical inspection of the ships
3. In addition, if warranted by evidence, detention of the ship.
The port state jurisdictions originated in the IMO convention and to a lesser extent, in
the ILO treaties. In accordance with the principles of international law, territorial
jurisdiction gives states the right to exercise control over foreign ships within their ports.
This right is qualified both by the concurrent jurisdiction of the port state and by the
obligations of the port state stemming from international law.
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From the historical point of view, the idea of control by the port state over foreign
flagged ships has been laid down in international conventions on maritime safety for a
substantial number of years. The Load Line marks of ships became operational in this
respect. In addition, the International Labour Organisation adopted in 1976 a
convention which also contains a port state control clause: the Merchant Shipping
(Minimum Standards) convention. J. Harninga(1976) said: “Port state control, as I see
it, is a continuing story indeed which progresses even so slowly, impulses every now
and then being given, as they unfortunately must, be spectacular disasters such as
those of the Torrey Canyon and the Amoco Cadiz”.
Legal Basis of Port State Control.
The concept of Port State Control has been laid down in a number of conventions
concerning safety of shipping and prevention of pollution for many years, including:
– The International Convention on Load Lines 1966(Article 21) (14),
– The International Convention for the Safety of life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS
Chapter 1, Regulation 19) (5),
– The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships 1973,
as modified by the Protocol 1978 relating thereto (Arts. 4, 5, 6 and 7) (6),
– The International Convention on Standards for Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers STCW 1978 (Arts. X (7),
– The Convention Concerning Minimum Standards in Merchant ships 1976
regarded as The ILO Convention No 147 (Art. 4) 18.
In addition, IMO has developed resolutions that include provision of the conventions
and guidelines of specific control procedures for port state control and in the case of
the Resolution A.542 (13) “Procedures of the control and discharges under Annex 1 of
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973/78 These
provisions and guidelines on specific procedures for port and coastal states control of
foreign ships visiting their ports or offshore terminals are constituted by IMO
Resolutions as follows:
Resolution A.466 (SII) adopted on 19 November 1981 “Procedures for the Control of
Ships”;
Resolution A.481 (XII) adopted on 19 November 1981 “Principles of Safe Manning”;
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Resolution A.542 (13) adopted on 17 November 1983 “Procedures for the Control of
Ships and Discharges” under Annex I of the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto.
Resolution A. 787 (19) adopted on 23 November 1995. ” Principles of Port State
Control” which amalgamates all the previous `Resolutions´. Most of the countries that
have established their port state control have adopted these instruments.
In related developments, port state control stated in different IMO conventions for
safety and Prevention of Pollution is consistent with the general principles of
international law. The right of a nation to board and inspect ships in its internal waters
is recognised. As F. L. Wiswall JR. 1986, “The essential implementation of all IMO
Conventions is by Flag State Control. The reason for this is maritime international
law that ship is held to be a veritable piece of the territory of the state whose flag she
flies, in the sense, then each ship is an ambassador of the flag state, and when she is
within foreign waters, the police powers of the port state with respect to her is limited by
customary limitations with respect to ambassadors and public ministers of foreign
states. Just as there are international legal rules of governance which authorise a host
state to examine the credentials of foreign ambassadors and public ministers, IMO
Conventional rules also authorise port states to validate and examine the credentials of
foreign ships, and just as improper conduct or criminal conduct may forfeit the limited
immunities of foreign dignitaries, also bad conduct on the part of a foreign ship may
forfeit the limited immunities which the port state is otherwise obliged to extend to her.
Thus, a ship in a foreign port is still governed within herself by the laws of the flag state
of the ship and in the absence of a direct, obvious and imminent. To other shipping or
to the port itself, safety is also a matter comprehended within the vessel herself, and
thus the controlling safety laws are those of the flag state of the ship and not those of
various port or coastal states. However, the IMO conventions have made some
changes to the extent that safety is no longer a matter entirely within the ship herself,
but is now a partial responsibility of the port state. The execution of some safety
conventions are the responsibility of the Flag States, the port state’s role is limited to
verification and to a limited degree, enforcement. That is why the issues of ship
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nationality, jurisdictions of Flag State and Port State come into play in international
safety conventions.
Port State Control as a complementary part of the Flag State Control
A ship is traditionally seen and accepted as a part of the country in which she is
registered otherwise as Flag State. Life is forged on board based on the sovereignty
and the laws of that country. The ship also flies the Flag of the country of registry
hence the word flag state. A flag state administration, therefore, is required to ensure
that ships registered in its territory are seaworthy and properly manned for safety. One
of the criticisms levelled against Flag of Convenience (FOC) is to maintain the
standards of ships that are registered under them. This usually results in an
unsatisfactory casualty record, posing danger to life and property in addition to the
marine environment.
The efforts of IMO to eradicate sub-standard ships with a view to realising its objectives
of “safer ships and cleaner oceans” have made the issues of port state control a
subject of increasing significance. In other words, the state IMO objectives will not be
only with an appropriate implementation and enforcement of all the obligations that a
contracting government assumes as a flag state without the implementation and
enforcement of the complementary part as a port state.
As Y. Sasamura (1994) said “Although it is the responsibility of Flag State to ensure
that ships flying their flags always comply with the provisions of the conventions, it may
sometimes be difficult for flag states to exercise full and continuous control over these
ships. In order to supplement these functions of flag states, the SOLAS. Load Lines
and MARPOL conventions provide for certain procedures the control of ships to be
exercised by port states”. The enforcement provisions of conventions by contracting
parties are, broadly speaking, divided into two categories, namely: –
(1) Enforcement by Administration (i.e., the government of the Flag State) which
includes surveys and certification of ships in respect of design, construction and
equipment; and
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(2) Enforcement by port states, which includes the control by port state control officers
of the construction of ships and equipment and the surveillance and detention of
discharges in contravention of the convention.
J. Courley (1981) said: “In consideration of arrangements for safety with pollution
prevention and control, an administration will be concerned with: –
(a) Its own ships (i.e., acting as a Flag State); and
(b) Foreign ships visiting its ports (i.e., acting as a port state). In an ideal
world, action as a port state would not be a major consideration as every
flag would ensure that its ships are operated at uniformly with standards
in accordance with agreed international contentions. However, the
conventions dictate what line of action is necessary to take.”
Consequently, a Flag State owes the world the primary duty to eradicate the number of
sub-standard ships on our seas; port state control acts a safety net as a deterrent.
Conventionally, port state control is an important element in achieving the eradication of
sub-standard ships world-wide since the safety of shipping, and hence the prevention
of accidents, is determined not just by establishing appropriate and adequate
international rules but, above all, by effective implementation and enforcement of those
rules. According to MARPOL and SOLAS, countries that are party to the convention
reserve the right to inspect ship visiting their ports inorder to ensure compliance to
international standards. Base on the issues of “compliance”, the port states have
established regional co-operation amongst themselves where the exchange of
information is carried out for enforcement of port state control.
Port State Enforcement of IMO Safety Conventions
By becoming a party to a convention in force, the Ports State enters a contract with all
flag state co-parties; this contract modifies the sovereign rights of the parties to it,
enhancing some and curtailing others. In the IMO, safety and prevention of pollution
conventions, the rights of the port states are enhanced because conventional
international law now establishes a standard procedure whereby they may board and
examine foreign merchant ships for safety and prevention of pollution defects, when
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those ships call at a port or place within the jurisdiction of the state. However, the
rights of a port state are also curtailed, because to comply with one conventional law,
they must follow specified procedures such as for examinations like the ones specified
in the following IMO conventions.
The convention for safety of life at sea – SOLAS 1974 emphasises “every ship holding
a certificate issued under regulation 12 or regulation 13 or Chapter 1 is subject in the
ports of the other contracting governments to control by officers duly authorised by
such governments in so far as this control is directed towards verifying that there is an
onboard valid certificates, and such certificates shall be accepted unless there are clear
grounds for believing that the conditions of the ship or of its equipment do not
correspond substantially with the particulars of that certificate. In this case, the officer
carrying out the control shall take such steps as will ensure that the ship shall not sail
until it can proceed to sea without danger to the passengers or the crew.
In the event of this control giving rise to an intervention of any kind, the officer carrying
our the control shall inform the consul of the country in which the ship is registered in
writing forthwith of all circumstances in which intervention was deemed to be necessary
and the facts shall be reported to the organisation. Also, it is expressed in the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ship 1973/1978 “A ship
required to hold a certificate is subject while in the ports or off-shore terminals under
the jurisdiction of a party to inspect the ship by officers duly authorised by the party
(port state).”
Such inspection shall be limited to verifying that there is on board a valid certificate,
unless there are clear grounds for believing that the conditions of the ship or its
equipment does not correspond substantially with the particulars of that certificate. In
that case, or if the ship does not carry valid a certificate, the port state carrying out the
inspection shall take such steps as will ensure that the ship shall not sail until it can
proceed to sea without presenting an unreasonable threat or harm to the marine
environment. That party (port state) may, however, grant such a ship permission to
leave the port or offshore terminal for the purpose of proceeding to the nearest
appropriate repair yard available.
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The International Convention on Load Lines 1966 expresses that port state control shall
be limited to the purpose of determining that the ship’s load corresponds with the
certificate and load line. In the International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, STCW 1978, port state control is
oriented towards verification that the proper certificates specified by the convention are
on board, and “such certificates shall be accepted unless there are clear grounds for
believing that certificate has been fraudulently obtained or that the holder of a
certificate is not the person to whom that certificate was originally issued”. It may be
discovered during the exercise of port state control that a certificate is absent, expired
or otherwise invalid, or that conditions do not accord with the particulars of the
certificate. In any of these cases, the convention limit the measure which may be
imposed by port states to those which ensure that the vessel obtains a valid certificate
or most conditions are brought into at least substantial compliance with the particulars
of the certificate. It is the exclusive responsibility of the Flag State of the ship to
impose penalties for violations of IMO safety and prevention of pollution conventions.
Thus it is clear that port states, which are parties to IMO safety and prevention of
pollution conventions, have been granted and accepted a limited responsibility for
enforcement.
The concept of Sub-Standard Ships
Owner and operator maintain ships of varying ages and sizes according to different
standards. Flag States national legislation often varies widely in terms of interpretation
and enforcement of safety standards. In the last few years, much effort has been put
into enforcing international regulations regarding construction equipment and manning
standards in the fight against oil pollution damage and safety of life. The term
“substandard ship” has been misunderstood and misinterpreted. It is easier to define a
substandard ship solely by a list of qualifying defects.
In general, a ship is regarded as “substandard” if the accommodation, machinery or
equipment such as life-saving appliances; radio communication and fire-fighting are
below the standards required by relevant conventions such as SOLAS, Load Lines,
COLREGS, ILO, etc. Furthermore reference is made to article 4 of the ILO convention
NO. 147, Section 3.7 of the Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control
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1982, Section III of IMO Resolution A.321 (IX) dated 16 December 1975 and Section 3
of IMO Resolution A.466 (SII) dated 19 November 1987. A ship shall be deemed to be
“substandard” if and when she has such deficiencies as are clearly hazardous to
safety, health or the environment on assessment of the non-compliance with relevant
technical, social or other safety standards applicable to the ship or her crew.
In another development, the failure of ships to meet required safety standards renders
the ship substandard. Substandardness can sometimes be construed in terms of
seaworthiness. In maritime law, seaworthiness has been defined as the “degree of
fitness which an ordinary, careful and prudent owner would require his vessel to have
as the commencement of her voyage, having regard to all the probable circumstances
of it.” A ship must be in good repair, for example, hull, and machinery, sufficiently.
Ballasted and manned by an efficient and competent crew. To achieve this end,
several internationally recognised minimum standards have been developed and
enforced by various maritime states through conventions and special agreements to
achieve global uniformity. A ship is substandard if it fails to meet these minimum
standards.
Consequently, the term “substandard ship” should not be confused with “open registry”
or “flag of convenience” ship because the Flag does not make the ship. Some studies
conducted on identifying potential polluters and criteria such as flag, age and size have
been used in the analysis. Of the three, the most commonly connected criteria are that
of the Flag. Unfortunately, the Flag is the variable factor in the interpretation of the
statistical information derived. The reason is simple. Vessels do not necessarily remain
in the same register throughout their service. If in any significant percentage of the
cases, the culprit(s) can change flag, this might obstruct the accuracy of the
information. The size of the vessel though a constant, can be misleading as well.
A poorly managed VLCC is probably just as likely to cause marine pollution as a poorly
maintained feeder tanker. The difference lies in the potential extent of the pollution
damage that could be caused. The age of a vessel, also a constant is by far the
singularly most accurate measure of any likelihood of pollution. Old ships, like any old
piece of machinery require constant and careful maintenance in order to perform
properly. The older the vessel, the more accident-prone it is. However, this does not
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cause pollution damage. Relatively new tankers have caused some of the major oil
spills in recent years. This is usually due to human error. As indicated earlier, one of
the criteria for seaworthiness is proper manning. A duly qualified crew is essential for
the safe navigation of any vessel.
Table 1
Mean fleet age for Selected flags 1984
Flag Brazil France Norway Denmark West
Germany
Sweden Spain Liberia World
Mean age 9.0 9.3 7.4 8.0 6.4 8.1 9.3 9.8 12.1
(Source: Lloyd’s Register Annual Casualty Statistical Returns, May 1987).
Table 2
Mean fleet age for selected flags from 1975-1980
Year Mean age Year Mean age
1975 16.3 1981 18.6
1976 18.5 1982 18.5
1977 20.0 1983 18.4
1978 19.4 1984 18.3
1979 19.3 1985 18.4
1980 18.6 1986 N/A.
(Source: Lloyd’s Annual Casualty Statistics Returns May
1987).
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In most maritime casualties reports human errors are solely responsible for accidents.
If any of the crew cannot carry out his duties as required of the voyage, the ship can be
regarded as substandard. However, if it cannot be concluded that a ship is made
substandard by the wrong judgement of the master or crew. It must follow then, that in
cases like that of Amoco Cadiz, Exxon Valdez, Khark V, Torry Canyon and Aragon, the
issue is not that of substandard but variables of malfunction (See Table 1). Some
maritime experts categorised substandard ships as follows:
(i) The absence of equipment or arrangement required by the international conventions,
(ii) Non-compliance of equipment or arrangement with relevant specifications of the
conventions.
In any event, statistics have shown that there are thousands of vessels plying the high
seas which are either substandard or have potentially serious deficiencies which would
render the vessels substandard. The effort to eliminate substandard ships has taken
several forms. There are individual remedial and punitive actions, as well as collective
actions in the form of conventions and port state control co-operative efforts. These
systems have been described in chapter VI of this thesis.
The elimination of substandard ships is a desirable goal for everyone, particularly in the
shipping industry, but the enforcement or the minimum standards is not an easy task.
Ordinarily, responsibility for enforcing the rules lies with the Flag States. However, it is
often nearly impossible for the Flag State to fully ensure that all its vessels comply with
the international standards. Open registries have often been singled out in this regard
because most vessels flying the flag of these states rarely call at the home port. The
more accurate explanation is that, most registries with large viable fleets have ships,
that do not call at the home port. Thus, the problem with enforcement of standards
does not lie in a lack of a “genuine link” or inadequate inspectorate; it lies in the everchanging movement pattern of ships.
No inspectorate, however large and efficient, can fully enforce standards. This is
evidenced by the loss ratio of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding member states,
which was worse than the world’s average for 1986. This analysis is not meant to
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defend open registries with less than admirable safety standards. It is an attempt to
form the non-political, non-economic, non-antagonistic factors surrounding substandard
ships, and the need to eliminate them.
In Europe, these pivotal groups, namely the shipowners, politicians and the electorate
recognised the need to eliminate substandard ships from European ports. These
groups recognised that a collective effort was needed in view of the above
consideration and identified the following motivating factors for immediate
implementation: –
(a) Economic pressure on the European shipping community from more
efficient or cheaper competitors;
(b) Growing awareness of the detrimental economic and political effects of
environmental pollution in industrialised countries of Europe;
(c) Globalisation of commerce and industry which has intensified and thus
forced politics to internationalise too (See Tables 1-3).
An independent assessment of the above factors leads to some rather interesting
hypotheses regarding the lucid movements by the European Nations concerted effort to
enforce international safety standards. The economic pressure on the European
shipping community can be attributed to the competitive cost advantage of flagging out
over tonnaging and protectionism. The comparative advantage of flagging out lies in
the lower crew costs and minimal or no taxation and minimum regulation.
The most attractive aspect of such crews lies in the strength of labour organisations.
Labour unions in the west are more organised and can pool greater collective
bargaining strength than their underdeveloped or developing country’s counterparts.
Flagging out gives the shipowner the opportunity to slash his operating cost and avoid
confrontation with powerful unions at the same time. Similarly, by flagging out the
owner can avoid high taxes and other operational costs.
The lack of serious competition for many years has led to complacency in European
shipping. Suddenly, faced with a major crisis, the European shipowners, unlike the
14
market-oriented Americans, failed to see that shipping today is not so much about
“cost-efficiency without sacrificing safety or quality” but rather “the ability to manage,
market and finance” that will deter whether a company can survive that market.
Following numerous incidents of environmental pollution, both land and sea-based,
Europe became increasingly aware of the detrimental economic and political effects of
environmental pollution. Green organisations in 1985 launched impressive antipollution campaigns, states passed numerous anti-pollution legislation and the
electorate preferred environmentally conscious candidates for political office. One of
the industries hit hard by this new anti-pollution fervour was the shipping industry.
Shipowners were forced by new safety regulations to employ expensive safety and
anti-pollution measures that drove their operational costs higher. As indicated earlier,
human error accounts for a majority of the large-scale marine pollution incidents. Here
too, technical solutions were found to correct human error.
The third motivation for implementing port state control was the intensification of
globalisation commerce and industry and the resulting internationalisation of politics.
Here again, the European shipowner was ill prepared to tackle new rules of the trade.
However, the European governments were first to recognised this new trend in 1982
and went ahead to forge new relationships. What was lacking was innovative ways to
reconstruct national structure to effectively compete in the new global market. This
was most evident in European-Far East relationships.
In Europe, the need to eliminate substandard ships was recognised with remarkable
success. Although the need was clear and concerted action was necessary, the
motivating factors, which eventually spurred this action, were misguided. The revival of
shipping in Europe would not entirely rest on uniformity of rules or applications.
European competitors need to reassess their relative position in the market and work
towards improving their competitive edge. The application of technical requirements on
shipowners is necessary in so far as the underlying reasons relate solely to the safety
of life and property at sea and marine pollution prevention is not a commercial venture.
Substandard ships are still a major concern in the shipping global market because the
potential horror of such ships nearly always has far-reaching consequences. The
15
efforts to eliminate them have taken the right direction in that national governments are
taking the initiative, both collectively and unilaterally, to identify such steps and restrict
their movements in port states within the scope of the relevant international
conventions and IMO regulations. Thanks to IMO, ILO and the likes, in this regard for
the innovations of safety culture in our oceans.
17
CHAPTER II
International Instruments on Port State Control
When talking about “PSC”, we often think that it is a new invention coming into being
with an IMO Resolution A.466 (XII) “procedures for the control of ships”, now
revoked by IMO Resolution A.787 (19) “Procedures for Port State Control”, and in
Europe with the implementation of the “Memorandum of Understanding on port state
control”. However, as we have had SOLAS Conventions for more than 50 years and
since the “Chapter I” in principle in all the conventions is and has been the same, we
can see that ships have been subject to port state control for many years. (See
Regulation 19 in Chapter I of SOLAS 1974 as amended). In addition to SOLAS,
there are many other instruments, which may be used in connection with port state
control. These international instruments are for the promotion and improvement of
maritime safety, prevention of pollution and seafarers social welfare, security. They
are used as a framework when carrying out port state control.
The 1974 SOLAS (Entered Into Force In Its Original Version 25 May, 1980)
SOLAS (Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea) 1978 protocol and later,
amendments to SOLAS 1974, laid down a comprehensive range of minimum
standards for the safe construction of ships and for the basic safety equipment (e.g.
fire protection, navigational, life-saving and radio) to be carried on board. The
convention also contains operational instruments, particularly on emergency
procedures, and proves for regular surveys and certificates of compliance.
Application:
It applies to the passenger ships irrespective of size and all cargo ships of a 500
gross tonnage and above engaged in international voyages. In everyday language
these ships are called “convention ships”. However, the convention does not apply
to:
18
1. Warships or troop ships,
2. Cargo ships with a gross tonnage less than 500.
3. Ships not propelled by mechanical means,
4. Wooden ships of primitive build,
5. Pleasure yachts not engaged in trade,
6. Fishing vessels
Chapters IV & V “Safety of Navigation”, however, apply to all ships, Chapter VI
“carriage of cargoes” applies to all ships, and Chapter VII “carriage of dangerous
goods” applies also to ships with a gross tonnage less than 500. Further, Chapter
VIII “Nuclear Ships” applies to all nuclear ships.
The SOLAS port state control regulation
Regulation 19 of Chapter I contains a right, but not an obligation, for Port State
Control officers to verify that there are valid safety certificates on board ship. The
certificates should be accepted unless there are clear grounds for believing that the
condition of a ship or of its equipment does not correspond substantially with the
particulars of the relevant certificate. A “No More Favourable Treatment Clause”
(NMFT clause) is not contained in regulation 19, but it can be found in Article 11(3)
of the 1978 Protocol.
In SOLAS, Chapter I, regulation 6(c) it is stated that an Administration nominating
surveyors or recognising organisations to conduct inspections and surveys as
stipulated in the SOLAS convention shall, as a minimum, empower them to require
repairs to a ship and carry out inspections and surveys if requested by appropriate
authorities of a port state. For many years there has been a dispute between
administrations and organisations (classification societies) about how to act when a
ship is detained in port or if a port state intervenes in some way or another. The
author wishes to emphasise this in this paragraph because it contains the relevant
instruments for administration and Classification Societies in connection with
“Delegation”.
This means that if ones own administration nominates a classification society to
carry out inspection on your behalf, it must give the authority to the organisation to
require rectification. If a Port State notifies for instance the classification society for
ship survey, this organisation must come on board immediately without waiting for
19
orders from the master or owner or even the Flag State. This is misinterpreted by
many. Another regulation, which shall be mentioned here, is Regulation II, Chapter I
of the SOLAS convention “Maintenance of condition after survey”. In this regulation,
it is stated that “the condition of the ship and its equipment shall be maintained to
conform with the provisions of the present regulations to ensure that the ship in all
respects will remain fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or persons on
board”. This means that the shipowner himself, or through the master, must ensure
that the ship always complies with all regulations. It is also stated that whenever an
accident occurs to a ship or a defect is discovered, the master or owner of the ship
shall report at the earliest opportunity to the administration or the recognised
organisation responsible for issuing the relevant certificate. It is unacceptable if a
ship comes into a port and afterwards the ship is found to be unseaworthy, the
certifying authority, often the classification society is reproached for not having
fulfilled their obligation. In this connection, it must be emphasised that at first it is the
shipowner, who is responsible for the ship’s maintenance etc. Further, the owner is
to ensure that the ship in all respects always complies with all the regulations and
that it is always fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or persons on board.
Secondly, responsibility falls on the Flag State, but as Flag States can not control
everything, such implementation are more or less only “pseudo responsible”. The
Flag States of course, are responsible for the certification, which have been issued,
especially just after inspection. It is the inspection body who must see to it that the
shipowner has ensured that everything is in order. If during the inspection, the
inspection body does not observe a deficiency then it can be blamed for not having
seen it but the owner is responsible if something is wrong. It is therefore, in the
author’s opinion, when talking about Port State Control very important that any party
involved is fully aware of what the regulations are supposed to cover.
The International Convention on Load Lines (ILC) 1966 (entered into force 21
July 1968)
The ILC 1966 Annex I “Regulations for determining Load Lines” established uniform
principles and rules with respect to the limits to which ships or international voyages
may be loaded. Concerning, the structural strength of the ship Annex I regulation 1
refers to the requirements of the classification societies. A similar reference entered
into force in the SOLAS Convention on 1st July 1998.
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Application:
The convention applies to all ships except:
a) Ships of war,
b) New ships less than 24 meters in length,
c) Existing ships of a gross tonnage less than 150,
d) Pleasure yachts not engaged in trade, and
e) Fishing vessels.
COLREG 1972/1981 (entered into force 15 July 1983).
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972,
and the 1981 amendments (COLREG 1972/1981). In everyday language, COLREG
lays down the basic “Rules of the Road” governing traffic at sea, including rights of
way, safe speeds, action to avoid collision, procedures to be observed in narrow
channels and in restricted visibility, and signals to be used to warn of manoeuvres. In
the annex to COLREG, requirements are laid down for:
• positioning and technical details of lights and shapes,
• additional signals for fishing vessels, fishing in close proximity,
• technical details of sound signal appliances, and
• distress signals.
Application
The Rules apply to all vessels on the high seas and in all waters navigable by seagoing vessels. As regards the COLREG control regulation, there are no articles or
regulations on control in COLREG. However, the carriage requirements are checked
within the framework of SOLAS (see SOLAS regulations 1/7 and 8).
21
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973
(MARPOL) and the 1978 Protocol related thereto- (MARPOL 73/78).
The convention covers all the technical aspects of pollution from ships, except
disposal of land generated wastes into the sea by dumping. This is covered by a
separate convention. It applies to ships of all types including High Speed Craft, and
submersible, floating craft and fixed or floating platforms operating in the marine
environments.
The convention consists of six Annexes (Annex Six is yet to enter into force as at
September 1999), two protocols dealing respectively with reports on incidents
involving harmful substances and arbitration. These Annexes include:
Annex I: Regulations for the prevention of Pollution by Oil. (Entered into force 2
October 1983).
Annex II: Regulations for the control of Pollution by Noxious liquid substances in
bulk (Entered into force 6 April 1987).
Annex III: Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Harmful substances carried
by sea in Packaged forms, or in Freight containers, Portable tanks or
Road and Rail Tank Wagons. (Entered into force 1 July 1992).
Annex IV: Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution of Sewage from ships.
Note: The countries around the Baltic Sea put this Annex into force
since 3 May 1990, at Helsinki, Finland (Helcom Agreement).
Annex V: Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Garbage from ships.
(Entered into force 31 December 1988).
Annex VI: Regulations for the control of air pollution. (Yet to enter into force).
Application:
The MARPOL Convention applies to all ships with the following modifications: The
convention shall not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary or other ships owned or
operated by a state and used, for the time being, only on government noncommercial service. However, each party shall ensure by the adoption of
appropriate measures not impairing the operations or operational capabilities of such
ships owned or operated by it that such ships act in a manner consistent, so far as is
reasonable and practicable, with the present convention. (External from Article 3 in
the MARPOL 1973 convention).
22
The MARPOL control regulation.
Article 5 of the Convention authorises port states to verify that there are valid
certificates and other relevant Documents on board ships in ports or offshore
terminals. The“ No More Favourable Treatment (NMFT)” can be found in Article 5(4)
in the MARPOL Convention).
The International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969
(Tonnage ´69) (entered into force 18 July 1982 for new ships and 18 July 1994
for existing ships).
The text of the Annex of the Convention establishes a universal system of tonnage
measurement for ships particularly Articles 4 & 6 respectively. Tonnage ´69 includes:
a) Regulations for determining Gross and Net Tonnage of ships.
b) International Tonnage Certificate.
Application:
It applies to ships engaged on International voyages except for:
a) War ships, and
b) Ships of less than 24 meters (79 feet ) in length,
For more detailed description of the application and the exceptions, Articles 3 & 4 of
the Convention are explicit enough for that purpose.
The Tonnage Control Regulation
This section is intended as additional information only. The “inspection” article is in
Article 12. However, it must be remembered that this convention is not a “Safety
Convention”, and TONNAGE´69 is seldom mentioned and used in connection with
Port State Control. However, that the transitional period of 12 years for the
application of the convention on existing ships expired on 18 July 1994.
As ship gross tonnage is the key for the surveyor to establish which requirements
are applicable to the ship, logically it is one of the first certificates, requested in
connection with the Port State Control inspection. In the period, just after 18 July
1994, many ships encountered problems in the ports, especially those built before
23
1982 and those built after 1982, which have been measured in accordance to the
principles laid down in IMO resolution A.494 (XII). Ships continue to run into
problems (March 1999) around the world due to lack of proper information (training).
In this resolution, it has been possible to continue to measure ships in accordance to
the existing or old rules. It means that ships built before 18 July, 1994 continue, if
they are of a gross tonnage less than 1600, to be equipped and built in accordance
with the regulations applicable to a ship of that particular size under the old tonnage
rules. It will often be the ships with a gross tonnage of 499 and 1599, in the socalled paragraph ships, which give problems. It is therefore, very important in
connection with Port State Control that inspectors use their common sense and
solve the problems in a pragmatic way.
Of course, no one must accept a certificate issued fraudulently. If this is the case,
the issuing authority must be informed immediately that the port state will not accept
the certificate and the reason why the certificate is not accepted. Note that a ship,
which has been measured in accordance to the ‘older’ rules, must have the following
text written on the ship’s entire “safety and pollution prevention” certificate: “The
above Gross Tonnage is according to the measurement system previously in force in
the International convention of Ships, 1969”. (For further clarification read the remark
column of the Valid International Tonnage Certificate (1969).
Furthermore, the new tonnage certificate should have the following text written
under the heading “Remarks”. The ship is re-measured according to article 3(2)(d)
of the 1969 Tonnage convention. The Gross Tonnage according to the
measurement system previously in force is 24 GRT (CF IMO Resolution A.758 (18),
if the ship is built before 18 July 1982. The ship is additionally measured according
to resolution A.494 (XII). However, Article 6 says, “the determination of gross and
net tonnage shall be carried out by the Administration which may entrust such
determination either to persons or organisation recognised by it”. In any case, the
Administration concerned shall accept full responsibility for the determination of
gross and net tonnage.
The International Labour Organisation (Ilo) 147 Convention (Merchant
Shipping Minimum Standards Entered Into Force 28 November 1981).
24
ILO 147 Convention required administrations to have effective legislation on safe
manning standards, hours of work, seafarers’ competency, and social security in
addition to employment standards equivalent to those contained in a range of ILO
instruments. For example, the minimum age, accident prevention, crew
accommodation, repatriation, social security, training. The convention is primarily a
Flag State instrument but it also includes Port States responsibilities.
Application:
The convention applies to every sea-going ship, whether publicly or privately owned
which is engaged in the transport of cargo or passengers for the purpose of trade or
is employed for any other commercial purposes. However, National laws or
regulations shall determine when ships are to be regarded as sea-going ships for
the purpose of this convention. The convention applies to sea-going tugs, but does
not apply to:
a) Ships primarily propelled by sail, whether or not they are filled with
auxiliary engines,
b) Ships engaged in fishing or in whaling or in similar pursuits, and
c) Small vessels and vessels such as oil rigs and drilling platforms when not
engaged in navigation. The decision as to which vessels are covered by
this sub-paragraph to be taken by the competent authority in each
country in consultation with representative organisations of shipowners
and seafarers.
In everyday language, it is said that the convention applies to merchant ships.
The ILO 147 control regulation:
The control regulation is in Article 4.states:
Generally it can be said that it allows an administration to apply its provisions
(including the power of detention) to any ship which calls at its ports, whether or not
the ships Flag State has ratified the convention. This is in view of the application of
No More Favourable Treatment to non-Convention ships.
The appendices to ILO 147 include the following:
25
1. Conventions relevant for the inspection on board (the “hard ware”
conventions).
a) The minimum age convention, 1975 (no. 138), or
The minimum age (Sean) convention (revised), 1936 No. 58, or
The minimum age (Sean) convention 1920 (no. 7).
b) The Medical Examination (seafarers) convention, 1946 (no. 73).
c) The Prevention of Accidents (seafarers) convention, 1970 (no. 134)
(Articles 4 and 7).
d) The Accommodation of crews convention (revised), 1949 (no. 92);
e) The food and catering (ship crews) convention, 1946 (no. 68) (Article 5);
f) The officers competency certificates convention, 1936 (no. 53) (Articles 3
and 4).
2. Conventions relevant in the framework of the provisions for PSC. (the “soft
ware”):
a) The seamen’s article of agreement convention, 1926 No.22;
b) The repatriation of seamen convention, 1926 (no.23);
c) The shipowner’s liability (sick and injured seamen) convention, 1936
(no.53); or the medical care and sickness benefits convention, 1960 (no.
130);
d) The freedom of association and protection of the right to organise
convention, 1948 (no. 87);
e) The right to organise and collective bargaining convention, 1949 (no. 98).
As the merchant Shipping (minimum standards) Convention primarily is a Flag State
instrument only those conventions mentioned under No. 1 above, will be applied on
board in connection with Port State Control. However, those mentioned under No.2,
will be used in the framework of the provisions of a PSC complaint report received
from the Flag State, which is supposed to investigate such matters.
26
The STCW 1978 Convention (Entered Into Force 28 April 1984) & (The 1995
Amendments Entered Into Force 1 February 1997)
STCW (Convention on Standards of Training and Watchkeeping for Seafarers)
1978, lays down extensive certification and qualifications requirements (including
syllabuses and sea time) for senior officers; all officers in charge of watches in the
deck, engine and radio departments and ratings forming part of a watch. All
seafarers will be required to have a certificate endorsed in a uniform manner. It
also specifies basic principles to be observed in keeping deck and engine watches
and special qualification requirements for personnel on oil, chemical and liquefied
gas tankers.
The 1995 amendments to the International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) 1978 entered into force on 1
February 1997. One of the major features of the amendments is the adoption of a
new STCW Code, to which many technical regulations have been transferred. Part
A of the Code is mandatory while part B is recommended. Dividing the regulations
up in this way makes administrations easier and it will also make the task of revising
and updating them more simples. For procedural and legal reasons there is no
need to call a full conference to make changes to the code(s).
One important amendment adopted by the 1995 conference concerns chapter 1
(General provisions). It includes enhanced procedures concerning the exercise of
Port State Control, which have been developed to allow intervention in the case of
deficiencies deemed to pose a danger to persons, property or the environment.
Measures have also been introduced for watchkeeping personnel to prevent fatigue.
Until 1 February 2002, however, parties may continue to issue, recognise and
endorse certificates, which applied before date in respect of seafarers that began
training or seagoing service before 1 August 1998.
Application
The convention applies to seafarers serving on board seagoing ships entitled to fly
the flag of a party except to those serving on board:
a) Warships, etc.,
27
b) Fishing vessels,
c) Pleasure yachts not engaged in trade, or
d) Wooden ships of primitive built.
The STCW Control Regulation:
The control regulation is in Article X, and the “NMFT clause” is in the same Article.
Note: that parties to the convention will be required to submit proved detailed
information to IMO concerning administrative measures taken to ensure compliance
with the convention.
The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), IMO’s Senior Technical Body, will use this
information, to identify parties that are able to demonstrate that they can give full
and complete effect to the convention. Other parties will then be able to accept that
certificates issued by these parties are in compliance with the convention. This
regulation is regarded as particularly important because it means that governments
will have to establish that they have the administrative, training and certification
resources necessary to implement the convention.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS´ 82)
On 10 December 1982 the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was
opened for signature at Montego Bay, Jamaica. More than 150 countries
representing all regions of the world participated. These countries convened for the
purpose of establishing a comprehensive regime “dealing with all matters relating to
the Law of the sea bearing in mind that the problem of ocean space are closely
interrelated and need to be considered as a whole”.
The convention is multi-faceted and represents a monument to international cooperation in the treaty making process. The need to elaborate a new and
comprehensive regime for the law of the sea was perceived and the international
community expressed its collective will to co-operate in this effort on a scale the
magnitude of which was unprecedented in treaty history. The law comprises 320
articles and nine annexes, governing all aspects of ocean space delimitation to
environmental control, scientific research, economic and commercial activities,
technology and the settlement of disputes relating to ocean matters.
28
Article 218 “Enforcement by Port States” allows a state to undertake investigations
on any vessel within its port or at an off-shore terminal, where the evidence so
warrants, institute proceedings in respect of any discharge from the vessels outside
the internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of that state in
violation of applicable international rules and standards established through the
competent international organisations or general diplomatic conferences.
Article 226- “Investigation of Foreign Vessels.
States should not delay a foreign vessel longer than is essential for purposes of the
investigations provided for in articles 216, 218 and 220. Any physical inspection of
a foreign vessel shall be limited to an examination to such certificates, records or
other documents as the vessel is required to carry by generally accepted
international rules and standards or of any similar documents which it is carrying,
further physical inspection of the vessel may be undertaken only after such an
examination and only when:
(a) There are clear grounds for believing that the condition of the vessel or its
equipment does not correspond substantially with the particulars of those
documents;
(b) the contents of such documents are not sufficient to confirm or verify a
suspected violation; or
(c) The vessel is not carrying valid certificates and records.
(d) If investigation indicates a violation of applicable laws and regulations or
international rules/standards for the protection and preservation of the marine
environment, release shall be made promptly subject to reasonable procedures
such as bonding or other appropriate financial security.
The IMO Resolution A.481 (XII): “Principles of Safe Manning”:
Safe manning is a function of the number of qualified or experienced seafarers
necessary for the safety of the ship, crew, passengers, cargo and property and for
the protection of the marine environment. In other words, and according to ILO
109, Art. 21and SOLAS Chapter V states that: “Every ship. Must be sufficiently,
efficiently and safely manned”. However, IMO Resolution A.481 (XII) was adopted
on 19 November 1981 and contains two annexes.
29
Annex 1. Contents of Minimum Safe Manning Document.
Annex 2. Guidelines for the application of principles of Safe Manning, in particular
a catalogue of certain capabilities necessary for keeping an orderly
navigational or engine room watch.
The resolution calls upon member governments to ensure that every ship to which
the 1978 STCW convention applies, will carry on board at all times a Minimum Safe
Manning Document, issued by the Flag State Administration specifying the
minimum safe manning required for the ship concerned. Furthermore, member
governments are urged, when exercising port state control functions in respect of
foreign flagships, to consider conforming of the actual circumstances aboard with
the information given in the Ship’s Minimum Safety Manning Documents as
evidence that the ship is safely manned.
The IMO Resolution A.787 (19) “Procedures for Port State Control” adopted
on 23 November 1995
This resolution provides basic guidance on the conduct of port state control
inspections and affords consistency in the conduct of these inspections, the
recognition of deficiencies of a ship, its equipment, or its crew, and the application
of control procedures. These procedures apply to ships which come under the
provisions of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as
amended (SOLAS 74), the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 (Load
Lines 1966), the International Convention for the Regulation of Pollution from ships,
1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, as amended (MARPOL
73/78), the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as amended (STCW 78), and the International
Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969 (ITC 69). Ships of nonparties or below convention size shall be given no more favourable treatment as
stated earlier.
In exercising Port State Control, parties will only apply those provisions of the
conventions which are in force and which they have accepted. If a Port State
exercises port state control based on the International Labour Organisation (ILO)
No. 147, “Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976”, guidance on
the conduct of such control inspections is given in ILO publication, “Inspection of
Labour Conditions on Board Ships: Guidelines for Procedures”. Under the
30
provisions of the applicable conventions noted above, the Administration (Flag
State) is responsible for promulgating laws and regulations and for taking all other
steps which may be necessary to give the applicable conventions full and complete
effect so as to ensure that, from the point of view of safety of life and pollution
prevention, a ship is fit for the service for which it is intended and seafarers are
qualified and fit for their duties.
In some cases it may be difficult for the administration to exercise full and
continuous control over some ships entitled to fly the flag of its state, for instance
those ships which do not regularly call at a port of the Flag State. The problem can
be, and has been, partly overcome by appointing inspectors at foreign ports and/or
authorising recognised organisations to act on behalf of the flag state
administration. These control procedures should be regarded as complementary to
national measures taken by administrations of flag states in their countries and
abroad and are intended to provide Helpance to Flag State administrations in
securing compliance with convention provisions in safeguarding the safety of crew,
passengers and ships, and ensuring the prevention of pollution. In other words, flag
state control must be self-sustainable here. The authorities of port states should
make attentive use of adequate provisions for the purpose of identifying
deficiencies, if any, in such ships which may render them substandard by ensuring
that remedial measures are taken (See Appendix 3: IMO Resolution A. 787 (19)-
Section 4.1 for more details).
Application of International Instruments
Elaboration has been done on a number of international conventions, which are
used in connection with PSC. It is obvious that PSC, with reference to a certain
convention, is only possible if the Port State itself is party to it and has fully
implemented the conventions in related thereto. However, it is relevant to recall that
international conventions are only binding on member states which ratify them, and
which by national legislation give effect to such conventions. Nevertheless, there
has been a tendency to consider that multilateral treaties have a higher legal validity
than bilateral treaties. Multilateral Treaties sometimes are regarded as “lawmaking”.
There is of course also a certain psychological pressure on States, if they are
amongst only a few, who have not ratified a certain convention. Often ships flying
31
the flag of a state that is not a party to a certain convention comply with the
requirements in the convention in any case in order to avoid trouble in the ports of
member states where the “NMFT clause” is put into force.
Ship owners of ships flying “non-party flag” often make a request to a classification
society with the purpose of getting a document issued which states that the ship
complies with certain requirements; let us say MARPOL for example. Such a
document is called a “letter of compliance”. However, as the conventions become
more and more global the above example will be rare in the future. There is a trend
that in the future such “letters of compliance” will not be accepted irrespective of the
matter is dealt with in chapter 1.5 of IMO Resolution A.787 (19) “Procedures for Port
State Control”. Even if we all agree upon the importance of what is covered in the
expression: Safer ships and Cleaner oceans, we have to admit (if we are objective)
that the previous mentioned pressures do produce what can be called a Creeping
Jurisdiction.
This means that after a maritime convention has entered into force, then, even if it
is not a requirement from a ship’s Flag State, almost all ship owners try to
implement the requirements in question so as to avoid trouble due to the “NMFT
clauses”. A “No More Favourable Treatment Clause” (NMFT Clause) has
sometimes been subject of discussion, as to whether the clause is in accordance
with the principles of “International Law”. The author’s opinion is that, if a port state
makes use of or makes reference to the “NMFT clause”, then, such a state should
have legislation, which explicitly permits the relevant steps to be taken. A “NMFT
clause” should never be used if it is implemented within the framework of a
technical standard by secondary legislation only.
32
CHAPTER III
The Port State Control in Europe and the Paris
Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control.
The Agreement of the Memorandum of Understanding
In Western Europe on January 26, 1982 after the sad fact of the founded AMACO CADIZ in
March 1978, more stringent commitments on Port State Control were felt to be necessary
over the first step to a co-ordinated and harmonised Port State Control, resulting in the MOU
of 1978 with respect to the Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in Europe.
The new Memorandum had to cover these main themes.
– Safety at sea
– Prevention of pollution by Ships
– Living and co-ordination on board.
It is said: “The main underlying reason for the MOU’s birth was of course that we cannot
afford substandard shipping threatens our ports and the environment.” Therefore, on this
date of January 26 1982, the maritime countries of 14 European nations reached in
understanding which came into effect in July 1982 that each would maintain an effective
system of Port State Control with a view to flag, foreign merchant ships visiting the ports of
its state comply with instruments laid down in various international conventions.
As Iain Sproat(1982) said “The Paris Memorandum, signed by fourteen European Maritime
Authorities established with effect from 01 July 1982, a harmonised and co-ordinated system
33
for inspection of 25% of foreign ships calling at European ports, in short, discrimination as
to flag, for the purpose of detecting which fail to meet standards laid down in international
conventions on safety, manning and pollution prevention, securing the verifications of
deficiencies one discouraging the operation of sub-standard vessels”. The charter of the
Memorandum of Understanding is the agreement on a number of commitments and
procedures that are directly related to the internationally adopted instruments.
What has been laid down in International Convention as a right for Port State Control is,
namely, to inspect foreign flagships on the basis of the convention which has been taken up
as a commitment, but is to be applied in a harmonised way. An effective information system
must take care of information on inspections made by each authority in order to avoid
repetition. As A. J. Cowley puts it “The Memorandum of Understanding on Port States,
which has concluded in Paris in January 1982, is a followship to the earlier discussions on
harmonised Port State Control, which stated in 1976. The authorities concerned decided to
accept stranger and clearly defined commitments on the number of inspections of Foreign
Flag Ships by each of the participating maritime authorities and to pay much greater
attention to the mutual exchange of information on inspected ships in order to avoid
duplication of inspections. Furthermore, the authorities decided to apply only those
conventions which have been ratified by the Port State Control involved and which have
entered into force”.
Because the information system about inspections is important in the Port State Control
under the MOU, the ship receives a Port State inspection report after inspection. If there is
no obvious inspections in the region, there could be duplications on inspections. This shows
the importance of the Port State information system in MOU in which results of inspections
are stored without delay, and in which ships´ names are deleted after a six month period until
another inspection of the ship is made. The MOU stated “each authority will consult, cooperate and exchange information with the other authorities in order to further the aims of
the Memorandum”. The aim of the MOU was initially to achieve an annual inspection rate
of 25% of the individual ships entering a country.
According to the text of MOU the partners should have each achieved, by 01 July 1985, an
annual total of inspections corresponding to 20% of the estimated number of individual
34
foreign merchant ships which entered their ports in a year. The ship that has been inspected
in another Port State Control partner’s port according to the text of the MOU, should in
principle, be left alone for six months. The MOU stated “the Authorities will seek to avoid
inspecting ships which have been inspected by any of the other Authorities within the
previous six MOUs, unless they have clear ground for another inspection”. Taken into
consideration that most of the ships in the region enter more than one port and more than one
regional state within the size MOU´s period, most of the ships visiting the region will be
inspected by a Port State Control at least once a year.
Relevant Instruments of Memorandum of Understanding
In order to maintain an effective system of Port State Control with a view to ensuring that,
without discrimination of flag, foreign merchant ships visiting the ports of its state comply
with instruments laid down in the various international conventions; that was why the 14
European nations signed the MOU. Those instruments are as follows:
– The International Convention on Load Lined, 1966
– The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974
– The Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea, 1974;
– The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as
modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto;
– The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978;
– The Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972;
– The Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standard) Convention, 1976 (ILO Convention 147).
It was also stated in the Memorandum that each authority would apply those relevant
instruments which are in force and which its state has accepted. An instrument so amended
would then be considered to be the “relevant instrument” for that authority.
As J. Cowley (1985) said “It is important to note that the Memorandum is thus in no way
contradictory to the contents of internationally agreed maritime conventions in IMO and
ILO. The authorities only implement the standards and procedures of those Conventions in a
35
harmonised way. It is believed that such harmonisation is important not only for the
shipping of the region states but also for the International Shipping Community”.
The “No More Favourable Treatment (NMFT) Clause
It is stated in the relevant instruments SOLAS Protocol (article II-3), MARPOL 1973/78
(article 5-(4)), and STCW 1978 (article 5), the clause of no more favourable treatment. In
the STCW Convention it is stated that “No More Favourable Treatment” shall be given to
ships entitled to fly the flag of a non-party than is given to ships entitled to fly the flag is a
Party”. In a MARPOL 1973/78 it is stated that “with respect to the ships of non-parties to
the convention, Parties shall apply the requirements of the MARPOL 1973/78 Convention as
may be necessary to ensure that no more favourable treatment is given in such ships”.
In the Memorandum of Understanding this clause is also stated and it has agreed that “In
applying a relevant instrument for the purpose of Port State Control, the authorities will
ensure that no more favourable treatment is given to ships entitled to fly the flag of the state
which is no Party to that instrument”. In this respect, J. Cowley emphasised that “the no
more favourable treatment clause is like wise based upon the internationally agreed
instruments. The committee it unanimously of the opinion that the “no more favourable
treatment clause” should only apply with respect to those instruments which themselves
contain such provision, notably in and only in SOLAS and its Protocol 1978, MARPOL
1973/78 and STCW 1978. It is a condition that these instruments are in force and have been
ratified by the Port State exercising the inspection. But, the ships of non-parties to the
relevant international conventions would thus be treated no differently nor more severely
than by any other individual party to the convention”.
Who conducts Port State Control Inspection in the European
Countries?
The Port State Control inspection “in European countries is conducted by the same persons
who conduct national inspections that constitute part of the national shipping inspection
service in their country. So apart from conducting inspections on their national ships, they
36
also conduct Port State inspections, which by definition is only done on foreign ships”. The
MOU states that “Inspections will be carried out by properly qualified persons authorised for
that purpose by the authority concerned and acting under its responsibility”. Port State
Control surveys must have no direct commercial interest vested in either the ports, or the
ships where inspections in accordance to the IMO instruments are carried out. The IMO
Resolution A.787 (19), chapter 2.5 deals with these requirements.
Inspections Procedures, Rectification and Detention
In selecting the ships for inspection, the surveyor is Helped by the daily list of incoming
ships (issued by the port authorities) and the MOU list of ships which have been inspected
during the previous six months. This is made by means of an online terminal from the
district to the MOU computer centre in France in due time. After comparison of these two
lists the choice of ships to be inspected is regardless of flag or owner. As indicated in the
MOU, special attention is also paid to ships, which may present a special hazard, for instance
oil tankers and gas and chemical carriers; and also ships that have had several records of
deficiencies.
When conditioning an inspection under the terminal of the MOU, the surveyors first check
the ship’s documentation. If the ship’s certificates are invited or incomplete, or if the
surveyor has clear grounds for believing the conditions of the ship and its equipment do not
correspond substantially with the particulars on the certificate, he will use his professional
judgement in deciding whether, clear grounds Help to conduct a more detailed inspection.
The Memorandum of Understanding stated as “clear grounds” inter alias the following:
– a report or notification by another authority;
– a report or complaint by the master, a crew member, or any person or organisation of the
ship, shipboard living and making conditions or the prevention of pollution, unless the
authority concerned deems the report or complaint to manifestly impounded;
– Other indications of serious deficiencies”.
If after the detailed inspection it is discovered that the ship does not comply with the
appropriate international standards, steps are taken to rectify the deficiencies. In the case of
37
serious deficiencies, which are clearly hazardous to safety, health or environment, the ships
may be delayed or detained until they are corrected. The MOU stated further that “in the
case of deficiencies which are clearly hazardous to safety, health or environment, the
authority will ensure that the hazard is removed before the ship is allowed to proceed to sea
and for this purpose will take appropriate action, which may include detention. The
Authority will, as soon as possible, notify the Flag State through its consul or, in his absence,
its nearest diplomatic representative or its maritime authority of the action taken”.
After the inspection, a report is always left on board as information to the master and as
proof that the ship has been inspected, also in the case of deficiencies that led to the
detainment of the ship. The details of every inspection are directly sent to the computer in
France by telex, in order that the MOU has the inspection list as up to date as possible. This
computerised regional information system for the rapid exchange of information and for
statistical purposes considerably reduces the chances of duplication of inspections.
The Memorandum also established that where deficiencies cannot be remedied in the port of
inspection, the authority may allow the ship to proceed to another port, subject to any
appropriate conditions determined by the authority with a view to ensuring that ships can so
proceed without an unreasonable danger to safety, health or environment. In such
circumstances the authority will notify the competent authority of the Region State where the
next port of call of the ship is situated, the parties mentioned in 3.7 of the MOU, and any
other authority as appropriate.
The Memorandum stated that “when exercising control under the Memorandum, the
authorities will make all possible efforts to avoid unduly detaining or delaying a ship”, and
also stated that nothing in the Memorandum affects rights created by provisions of relevant
instruments relating to compensation for under detention or delay”.
38
Table 4:
Changes in loss rate for each Member State
Pre/Post December 12, 1982
Member State Loss rate 1968-
1982
Loss rate 1983-
1986
Absolute
Change
Relative
Change (%)
B 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100
DK 0.16 0.03 -0.13 -81
SF 0.19 0.06 -0.13 -68
F 0.10 0.03 -0.07 -70
D 0.12 0.06 -0.06 -50
GR 0.98 1.11 +0.13 +13
IRL 0.17 0.01 -0.16 -94
I 0.30 0.11 -0.19 -63
NL 0.21 0.05 -0.16 -76
N 0.14 0.21 +0.07 +50
P 0.28 0.02 -0.26 -93
E 0.46 1.12 -0.66 +143
S 0.10 0.01 -0.09 -90
GB 0.11 o.27 +0.16 +145
(Source: Lloyd’s Register Annual Returns for the years 1968-1985, Monthly Shipping
Statistics, May 1987 for the year 1986 [51]).
Table 5
DEFICIENCIES FROM 1979 TO 1988
PERIOD
NO. OF REPORTS PARIS
MEMBERS
OUTSTANDING
REPORTS
Nov. 1978-Mar. 1979 43 28 6
Apr. 1979- Dec. 1979 84 58 1
July 1980-Sept. 1980 18 10 9
Oct.1980-Oct. 1981 194 170 9
Oct. 1981-Dec. 1982 438 413 37
Jan. 1983-Oct. 1983 281 236 40
July 1984-June 1985 186 157 18
Sept. 1985-Nov. 1986 179 163 _
TOTAL 1610 1375 129
(Source: IMO, MSC Annual Report 1987.London: IMO).
Note that the information provided in this table shows that the 14 European State Members
of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (PARIS MOU) are working towards the
enforcement of marine pollution prevention conventions at that time.
39
Table 6
Loss rates for all Member States 1968-1986
Year GRT Lost (´000) GRT Registered
(´000)
GRT Lost + 100
over GRT
Registered
1968 263.391 86 943 0.30
1969 382.044 92 311 0.41
1970 213.831 98 123 0.22
1971 429.279 107 231 0.40
1972 201.145 114 357 0.18
1973 246.780 121 765 0.20
1974 314.969 129 617 0.24
1975 300.002 139 098 0.22
1976 229.644 147 373 0.16
1977 307.659 151 655 0.20
1978 905.175 154 965 0.58
1979 696.932 149 237 0.47
1980 667.356 149 147 0.45
1981 521.176 147 593 0.35
1982 450.801 142 070 0.32
1983 608.720 129 815 0.47
1984 677.153 115 447 0.59
1985 375.159 98 010 0.38
1986 416.100 90 717 0.46
(Source: Lloyd’s Register Annual Casualty Reports for the years 1968-1985,
Monthly Shipping Statistics, May 1987 for the year 1986).
Note that, the years 1968-1973 and 1976-1980 respectively, no data were available
for IRL. Therefore, GRT lost and GRT registered for these years are exclusive of
IRL.
40
Application of the MOU to ships below 500 gross tonnage
It was agreed in the Memorandum of understanding (MOU) about the application for ships
below 500 gross tonnage that in the case of these kinds of ships “the authorities will apply
those requirements of the relevant instruments which are applicable and will to the extent
that a relevant instruments does not apply, taken such actions as may be necessary to ensure
that those ships are not clearly hazardous to safety, health or environment. Furthermore, as a
result of recent agreements between MOU partners, a List of items to which surveyors
should pay special attention when inspecting small ships below the size covered by
MARPOL 73/78, has been included in Annex 1 of the original Memorandum of
Understanding. Also measures have been agreed for situations in which a ship’s equipment
for the protection of the marine environment is in operative.
Why Memorandum of Understanding?
After the international convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships, 1973 as
modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, MARPOL 73/78 entered into force on 02
October 1983. The IMO procedures for the control of ships and discharges under Annex I of
MARPOL 73/78 by the IMO Assembly (Resolution A.542 (13) and (32)) have been included
in Annex I of the MOU (Guidelines for Surveyors). After the International Convention on
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for seafarers, 1978(STCW) entered
into force on 28 April 1984, the procedures for control of manning and certification, that had
been laid down in the Annex I of the Memorandum of Understanding have been up dated in
order to cover the new situation after STCW entered into force.
Letters of Warning- Also the Nations partners of the MOU have decided to issue letters of
warning to the master of ships from states that are not party to the MARPOL 73/78 and
which do not comply with MARPOL 73/78 standards. In this letter of warning the master is
informed that during future calls of ports in the 14 port state countries that signed the MOU,
his ship may be subject to extensive inspections and/or denial of port entry unless one of the
following documentation of his ship can be shown:
41
– A wide IOPP certificate in case the Flag State of his ship has become a Party to
MARPOL 73/78, or
– A declaration of Compliance, stating that the ship has been surveyed and that the
survey should that the structure, equipment, systems, fittings, arrangements and
material of the ship and the conditions thereof more in all respects satisfactory
and that the ship compiled with the applicable requirements of Annex I to
MARPOL 73/78; or
– A declaration showing that an application for IOPP certificate or Declaration of
compliance has been filled, and that the survey and inspections necessary for the
issue of the said documents will take place as soon as possible. It states thus: “It
is also decided that the ships that do not comply with MARPOL requirements
will receive a letter of warning and may be denied entry into ports in the
Memorandum of Understanding region. All MOU partners will be informed
through their computerised information system of the action taken”.
In addition, the master of the ship is informed that, the Port State Control officer carrying out
inspections on ships, may take such steps as will ensure that the ship shall not sail until it can
proceed to sea without presenting an unreasonable threat or harmful to the marine
environment. These steps may include the ship being obliged to discharge all its oily wastes
to port reception facilities before permission is granted to leave the port.
Documents established and used for the purpose of the Paris MOU on
Port State Control
The Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in its annexes has established
different documents for use for the purpose of Port State Control, such as the following:
– Telex form, in case of deficiencies not fully verified or only provisionally repaired. This
telex shall be sent to the competent authority of the region state where the next port of
call of the ship is situated;
– Report form on inspection in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding on
Port State Control;
– Information system on inspections;
42
– Information system on inspections; and
– Telex form for ships inspected.
Also the letter of warning is established for the masters of the ships from states that are not
party to MARPOL 73/78 and which do not comply with MARPOL 73/78 standards.
The Aide Memoir for Surveyors
To Help surveyors in keeping track of all provisions and amendments thereto of the relevant
conventions a so-called “Aide-Memoir” was issued to them. It contains, inter alia, reference
to convention provisions, sections and articles of the MOU and codes for the information
system.
Operational Violations
Regarding the operational violations, the entry into force of MARPOL 73/78 has caused the
Port State Control partners to decide that this section should be further developed. The
section 5 of the Memorandum of Understanding stated that the authorities will upon the
request of other authorities endeavour to secure evidence relating to suspected violations of
the requirements on operational matters of rule 10 of the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions of Sea, 1972(COLREG) and the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution at sea, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978, (MARPOL 73/78)
relating thereto. In case of “suspected violations involving the discharge of harmful
substances, the authority will, upon the request of another Authority, visit in port the ships
suspected of such a violation in order to obtain information and where appropriate to take a
sample of any alleged pollutant”. In this respect, the partners of the MOU will establish a
network of liaison officers in the 14 countries to be contacted should violations of discharge
provisions be carried out. Furthermore, the partners are examining whether telexes and
forms used for investigation and reporting purposes should be further harmonised.
However, the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (Paris-MOU) on Port State Control is an
initiation between European Maritime Authorities and Canada. It consists of Agreements
and a number of Annexes including guidelines for surveyors in Annex I, which now serve as
a yardstick for international Port State Control inspection globally (See Tables iv-vi).
1
CHAPTER IV
The Port State Control in Europe and the MEMORANDUM of understanding
on Port State Control.
The Agreement of the Memorandum of Understanding
In Western Europe on January 26, 1982 after the sad fact of the founded AMAKOCADIZ in
March 1978, more stringent commitments on Port State Control were felt to be necessary over
the first step to a co-ordinated and harmonised Port State Control, resulted in the MOU of
1978 with respect to the Memorandum of understanding on Port State Control in Europe. The
new Memorandum had to cover these main themes.
– Safety at sea
– Prevention of pollution by Ships
– Living and co-ordination on board.
– And also it is said, “The main underlying reason for the MOU’s birth was of course that
we cannot afford that substandard shipping threatens our ports and the environment
Thus, on this date of January 26, 1982 the maritime countries of 14 European nations
reached in understanding which came into effect in July 1982 that each would maintain
an effective system of Port State Control with a view to flag, foreign merchant ships
insisting the ports f its state comply with instruments laid down in various international
conventions.
As Iain Sproat said “The Paris Memorandum, signed by fourteen European Maritime
Authorities established with effect from 01 July 1982, a harmonised and co-ordinated system
for inspection of 25% of foreign ships calling at European ports, in short, discrimination as to
flag, for the purpose of detecting which fail to meet standards laid down in international
conventions on safety, manning and pollution prevention, securing the verifications of
deficiencies one discouraging the operation of sub-standard vessels”. The charter of the
Memorandum of understanding is the agreement on a number of commitments and
procedures that are directly related to the internationally adopted instruments.
What has been laid down in International con Convention as a right for Port State Control,
namely, to inspect Foreign Flagships on the basis of the convention in question has been
taken up as a commitment, towards each after to do so in practice in a harmonised way?
Besides, ships should only be inspected in one of the region ports once every six months in
order to avoid an necessary inspections. An effective information system must take care of
information on inspections made by each authority in order to avoid duplication of the work.
As A.J. Cowley said “The Memorandum of understanding on Port State Control, which has
2
concluded in Paris in January 1982, is a followship to the earlier discussions on harmonised
Port State Control, which stated in 1976. The authorities concerned decided to accept stranger
and clearly defined commitments on the number of inspections of Foreign Flag Ships by each
of the participating maritime authorities and to pay much greater attention to the mutual
exchange of information on inspected ships in order to avoid duplication of inspections.
Furthermore, the authorities decided to apply only those conventions which have been ratified
by the Port State Control involved and which have entered into force”.
Because the information system about inspections is important in the Port State Control under
the MOU, the ship receives a Port State inspection report after inspection. If there is no
obvious inspections in the region, there could be duplications on inspections. This shows the
importance of Port State information system in MOU in which results of inspections are
stored without delay, and in which ships names are deleted after a six months period until
another inspection of the ship is made. The MOU stated “each authority will consult, cooperate and exchange information with the other authorities in order to further the aims of the
Memorandum”. The aim of the MOU was initially to achieve an annual inspection rate of
25% of the individual ships entering a country.
According to the text of MOU the partners should have each achieved, by 01 July 1985, an
annual total of inspections corresponding to 20% of the estimated number of individual
foreign merchant ships which entered their ports in a year. The ship that has been inspected in
another Port State Control partner’s port according to the text of the MOU should in principle
be left alone for six months. The MOU stated “the Authorities will seek to avoid inspecting
ships which have been inspected by any of the other Authorities within the previous six
MOUs, unless they have clear ground for another inspection”. Taken into consideration that
most of the ships in the region enter more than one port and more than one regional state
within the size MOU´s period, most of the ships visiting the region will be inspected by a Port
State Control at least once a year.
4.2. Relevant Instruments of Memorandum of understanding
In order to maintain an effective system of Port State Control with a view to ensuring that,
with out discrimination of flag, foreign merchant ships visiting the ports of its state comply
with instruments laid down in the various international conventions; that was why the 14
European nations signed the MOU. Those instruments are as follows:
– “The International convention on Load Lined, 1966
– The International convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974
3
The Protocol of 1978 relating to the international Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,
1974;
– The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships, 1973, as
modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto;
– The International Convention on Standards of Training, certification one Watch-keeping
for seafarers, 1978;
– The Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972;
– The Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standard) Convention, 1976 (ILO Convention 147).
It was also started in the Memorandum that each authority would apply those relevant
instruments which are in force and which its state has accepted. An instrument so amended
would then be considered to the “relevant instrument” for that authority.
As J. Cowley said “It is important to note that the Memorandum is thus in no way
contradictory to the contents of internationally agreed maritime conventions in IMO and ILO.
The authorities only implement the standards and procedures of those Conventions in a
harmonised way. It is believed that such harmonisation is important not only for the shipping
of the region states but also for the International Shipping Community”.
The “No More Favourable Treatment Clause (NMFT Clause)
It is stated in the relevant instruments SOLAS Protocol (article II-3), MARPOLE 1973/78
(article 5-(4)), and STCW 1978 (article 5), the clause of no more favourable treatment. In the
STCW Convention it is stated that “No More Favourable Treatment” shall be given to ships
entitled to fly the flag of a non-party than is given to ships entitled to fly the flag is a Party”.
In a MARPOL 1973/78 it is stated that “with respect to the ships of non-parties to the
convention, Parties shall apply the requirements of the MARPOL 1973/78 Convention as nay
be necessary to ensure that no more favourable treatment is given in such ships”.
In the Memorandum of Understanding this clause also is stated and it has agreed that “Inn
applying a relevant instrument for the purpose of Port State Control, the authorities will
ensure that no more favourable treatment is given to ships entitled to fly the flag of the stat4e
which is no Party to that instrument”. In this respect J. Cowley said “the no more favourable
treatment clause is like wise based upon the internationally agreed instruments. The
committee it unanimously of the opinion that the “no more favourable treatment clause”
should only apply with respect to those instruments which themselves contain such provision,
notably in and only in SOLA Protocol 1978, MARPOL 1973/78 and STCW 1978. It is a
condition that these instruments are in force and have been ratified by the Port State
4
exercising the inspection. But, the ships of non-parties to the relevant international
conventions would thus be treated no differently nor more severely than by any other
individual party to the convention”.
Who conducts the inspection for Port State Control in European Countries?
The Port State Control inspection “in European countries are conducted by the same persons
who conduct national inspections. They for part of the national shipping inspection service in
their country. So apart from conducting inspections on their national ships, they also conduct
Port State inspections, which by definition is only done on foreign ships”. The MOU stated
that “Inspections will be carried out by properly qualified persons authorised for that purpose
by the authority concerned and acting under its responsibility”. Port State Control surveys
must have no direct commercial interest vested in either the ports, or the ships where
inspections in accordance to the IMO instruments are carried out. The IMO Resolution A.787
(19), chapter 2.5 deals with these requirements.
Inspections Procedures, Rectification and Detention
In selecting the ships for inspection, the surveyor is Helped by the daily list of incoming
ships (issued by the port authorities) and the MOU list of ships which have been inspected
during the previous six months. This is made by means of an online terminal from the district
to the MOU computer centre in France in due time. After comparison of these two lists the
choice of ships to be inspected is regardless of flag or owner. As indicate in the MOU, special
attention is also paid to ships, which may present in a special hazard, for instance oil tankers
and gas and chemical carriers; and also ships, which have had several recent deficiencies.
When conditioning an inspection under the terminal of the MOU, the surveyors first check the
ship’s documentation. If the ship’s certificates are invited or incomplete, or if the surveyor
has clear grounds for believing the conditions of the ship and its equipment do not correspond
substantially with the particulars on the certificate, he will use his professional judgement in
dividing whether, clear grounds Help to conduct a more detailed inspection.
The Memorandum of understanding stated as “clear grounds” inter alia the following:
– “a report or notification by another authority;
– a report or complaint by the master, a crew member, or any person or organisation of the
ship, shipboard living and making conditions or the prevention of pollution, unless the
authority concerned deems the report or complaint to manifestly impounded;
– Other indications of serious deficiencies”.
If after the detailed inspection it is discovered that the ship does not comply with the
appropriate international standards, steps are taken to rectify the deficiencies. In the case of
5
Serious deficiencies, which are clearly hazardous to safety, health or environment, the ships
may be delayed or detained until they are corrected. The MOU stated further that “in the case
of deficiencies which are clearly hazardous to safety, health or environment, the authority will
ensure that the hazard is removed before the ship is allowed to proceed to sea and for this
purpose will take appropriate action, which may include detention. The Authority will, as
soon as possible, notify the Flag State through its consul or, in his absence, its nearest
diplomatic representative or its maritime authority of the action taken”.
After the inspection, a report is always left on board as information to the master and as a
proof that the ship has been inspected, also in the case of deficiencies which led to the
detainment of the ship. The details of every inspection are directly sent to the computer in
France by telex, in order that the MOU has the inspection list as up to date as possible. This
computerised regional information system for the rapid exchange of information and for
statistical purposes considerably reduces the chances of duplication of inspections. The
Memorandum also established that where deficiencies cannot be remedied in the port of
inspection, the authority may allow the ship to proceed to another port, subject to any
appropriate conditions determined by the authority with a view to ensuring that ships can so
proceed without un reasonable danger to safety, health or environment. In such circumstances
the authority will notify the competent authority of the Region State where the next port of
call of the ship is situated, the parties mentioned in 3.7 of the MOU, and any other authority
as appropriate.
The Memorandum stated that “when exercising control under the Memorandum, the
authorities will make all possible efforts to avoid unduly detaining or delaying a ship”, and
also stated that nothing in the Memorandum affects rights created by provisions of relevant
instruments relating to compensation for under detention or delay”.
Application of the MOU to ships below 500 gross tonnage
It was agreed in the Memorandum of understanding (MOU) about the application for ships
below 500 gross tonnage that in the case of these kinds of ships “the authorities will apply
those requirements of the relevant instruments which are applicable and will to the extent that
a relevant instruments does not apply, taken such actions as may be necessary to ensure that
those ships are not clearly hazardous to safety, health or environment. Furthermore, as a result
of recent agreements between MOU partners, a List of items to which surveyors should pay
special attention when inspecting small ships below the size covered by MARPOL 73/78, has
been included in Annex 1 of the original Memorandum of Understanding. Also measures
have been agreed for situations in which a ship’s equipment for the protection of the marine
environment is in operative.
6
Inclusions in the Memorandum of Understanding
After the international convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships, 1973 as
modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto MARPOL 73/78 entered into force on 02
October 1983. The IMO procedures for the control of ships and discharges under Annex I of
MARPOL 73/78 by the IMO Assembly (Resolution A.542 (13) and (32)) has been included
into Annex I of the MOU (Guidelines for Surveyors). Also after the International Convention
on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for seafarers, 1978(STCW) entered
into force on 28 April 1984. The procedures for control of manning and certification, that had
been laid down in the Annex I of the Memorandum of Understanding have been up to date in
order to cover the new situation after STCW entered into force.
Letters of Warning- Also the Nations partners of the MOU have decided to issue letters of
warning to the master of ships from states that are not party to the MARPOL 73/78 and which
do not comply with MARPOL 73/78 standards.
In this letter of warning the master is informed that during future calls of ports in the
14 port state countries that signed the MOU, his ship may be subject to extensive
inspections and/or denial of port entry unless one of the following documentation of
his ship can be shown:
– A wide IOPP certificate in case the Flag State of his ship has become a Party to
MARPOL 73/78, or
– A declaration of Compliance, stating that the ship has been surveyed and that the
survey should that the structure, equipment, systems, fittings, arrangements and
material of the ship and the conditions thereof more in all respects satisfactory
and that the ship compiled with the applicable requirements of Annex I to
MARPOL 73/78; or
– A declaration showing that an application for IOPP certificate or Declaration of
compliance has been filled, and that the survey and inspections necessary for the
issue of the said documents will take place as soon as possible.
It is said, “it is also decided that the ships that do not comply with MARPOL
requirements will receive a letter of warning and may be denied entry into ports in the
Memorandum of Understanding region. All MOU partners will be informed through
their computerised information system of the action taken”.
In addition, the master of the ship is informed that the Port State carrying out
inspections on his ship may take such steps as will ensure that the ship shall not said
7
until it can proceed to sea without presenting on unreasonable threat of harm to the
marine environment. These steps may include the ship being obliged to discharge all
its oily wastes to port reception facilities before permission is granted to leave the
port.
Documents established and used for the purpose of the MOU Port State Control
The Memorandum of Understanding in Port State Control in its annexes has established
different documents for use for the purpose of Port State Control, such as the following:
– Telex form, in case of deficiencies not fully verified or only provisionally repaired. This
telex shall be sent to the competent authority of the region state where the next port of
call of the ship is situated (see appendix)
– Report form on inspection in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding on
Port State Control (appendix?)
– Information system on inspections (appendix?)
– Information system on inspections (Appendix?)
– Telex form for ships inspected (Appendix?)
Also the letter of warning is established for the masters of the ships from states that are not
party to MARPOL 73/78 and which do not comply with MARPOL 73/78 standards
(appendix?)
The Aide Memoire for Surveyors
To Help surveyors in keeping truck of all provisions and amendments thereto of the relevant
conventions a so-called “Aide-Memoire” was issued to them. It contains, inter alia, referenced
to convention provisions, sections and articles of the MOU and codes for the information
system. The codes for the information system and the report of inspections are shown in
appendixes. ? A report on inspections filed with references and codes are shown in
appendix?
Operational Violations
Regarding the operational violations, the entry into force of MARPOL 73/78 has caused the
Port State Control partners to decide that his section should be further elaborated. The section
5 of the Memorandum of Understanding stated that the authorities will upon request of
another authorities endeavour to secure evidence relating to suspected violations of the
requirements on operational matter of rule 10 of the International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions of Sea, 1972(COLREG) and the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution at sea, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978, (MARPOL 73/78) relating
thereto. In case of suspected violations involving the discharge of harmful substances, the
authority will, upon request of another Authority, visit in port the ships suspected of such a
8
violation in order to obtain information and where appropriate to take a sample of any
allegated (alleged) pollutant”. In this respect, the partners of the MOU will establish a
network of Liaison officers in the 14 countries to be contacted should violations of discharge
provisions are carried out. Furthermore, the partners are examining whether telexes and forms
used ford investigation and reporting purposes should be further harmonised.
However, we have to note that, Paris MOU on Port State Control is an initiation between
European Maritime Authorities and Canada. It consists of Agreements and a number of
Annexes including guidelines for surveyors in Annex I, which now serve as a yardstick for
international Port State Control inspecting globally (See Tables iv-vi).
51
CHAPTER V
Port State Control in West Africa
A number of states, especially Australia, Canada, Japan and the United States of
America which have a strict Port State Control system in their own ports followed the
footsteps of the Paris MOU closely. In 1984, Japan announced the establishment of
its own port state control regime along the same lines as the Paris MOU. In April
1987, the first official co-operation of the MOU was established with the Canadian
Coast Guard. This basically serves as general guidelines of co-operation between
MOU members and non-member Maritime Administrations. The co-operation
agreement includes the mutual exchange of information and guidelines on Port
State Control inspection reports in addition to participation in seminars, workshops,
conferences and other maritime meetings. Observers also attend the annual
seminars of surveyors from Japan and the United States. This co-operation serves
as a forum, and should be encouraged for effective Port State Control
implementation and enforcement at the international and regional levels. The forum
should also offer the opportunity for exchanging information and training needs. The
shipping industry, particularly the charterers and insurance companies have also
expressed a keen interest in establishing formal arrangements for such co-operation
by requesting member States to identify the ships which are repeatedly categorised
as SUBSTANDARD.
The Paris MOU Committee on Port State Control had already established a formal
agreement with the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS),
which may lead to the creation of a Code of Conduct practices that will enable the
exchange of confidential information on “Unrepentant” vessels in the “BLACK LIST”.
Although the statistics data released by the Secretariat does not indicate whether
52
the introduction of the Paris MOU has had any effect on substandard shipping,
officials in a number of ports are convinced that the conditions of vessels have
improved; but it has been a very slow process. No doubt that the MOU Members
have continued their efforts on improving inspection performances in respect of
quantity and quality; but much is needed to be done in the fields of safety
regulations by improving the living conditions of the vessels and also pollution
prevention mechanisms through international and regional co-operations, be it
governmental or non-governmental.
The relevant Administrations consider the Paris MOU as a formal co-operation
regime to enforce the issues, but not as an international regime creating new legal
rights and obligations for its members. However, the Paris MOU on Port State
Control is only a “Memorandum of Understanding” and not an International
Convention or Treaty. In principle, the Paris MOU as the basis of port state control
in the world is regarded as an international instrument to be applied by Flag States
that wish to enforce and implement port state control in their territorial waters.
Even though the Paris MOU is an informal international instrument, it has,
nevertheless, considerable effect. It allows the maritime authorities to concentrate
their efforts on technical, operational and managerial topics with a realistic approach
to the problem, particularly on Port and Flag States responsibilities in their territorial
waters. Since it is not a convention, it does not require any ratification and adoption
of national legislation, but it can be speeded up through incorporation by regional
co-operation. However, the method of processing the information at such a low cost
gives an incentive to administrations with a tight budget and a demand on high
return to join in the co-operation.
The Port State Control Committee and the Ministers concerned should consider
expansion of the Port State Control and Paris MOU regime in other fields such as
increase in reception facilities at ports and strengthening discharge standards
established in International Maritime Conventions. However, the Paris MOU on Port
State Control is a system of harmonised inspection procedures designed to target
substandard ships with the main objective being their eventual elimination.
53
The States should also continue to achieve the MOU aims and objectives based on
the IMO Regulations and Guidelines by encouraging other regional groups in cooperating and co-ordinating port state control in their own national waters if the
desired international standards are to be realised globally. It is clearly understood
that the responsibility for ensuring that ships comply with the provisions of the
relevant instruments lies upon the owners, Masters and the Flag States
Administrations respectively.
Unfortunately, certain flag states, for various reasons, fail to fulfil their commitments
contained in the agreed international legal instruments and subsequently, some
ships are sailing in the worlds seas in an unsafe condition, threatening the lives of all
those on board as well as the marine environment; visa a vis the role of the ship
involved, the crew, the owner and others possibly involved. That is what exactly
port state control is trying to prevent, control and possibly minimise its occurrence in
our international waters.
West and Central African States MOU
All countries have the right to inspect ships visiting their ports to ensure they meet
IMO requirements regarding safety and marine pollution prevention standards, and
experience has shown that port state control works best when it is organised on a
regional basis. The first such regional port state control agreement, covering
Europe and the North Atlantic, was signed in 1982; and is known as the Paris
Memorandum of Understanding (Paris MOU). The Latin-American Agreement
(Acuerdo de Vina Del Mar) was signed in 1992; the Tokyo Memorandum of
Understanding /Tokyo MOU), covering Asia and the Pacific, was signed in 1993; the
Caribbean Memorandum of Understanding (Caribbean MOU) was signed in 1996
and the Meditterean Memorandum of understanding (Mediterranean MOU) was
signed in 1997.
Like the other agreements, the Indian Ocean MOU was also signed in South Africa
on 5 June 1998. This Indian Ocean MOU requires each maritime authority which is
54
a signatory to the agreement to establish and maintain an effective system of port
state control and also sets out an annual required total number of inspections of at
least 10% of the estimated total of the foreign merchant ships entering the ports
during the year. The MOU encourages exchange of information so that ships which
have been inspected by one port state and found to be complying with safety and
marine pollution prevention rules are not subject to too frequent inspections, while
ships presenting a hazard and those ships which have deficiencies which need to be
rectified will be targeted.
In another development, delegations from several West and Central African
countries discussed establishing a Port State Control Agreement for the region
during the 18th IMO Assembly in´1993. It was agreed that the Ministerial
Conference of West and Central African States on Maritime Transport (MINCOMAR)
would act as co-ordination body for the Implementation of any such agreement,
while Guinea offered to convene the establishment of the basis for port state control
in the region and related training needs. Nigeria has also expressed interest in
actively participating in setting up the regional Port State Control regime.
Discussions between MINCOMAR and IMO are currently under way (1999) with a
view to preparing a first preparatory meeting.
External support is seen as crucial to establishing a Port State Control agreement in
the region and IMO has sought donations to help promote port state control and to
provide backing for convening the meetings. At the same time, competent Port
State Control is dependent on the efficient Maritime Administration being in place,
and IMO is involved in organising technical co-operation to help those countries,
which require it to build up their Maritime Administrations. Based on above
preparatory stages, eighteen West and Central African States have now agreed to a
draft MOU on Port State Control (PSC), at a meeting in Conakry-Guinea that ended
on 22 January 1999. The meeting was jointly organised by the Guinean
Government and IMO and was supported by the Ministerial Conference of West and
Central African States on Maritime Transport (MINCOMAR). The aim is to hold a
further meeting to adopt the MOU in Nigeria during October 1999.
55
The Conakry meeting was also attended by representatives of IMO, the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Economic Commission for Africa
(ECA), MINCOMAR, the Communa´aute economique et mone´taire de I´Afrique
Centrale (CEMAC) and other regional organisations. Funding for the meeting was
provided by the Guinean and Nigerian Governments respectively. Participants
continued work on developing a set of training measures to improve the maritime
Administration infrastructure and human resource capability of the participating
states. The aim is to develop a regional training programme fore the West and
Central African region. Further, the meeting agreed, in principle, that the Regional
Secretariat would be established in Nigeria while a regional Information Centre
would be set up at MINCOMAR Head Office in Co’te d’Ivoire.
The draft MOU that was agreed in Conakry is similar to other regional PSC
agreements already established around the world regarding Safety and Marine
Pollution Prevention standards. However, the West and Central African MOU will
also be expected to cover PSC inspections on smaller ships (below 500 gross
tonnage) which are not generally covered by most IMO regulations. These ships
tend to trade inter-regionally. Furthermore, establishing PSC agreements in the
remaining areas of the world not already covered requires support and co-operation
within the region. In each region, participating countries (and in particular the focal
point or lead country) are dependent on the developed maritime countries for
provision of the necessary budget to ensure such establishment for the day to day
running of the PSC Agreement. From outside the region, support is required in
terms of technical expertise and databases, as well as financial Helpance from
donor countries. IMO is also involved through its Technical Co-operation
Programme.
Port State Control Inspections in Nigeria
Nigeria got her independence on 1 October 1960. Located in West Africa, bordering
the Gulf of Guinea, between Benin, Cameroon, Niger and Chad republics
respectively. It has an area of 923,773 square kilometres with an approximate total
56
population of 121.8 million people (1998 estimate). In the area of merchant marine
sector, Nigeria has a total of 29 ships of 1000 GRT and above. These ships include:
Bulk carrier 3
Cargo 2
Chemical tankers 3
Oil tankers 20
Roll-on/roll-off cargo 1
(Source: Nigerian Ports Authority Annual Report 1997 Estimate).
Nigeria has two major ports otherwise known as cargo interface and feeder ports
and four other transit ports in addition to the newly established Inland Waterways at
Lokoja that serves for local or domestic ports. The ports are as follows: –
1.APAPA-WHARF PORT, APAPA, LAGOS; *
2.TIN-CAN ISLAND PORT (TCIP), LAGOS; *
3.DELTA PORT IN WARRI;
4.PORT HARCOURT PORT IN P/HARCOURT;
5.FED. LIGHTER TERMINAL PORT IN ONNE;
6.HUB PORT, CALABAR (EPZ); and
7 INLAND WATERWAYS, LOKOJA.
(Those with asterisks, are the major ports in the country).
(Source: Nigerian Ports Authority Annual Report, 1998).
Nigeria depends mainly on sea transport for her major exports and imports in
addition to air and road transport systems.
58
Figure 3
ORGANISATINAL CHART: NIGERIAN MARAD POLICY AND OPERATIONS
PRINCIPLES.
KEY:
MSA: Maritime Safety Administration
MARADS: Maritime Administration
MET: Maritime Education & Training
FED. MIN. OF TRANSPORT
PERMANENT SECRETARY
LEGAL ADVISER
MARITIME
SERVICES DEPT.
LEGAL
LEGISLATION
REGISTRATION
POLICY
INTERNAL
PORT/HARBOURS
EXTERNAL
SUBSIDIES?
LOANS
OPERATIONS
MSA/MARADS/MET
SAFETY
NAVIGATION, CARGO
CONSTRUCTION
AIDS TO NAVIGATION,
LAND
RADAR
PLEASURE BOATING
SEARCH AND RESCUE
ACCIDENT
INVESTIGATION
PILOTAGE
POLLUTION
SEAMAN AFFAIRS
MANNING
SCHOOL AND
ACADEMIES
ON BOARD TRAINING
CERTIFICATION
COAST GUARD
WATER WAY POLICE
MARITIME POLICE
BORDER POLICE
CUSTOM POLICE
POLICY
59
Figure 4
ORGANISATIONAL CHART: NMA
(Source: National Maritime Authority, Nigeria, Organisational Chart 1997)
SHIIP ACQUISITION
& SHIP BUILDING
FUND UNIT
PUBLIC
RELATIONS
UNIT
LEGAL
SERVICES
DEPARTMENT
ZONAL
OFFICERS
ADMIN. AND
PERSONNEL
SERVICES
DEPT.
INTERNAL
AUDIT
UNIT
SURVEY &
INSPECTION
DISTRICTS
MARITIME
SAFETY
DEPT.
PORT
SERVICES
CONTROLLERS
COMMERCIAL
AND
OPERATIONS
DEPARTMENT
FINANCE &
INVESTMENT
DEPT.
RESEARCH
PLANNING &
STATISTICS
DEPT.
NATIONAL MARITIME
AUTHORITY
FEDERAL MINISTRY
OF TRANSPORT
60
Nigeria is a contracting Party to some of the IMO and ILO Conventions and
therefore, exercises effectively the basic objectives of a “Port State” as given in
these conventions and also to ensure that no preferential treatment is given to nonconvention ships that are substandard in its territorial waters. Administration of
maritime conventions relating to documentation and detention of ships in Nigeria is
the responsibility of the National Maritime Authority (NMA). The former Maritime
Inspectorate Division (MID) and the Government Inspectors of ships (GIS) initially
carried out such responsibilities respectively.
The aim of the National Maritime Authority (NMA), is to Help in the economic
integration of shipping activities of the West African sub-region by offering protection
to Nigerian vessels flying the nation’s flag in another Flag State’s seaports; in
addition to achieving a systematic control of the merchant mechanisms of sea
transport and promotion of seafarers training in the Nigerian maritime transport
technology. It is the Authority that co-ordinates the implementation of the “National
Policy on Shipping” as is being formulated from time to time by the Federal
Government of Nigeria (source: National Shipping Policy Decree No. 10 of 30 April
1987).
However, the NMA is not a fully autonomous body, because its activities are being
monitored and supervised by the Federal Ministry of Transport as its parent Ministry.
In other words, the National Maritime Authority is one of the parastatals under the
Ministry of Transport in Nigeria (See figure 3 on pp 52). The NMA undertakes
inspection of national and foreign flag vessels on behalf of the Ministry and the
Federal Government of Nigeria, to ensure that ships visiting the Nigerian ports
comply with the standards laid down in the relevant national and international
instruments, without discrimination. Further, the ships of non-parties to the relevant
International Conventions will be treated neither differently nor more severely by any
other individual that is a party to the convention.
In another development, and in order to compete at sea, Nigeria has to meet the
Safety Standards as required by the International instruments. The Safety of a ship
as we are aware of, is expensive, but this is what we call `affordable safety´.
61
Without keeping certain standards, we cannot have a good Flag State. A national
coast guard regiment is being constituted for search and rescue (SAR) operations
as well as for anti piracy action in the country’s territorial waters.
These days, marine pollution and other environmental issues are included in the
concept of `seaworthiness’. But, complying with International Eco-Standards is an
expensive tool for commerce. The EU might say that the emission levels for
exhaust should be set at such and such a number. If they push hard enough, they
will push through a convention that fits their own environment. Whenever you to talk
of safety you are talking cost and developing countries often cannot afford that level
of safety; but if it pays, we have to go right ahead. The laws and regulations
concerning Port State Control in Nigeria are as follows:
(i)Federal Government of Nigeria National Shipping Decree No. 10 of 1987 as
National Legislation. (This is subject to review from time to time);
(ii)The Federal Ministry of Transport Administrative Directives on Maritime Safety
Policies such as implementation and enforcement;
(iii)The National Maritime Authority Policy Guidelines on Regional Agreements and
other Treaties on Maritime Safety;
(iv) The Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) Rules and Regulations for seaports.
Furthermore, there is the implementation and enforcement of the International
Instruments such as ratified namely, SOLAS, MARPOL, LOAD LINE, TONNAGE,
COLREG, STCW, ILO, (see table vii for more details) in order to ensure full
compliance to International Standard requirements in the country. The Nigerian
Maritime Administration also derives its international jurisdictional power and control
from these conventions in addition to those from the National Legislation.
The competent maritime Administration may, at any time, control and inspect
Nigerian vessels, wherever they are, and foreign vessels in Nigerian ports. The
competent maritime authority in co-ordination with other ministries such as ministry
of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, and that of Environment, that controls and
inspects the oil pollution hazards. in conjunction with Nigerian Coast Guards which
62
comprises of Naval Police, Nigerian Navy and Custom Border Patrol Team for ships
Safety and Marine Pollution Prevention.
Nigeria has ratified the following Conventions, namely:
(a) IMO Conventions No. 48 and 93
(b) SOLAS Convention 1974, 1978 and amended 1988
(c) Load Lines Convention of 1966
(d) Tonnage Convention of 1969
(e) STCW Convention of 1978 and 1979
(f) INMARSAT Convention ´76 and QA 76
(g)Facilitation Convention of 1965
(h)MARPOL Convention of 1973 and 1978
(i)London Convention (LDC) of 1972
(j)Salvage Convention of 1989
(k)ILO Convention No. 147
(L) UNCLOS- COLREGS of 1972
(Source: -Http://www IMO Webster, 1998).
Although, the Nigerian Government has ratified many conventions, bureaucratic
hurdles have resulted in their inadequate implementation (See Tables 7 (a), (b) and
(c) respectively).
63
Figure 5
ORGANISATION CHART: MARITIME SAFETY DEPARTMENT
D. G.
NMA
HEAD
OFFICE
HEAD OF
DEPART.
MARITIME
SAFETY
DIVISION
SHIP REGISTRY
UNIT
ACCOUNTS AND
PERSONNEL
UNIT
NAUTICAL
SURVEY
EXAM
ENGINEERING
SURVEY
EXAM
SHIP
INSPECTIONS
UNIT
MERCHANTILE
UNIT
NORTHERN
DISTRICT
EASTERN
DISTRICT
EAST CENTRAL
DISTRICT
WEST CENTRAL
DISTRICT
WESTERN
DISTRICT
64
Selecting ships for Inspection
In selecting ships for inspection, the ” surveyor” is Helped by daily list of incoming
ships, sensibly concentrating on those registers especially on owners known to be
unreliable, and on older vessels. Special attention is paid to ships, which may
present a special hazard, for instance oil tankers, gas and or chemical carries; and
also ships, which have had several deficiency records. However, international
instruments such as principles and procedures on Port State Control, especially
those related to the selecting of ships for inspections from other MOU sectors, are
applied.
Below, are the types of ships calling at most of the Nigerian ports. Bulk carriers,
Tankers such as Oil, gas, Chemicals, Containers, Ro-Ro, etc.
NUMBER OF GRT. OF VESSELS ENTERED AT NIGERIAN PORTS & CRUDE OIL
TERMINAL 1988-1997
YEAR NO. OF VESSELS G. R. T.
1988 2,369 69,850,312
1992 3,995 83,933,086
1993 3,943 87,082,533
1994 3,073 79,347,649
1995 3,023 78,838,624
1996 3,124 79,963,926
1997 3,985 91,521,669
1998 5,291 91,743,048
1999 – –
(Source: Nigerian Ports Authority Annual Report, 1998).
The VOLUME of Traffic in most of the major ports has continued to increase from 19976-
1983. It went down in 1985-1988. From 1992, it rises as shown in the below table
particularly the Tankers and the Container Carriers.
65
Inspection Procedures
In compliance with the recommendations contained in IMO Resolution A. 466 (xii), it
is preferred for the right to board and inspect ships for the purpose of control to be
implemented by Government Inspectors. On boarding a vessel and conducting an
inspection, the surveyor must first check the ships DOCUMENTATION
CERTIFICATES, and from these documented information regarding dates of issue,
initial survey, expiry, annual survey, and other related issues alike can be extracted
and equally detected by the Surveyor on whether the Vessel is in compliance with
the international requirements or not. However, IMO Resolution A.787 (19) “
Procedures for port state control” and IMO Resolution A. 481 (xii) “ Principles of
Safe Manning” respectively, have explained in detail on how Port State Control
Inspection should be carried out.
Certificates and other relevant Documents that must be checked during ship
inspection as applicable, are as follows:
International Tonnage Certificate (1969).
Passenger ship Safety Certificate; which must include the following:
Cargo ship safety construction certificate,
Cargo ship safety Equipment certificate,
Cargo ship Radiotelegraphy certificate,
Cargo ship Radiotelephony certificate,
Cargo ship Radio safety certificate,
Exemption certificate,
Cargo ship safety certificate.
International Certificate of Fitness for carriage of Liquefied Gases in Bulk,
Certificate of Fitness for the carriage of Liquefied Gases in Bulk.
International Certificate of Fitness for the carriage of Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk,
Certificate of Fitness for the carriage of Dangerous Chemical in Bulk.
International Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate
International Pollution Prevention Certificate for the carriage of Noxious Liquid
Substances in Bulk.
66
International Load Lines Certificate (1966),
International Load Line Exemption Certificate.
Oil Record Book, part 1 and 11.
Cargo Record Book.
Minimum Safe Manning Document,
Certificate of Competency (COC).
Medical Certificate (see ILO Convention No. 73 Concerning Medical Examination of
Seafarers).
Stability Information. Copy of Document of Compliance (DOC) and Safety
Management Certificate (SMC) issued in accordance with the International
Management Code for the Safety Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention
(SOLAS Chapter IX).
Certificates as to the ship0´s Hull Strength and Machinery installations issued by the
Classification Society in question (only to be required if the ship maintains its Class
with a Classification Society).
Documents of Compliance with the special requirements for ships carrying
Dangerous Goods.
High Speed Craft Safety Certificate and Permit to operate High Speed Craft.
Dangerous goods special LIST or manifest, or detailed stowage plan.
Ships logbooks with respect to the records of tests and drills; and the log for records
of inspections; and for maintenance of Live saving appliances and arrangements.
Special Purpose Ship Safety Certificate.
Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Safety Certificate.
For oil tankers, the record of oil discharge monitoring and control system for the last
Ballast voyage must be shown and presented.
The Muster List, Fire control plan, and for passenger ships, a damage control plan.
Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan.
Survey Reports Files (in case of bulk carriers or oil tankers).
Report of Previous Port State control inspection
For Ro-Ro passenger ships, information on the A/A- max. Ratio.
Document of Authorisation for the carriage of grains.
Cargo Securing Manual.
67
CLC-Certificate (applies for ships, which carry more than 2000 tonnes of oil in bulk.
It is a reason for detention or suspending the cargo operation if the ship can not
present the certificate).
If there are clear grounds for believing that the condition of a ship or its equipment,
or even its crew, does not SUBSTANCIALLY meet the applicable requirements of a
convention, a more detailed inspection shall be carried out using `professional
judgement. ´ The procedures to be followed can be found in IMO Resolution A. 787
(19), chapter 2.5 (See Appendix viii).
The Surveyor, on carrying out a more detailed inspection, should be accompanied
by a responsible officer on board. To aid him in this tour-inspection of the vessel, a
previous report used could be of great help and Helpance, and this report can
double as an “ aide-memoir”. Items to particularly note are the condition of deck
structure and openings (Load Line items), “good housekeeping” with regards to
Safety. Others include reception facilities for disposing wastes/rubbish, fire fighting
equipment and an inspection of the bridge and relevant navigational equipment.
It is expected and required, that during this tour the surveyor will examine records
required to be maintained on the vessel such as log books, records of musters and
drills, maintenance of LSA and FFA, oil record book, compass deviations for the
intended voyage in addition to other navigational equipment as required by SOLAS,
are fitted and functioning effectively as required.
Rectification and Detention of ships
On completion of the inspection of a vessel, a report is filled in, and the surveyor has
to make remarks regarding deficiencies on the report. It is said that: “If any
deficiency is observed on any vessel, it then means that, the ISM CODE system has
not been applied as required.” I quite agree with this statement. If during the
inspection, it is discovered that the ship does not comply with the appropriate
International Standards, steps are taken to rectify the deficiencies, which are clearly
68
hazardous to safety, health or the environment. The ship may be delayed or
detained in accordance to the Nigerian Maritime Law and implementing decisions or
regulations of the law will prevail until these deficiencies are corrected or rectified to
international standard levels.
The Master will be requested to acknowledge by signature the completed report of
which a copy of the report must be retained by him on board for the information of
the owners, and of course, for the inspectorates at subsequent ports of call. The
Authority must ensure that the hazard is removed before the ship is allowed to
proceed to sail at sea. For this purpose, appropriate action must be taken to ensure
that No More Favourable Treatment is given to substandard ships.
A copy of such a report must also be sent to IMO through a Flag State
Implementation (FSI) meeting. The written report shall include when, where and
why the ship is either delayed or detained with attached photographs, audio and
videotapes where necessary. Any Surveyor or Port State Control Inspector who
fails to write and submit an “ inspection report”, is considered as NOT a good Flag
State representative in the Eyes of IMO. However, the Authority will make all
possible efforts to avoid the unduly detaining or delaying of the ship. Compensation
will be required to be paid to the owners for such acts when it is established that,
detention and delay were deliberate.
Problems of Port State Control Inspections in Nigeria
There are numerous problems facing the full implementation and enforcement of
port state control in Nigeria to the required standards. Despite the inadequate
funding of the shipping sector by the Federal Government, educated and trained
personnel to implement and enforce PSC is lacking, in addition to inadequate
planning. Others include political instability and economic uncertainty. Corruption is
also very eminent. The non-challant attitudes of Nigerian shippers and the mass
media in Nigerian shipping policy decisions also constitute another set backs.
The PSCO´s Inspection Reports are not adequate to global requirements. Further,
there is no effective method of communication between surveyors and inspectors in
69
most of the Nigerian ports at present (1999). Experience has shown that, vessels
are sometimes selected for inspection in different Nigerian ports within a short
period of time particularly in the major ports of the country, example; in Apapa and
Tin Can Island ports respectively without adequate information being recorded in
any database system. The only evidence of survey is the inspection report held on
board by the master. In order to apply an effective method of communication such
as a computerised system used in countries that are Party to the Paris MOU, a
database must be created and installed for the proper and adequate record keeping
of all surveys and inspections carried out on a vessel including the vessels
particulars. Such a database network system is essential in harmonising port state
control activities, particularly within a region.
Precisely, most of the PSC Inspectors do not have the pre-requisite qualifications as
prescribed in IMO Res. A. 787 (19), Chapters 2.4 & 2.5 respectively. The emphasis
here is, there the problem of lack of experience and knowledge of nautical and
marine engineering background in addition to incompetence and skills. Furthermore,
inspectors have either no sea training background and experience or attend any
reputable maritime training institution to qualify them as PSCOs´. Problem of wrong
applications of PSC rules and regulations that creates rooms for PSCOs´ to have
vested commercial interests either in the port of inspections or in the ships
inspected. Additional problems include inappropriate criteria for employing PSCIs in
the country.
All these problems create and equally give opportunities for the sub-standard
vessels to operate smoothly and freely in the Nigerian coastlines, thereby causing
hazards and pollution in our ports and get away with it.
On completion of reports in another development, surveyors under Paris MOU
Parties must forward such reports to the different ports of National Maritime
Authorities Head offices. It is then the Authority’s responsibility to forward the
received reports to all other port offices in and within the region, so that such offices
will be aware of such moves. Telex and telexfax, which is considered fast and more
economically reasonable, are also used, in sending inspection reports in addition to
70
telephone and e-mail routes. With such reports at hand, surveyors and inspectors
can create a database and take appropriate action when necessary with ships
calling at their ports in the short term. The installation of a computerised system can
create good grounds for an effective and efficient communications network not only
for Nigerian ports but also for the entire West and Central African regional ports.
Although the equipment is capital intensive, its operation is more reliable,
sustainable, safer and faster.
In the Nigerian context, port state control reports are usually not carried out. Where
it is being carried out, it is not up to date and comprehensive enough to one
understanding. Furthermore, the reports are not being sent to the appropriate
quarters for necessary action; rather the Inspection officer will write the report and
keep. One of the Inspectors (Name withheld), reliably told me that, it even useless
to write a report since the officer that is going to read the report, will not read or even
“blame you” for inability to perform. Therefore, “why bothering yourself with PSC
inspection reports since it is not going to be read and also of valueless”.
One can see the kind of problems Nigerian PSC processes of implementation are
facing. No doubt, that, one has to conclude that, something is wrong somewhere
and that thing requires attention and ratification if progress has to be made. The
stumbling blocks that are led on the path of PSC implementation in Nigeria, have to
be cleared, otherwise, if allowed to continue and persist, the long term effect is
going to be disastrous to the detriment of the majority of the population, and
consequently a set back in the economic and political development of the entire
country. There is the need for the entire political system of the nation to be overhauled if policies that are formulated are to be achieved.
73
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSION
While flag states are responsible for the enforcement of IMO conventions, PSC is
seen as fulfilling a caretaker role as regards supervising the application of such
conventions. Experience from PSC can have a beneficial influence on flag state
control. World wide application of PSC through the global proliferation of regional
agreements will emphasise the administrative character of Port State Control, while
exchange of information between regions will increase the effectiveness of control,
and regional reports on deficiencies reported and ships detained will provide IMO
with valuable statistical data.
However, the development of PSC raises some questions. Is the traditional role of
the Flag State, which has the ultimate responsibility for safety, being eroded? Are
we promoting yet one more set of already numerous on board inspections? Is there
a danger that some participating countries may use port state control as a trade
barrier or as a retaliatory tool? Can the introduction of the International Safety
Management (ISM) Code for operational requirements be considered too subjective
for disciplined control? Could port state control be abused by unscrupulous Port
Authorities? Will the whole process cause a global delay in shipping movements?
These are questions that need to be addressed on matters related to the port state
control evolution.
74
IMO has addressed these matters through its Flag State Implementation subcommittee, which was held in its sixth session in June 1998. It is to be hoped that
the need for global economic development (and shipping trade is essential for this
purpose) can be balanced with today’s imperatives of safety and the protection of
the environment. However, some of the above questions remained unanswered.
The IMO sub-committee on Flag State Implementation also has a forum for
interaction between flag states and port states, where discussions on Port State
Control requirements as well as difficulties experienced in the control process are
being debated for the IMO Assembly’s consideration. It is particularly important that
the sub-committee is used in this way; since without proper consultation between
flag states and port states, there is a danger that an individual state, or group of
states, may choose to go down the path of unilateral action; thereby imposing local
requirements which can go beyond those contained in the agreed international
conventions. But, Port State Control is recognised to be the safety net; the main
responsibility for compliance still rests on the Flag State.
Port State Control “The inspection of foreign flag vessels visiting national ports” has
been invented for efficient and effective implementation and enforcement of
maritime safety rules and regulations globally. In an ideal word, Port State Control
(PSC) would not exist, but when ship owners, classification societies, insurers or
flag state administrators have, in one way or another failed to do their job, port state
control comes on to the scene.
Today, almost all statutory surveys are carried out by classification societies, and
only a very small percentage of the surveys are carried out by the Flag States
themselves or nominated surveyors. The number of ships with deficiencies that are
clearly hazardous to safety, human health or the environment has not decreased
since 1980 /1981, when the “ mandatory annual survey scheme” was introduced.
Ships are seen with “fresh and clean” certificates, which should give a ship certain
privileges, but often-port states find deficiencies where the only appropriate action is
“Detention of the Ship.” For the purpose of improving the situation, Port State
Control Officers only take photos of the worst areas of the ship. The photos are
75
usually accompanied by a brief description of the relevant particulars of the detained
vessel, which are attached to the Port State Control Reports. Copies of such reports
have to be sent to IMO, ILO and the Flag State of the detained vessel.
These reports cannot be ignored, and the flag states that are the responsible bodies
for the execution of the statutory surveys have to realise that monitoring by quality
auditing or checking is necessary. Any flag state has to act if a ship flying its flag is
detained. If the detention is justified, both the ship owner and the master are to be
prosecuted. However, if the detention is not justified, the Flag State should inform
the port state that the detention in the opinion of the Flag State is unjustified. Such
matters “in between” will be treated as adhoc.
ILO-RULES: Except for “cargo gear”, which is covered by ILO convention 152,
“Convention Concerning Occupational Safety and Health in Dock Work”, ILOrequirements in general are not controlled within an international survey certification
scheme. However, convention No. 178 of 1996, “ Labour Inspection- Seafarers,
covers a flag state’s obligation internationally. Flag states should therefore ensure
that the relevant ILO instruments are complied with by establishing a
survey/certification scheme especially in these areas. Today, only few flag states
have such systems. However, the current (up to 1999) ILO No.147 convention has
come to rescue the situation of crew members as regards their health, working
conditions and other related matters, particularly on board ship.
Operational Control:
In an emergency, the best equipment in the world is only effective if the crew is
adequately trained to use it. The importance of reining in the use of marine safety
equipment cannot be over emphasised and until designers and manufacturers can
come up with equipment that is foolproof; the efficiency of the training will largely
determine the effectiveness of safety equipment. The problem with trying to train for
emergencies is that it is very difficult to get any degree of realism into the training.
Realism can be achieved by creating an emergency, which means creating a risk.
76
It is no wonder that with this sort of training, crews are ready to abandon ship in a
real emergency. They have no real knowledge of just how harsh conditions on
board a life raft or lifeboat can be. Training does not have to involve risk, but can
still have a strong element of realism if money is spent. Cost, perhaps, is the
limiting factor in bringing realism to safety training. For example, training in lifeboat
and life raft launching and operation would be much better if it were done from a
ship in moderate sea conditions with the ship rolling. This sort of experience is
much more likely to make a lasting impression than the game-like atmosphere that
now pervades lifeboat training. Realistic training does not seem to be forthcoming
except in the rather exceptional circumstances of some training vessels.
Fire fighting is one area where realism can be and is brought into training. On some
training courses, crews have to enter burning compartments in order to give them a
very healthy respect for fire and confidence in using the equipment. Compare this
with the attitude towards life rafts. Many crewmembers have never seen a life raft
opened out. They do not know what is inside and what to do to get the best out of
the life raft. A measure of realism, however, can be brought into training by using
films.
Instead of reassuring passengers that ships are safe, ship owners should send
“signals” that there is a minor risk (if anything goes wrong) by going to sea. By
doing so, the public is prepared, or better prepared mentally if the impossible should
happen anyway. The input into the development of safety equipment from those
who would have to use it is small. Fire fighting is perhaps an exception, but much of
the equipment is similar to that used on shore. Training in safety is so important that
it must be considered along side the development of new equipment. In connection
with Port State Control, it has become essential to control the crews’ ability to
handle the various emergency situations. Until recently, Port State Control has
emphasised the “technical aspects” and only very little has been done on the
“operational aspects”. In the future, both flag states and port states have to look into
the operational aspects of how the crew and the ship function together. The
77
operational aspects are the results of co-operation between the “technical element”
and the “human element”.
In November 1991, the IMO Assembly adopted IMO Resolution A. 681 (17)
“Procedures for the Control of Operational Requirements Related to the Safety of
Ships and Pollution Prevention”. This Resolution was revoked by another
Resolution A. 742 (18) “ Procedures for the Operational Requirements related to the
Safety of Ships and Pollution Prevention”. At the 19th assembly, A.742 (18) was
amalgamated with the other Port State Control Resolutions into A. 787 (19) “
Procedures for Port State Control”, where all the operational requirements are
included.
International law has always recognised the sovereign jurisdiction of Coastal or Port
States over their territorial sea and internal waters. Hence, the inclusion of the “No
More Favourable Treatment” clause in Maritime Safety and Pollution Prevention
Conventions, beginning in MARPOL 73/78 and SOLAS 74/78, were the most
convenient means to enable Port States to exercise control. However, this control is
not absolute. The conventions clearly state the extent to which control may be
exercised over foreign flag vessels, and, with the exception of ILO 147 Convention,
such control may not extend to the internal management of the ship’s affairs. In
addition, MARPOL 73/78, SOLAS 74 and the Protocol of 1978, and the STCW ´78,
provide for compensation to be paid for undue delay or detention. The UNCLOS
also provides for this compensation by calling for a “right of recourse” in the courts
of the Port State exercising this control.
However, Port State Control is very effective tool that a State can use to enforce
national and international rules, and also to protect its coastal area from pollution so
that ships may operate and navigate safely in the territorial and EEZ waters towards
ensuring that, sub-standard ships will not be given easy access to their ports and
other ports in the region. With regional co-operation, education and training in
addition to seminars and workshops participation, nationals will be able to
implement the laws governing the conduct of Port State Control on foreign ships
visiting their ports.
78
RECOMMENDATIONS
When establishing of co-operation and support in each region, participating
countries (and in particular the focal point or lead country) are dependent on the
countries concerned for providing of the necessary budget to ensure the
establishment of day-to-day running of the port state control agreement. From
outside the region, support is required in terms of technical expertise and
databases, as well as financial help from donor countries. IMO is also involved
through its Technical Co-operation Programme. Thank God and IMO, in October
1999, the West and Central African MOU will be signed in Abuja, Nigeria. The
advantage of this regional MOU on PSC is to promote co-operation through effective
sharing of information by harmonising the entire implementation globally. Further,
the excessive and unfair competition among regional ports will be avoided to some
extent.
A review of the region’s maritime safety infrastructure, with particular regard for
surveys and inspection requirements as set out in IMO conventions should also be
established and evaluated regularly. The convening of one or more regional
meetings of experts (legal and technical) to discuss a preliminary draft of a Port
State Control agreement of co-operation with the participation of relevant maritime
Administration has to be given priority. The agreements should be based on the
special characteristics of the regional consensus as to the establishment of the
Secretariat and the location of the required Information Centre.
Furthermore, a regional meeting of Heads of Maritime Administrations and
Government officers to consider and sign the agreement for co-operation (MOU-onPSC), and a plan of action for the training of Port State Control officers (PSCO`S),
has to be pursued vigorously. The preparation of a strategy and a plan of action for
future training are equally important and should NOT be undermined. Nigerian Port
State Control Officers must change their attitudes towards realising safety culture in
her territorial waters. IMO has played a vital and important roles in the signing of
Agreements globally.
79
The task of reinforcing maritime infrastructure and the human resources capability of
the individual regional schemes to effectively meet their objectives according to
international standards has to be strictly adhered to. In addition, putting in place an
electronic information network for sharing information and tracing suspected
vessels, needs to be installed across the regions if the desired goals of Port State
Control surveys and inspections are to be realised. The idea is to enable the
regions to transmit relevant data to IMO for input into a world database (such as
International Ship Information Database (ISID)) system equivalent to that of the
Paris MOU (IRIS project on the exchange of inspection records), so that all
Governments can have access to it with the aim of improving safety and protection
of the environment. However, in the near future, and with the development of
regional PSC Agreements across the world, maritime databases around the globe
could be connected internationally.
The questions here are that: Will the traditional role of Flag State be eroded or is
PSC another set of surveys and inspections? Will PSC not be used as trade
barriers or retaliatory tool? Don’t you think PSC will be too subjective to control in
the near future? Will unscrupulous authorities not abuse it if allowed to be
implemented? Will PSC not delay global shipping movements in the next
millennium? How am I sure that, PSC will finally eradicate substandard ships in our
international waters? However, whether Port State Control will become
institutionalised and whether, a single global Port State Control (PSC) regime could
be established in the future. Assuming political will and the commitment of the
countries concerned to eradicate substandard ships, it seems that, the regional
approach has clear advantages:
i. The special characteristics of the region are taken in to account;
ii. There is more effective sharing of information;
iii. There is extended control of the ships whilst they are plying the regional waters;
iv. Better cost/benefit returns are achieved;
v. A harmonised system of surveys and inspections is easier to achieve;
vi. There is a harmonised system for training and qualifications of Port State
Control officers;
80
vii. Unfair competition between ports in the region is avoided;
viii. The deterrent effect for preventing substandard ships operating elsewhere in
the world is increased; and
ix. Inter-regional co-operation will become global co-operation through the
interface between regional Secretariats.
Port States should have a legitimate interest in the safety of passengers and crew
on board foreign ships calling at their ports. It is necessary for them to include
control of compliance with on board operational requirements in their country. Article
2 of ILO Convention No. 147 convention, requires member States to have laws or
regulations laying down safety standards, including standards of competency, hours
of work and manning social security measures in addition to other living conditions.
That is why it is advisable to set up a Safety Committee among the crew on board.
In exceptional cases where the overall condition of a ship is obviously substandard,
the competent Authority may suspend the inspection of that ship until the response
parties have taken the steps necessary to ensure that it complies with the relevant
standard requirements. This possibility has already been inserted in the Paris MOU
and is now a generally accepted procedure.
The Flag State’s responsibility is implementation by establishing legislation (primary
or secondary) on Port State Control and Flag State Implementation, which will
instruct surveyors and inspectors on what is expected of them. With respect to the
ships of non-parties to the convention, Parties shall apply the requirements of the
present convention as may be necessary to ensure that “No More Favourable
Treatment” is given to such ships (MARPOL 73/78 ART. 5 (4). Further, Flag States
must verify (by inspection or other means) that their ships comply with national laws
and regulations which apply the standards prescribed by the convention. This is
because national legislation has to be “substantially equivalent” with the
International Minimum Standard requirements.
In case of any deficiency, legislation must exist which will instruct the master or
operators to rectify such deficiencies immediately, or else the ship may be detained
or delayed when there are ” clear grounds ” to do so or if “professional judgement”
81
deems it necessary. Furthermore, complaints from crew, passengers, masters or
any other person on board are to be listened to and action has to be taken
appropriately, because ships must be ” sufficiently and efficiently manned”.
Therefore, a Port State Control officer on inspection has to ensure always that every
ship has not only a “Safe Manning Document” on board but also has “Certificates of
Competency ” of the seafarers employed. The officer can also simulate in order to
check how the crew reacts to emergency events. The muster list must always be
checked in case of any misrepresentation in it.
Many things could be said about how the ship owner, operator and Captain can
manage Port State inspection at its best. However, if the following items are NOT IN
ORDER, a Port State Control survey will usually be a matter of routine. Thus:
i. The ship should be provided with one (or may be more) ” Certificate ring binder”
where all certificates and other kinds of documentation can be filed properly.
ii. Port State Control reports from previous inspections must be retained on board
for a period of TWO years and must also be available for consultation by Port
State Control Officer at all times.
iii. The ship should be provided with a ” Record of Approved Safety Equipment”
from which it can be seen what the Flag State requirements are, and which
rules the ship shall comply with.
iv. The ship’s officers should be acquainted with IMO Resolution A. 787 (19)
“Procedures for Port State Control”.
v. Each ship’s (Captain/Company) must have some kind of contingency plan on
“How to handle a situation where the Port State Control survey/inspection
causes difficulties” (For example; the ship is required to comply with
international standard regulations or the ship is detained).
The ship has to be in a reasonable condition and comply with all statuary
regulations, the gangway properly rigged (remember the net), the alleyways clean
and the papers neatly at hand. (This, together with the Captain’s and Crews positive
attitude, helps the Port State Control Surveyor or Inspector to run the inspection
smoothly without unreasonable delay, detention or cost for the ship owner).
82
Port State Control is recognised as being a step in the direction towards the
eradication of sub-standard ships, when it is carried out in accordance with IMO
Assembly resolutions and recommendations. Many of IMO’s technical conventions
contain regulations enabling Governments to inspect ships visiting their ports to
make sure that they meet IMO standards. Therefore, and based on the findings on
page 68, I would like to make the following recommendations:
A number of PSCOs´ employed with inadequate qualifications in addition to lack of
experience, need to be reviewed. PSCOs´ require to be educated and trained in
accordance with the stipulated and prescribed guidelines, example, IMO Res. A.
787 (19) or as envisaged in the West and Central African MOU. Also, the
establishment and implementation of the West and Central MOU needs to be
expedited. Of course the wage structure of the entire PSC Inspectors has to be
reviewed if commercial interests vested on ships inspected or on ports where the
ships are to be inspected, are to be avoided.
The Maritime Academy of Nigeria, Oron (MAN ORON) as the only maritime
institution in the country, should develop a model training course for training of
PSCOs´ taking in to account the technical advise and Helpance from the IMO
Technical Co-operation Committee for international standards requirements to be
met. There is the need for regular review of PSCOs´ activities by the Director
General of the NMA in order to assess and ascertain the quality of performances.
Furthermore, in addition to competency in carrying out PSC responsibilities as
required, the methodology adopted in appointing PSCOs´ and the allies Officers
need to be reviewed based on credibility, integrity, passed-experience and
appropriate qualifications of individual applying for the post or seeking promotion to
such position.
In another development, the Maritime Safety Dept. should establish an inter and
intra Districts Links that will serve as an effective means of communication not only
between PSCOs´, but also between PSCOs´and the other agencies in the ports in
case of high traffic. Such agencies include. The Ports Authority, the Customs, the
Immigrations, Navy, etc.
83
For efficiency and effectiveness, PSCOs´ should be provided with the necessary
tools related to PSC Inspections. Such tools include, a car, chauffeur or boat,
mobile radio or telephone, helmet, hand-gloves, rain-boot, raincoat, writing materials
and other necessities required of PSC implementation.
For sustainable and effective implementation of PSC in the region, the newly
established West and Central African MOU needs funding on continuous
incremental approach if the regional agreement is to survive.
With regard to the need for harmonisation and training, it is clear that the
establishment of the various regional Port State Control regimes, essential as it is, is
only the beginning. Problems already identified within the European MOU, which, is
composed of quite similar maritime Administrations, will be accentuated in other
regions where European conformity and affinity do not exist. Some of the problems
are related to the peculiarities of the regions and their different stages of
development which dictate different patterns of control, as regards the methodology
of inspection, targets to be achieved, different training and experience among the
control officers, and possibilities of abuse. However, solutions to these problems
have to be found by whatever means.
Of course, we are not unaware of the problems facing developing countries from
political instability to economic uncertainty in addition to socio-cultural and religious
diversities. However, if such countries are interested in developing maritime and
shipping activities in their regional domains, such differences and barriers need to
be resolved. The flag and port states respectively have to prioritise the maritime
sector in order to enable the developed maritime nations to give both financial and
technical aid where applicable.
It is therefore, imperative to continue working towards the harmonisation of basic
procedures and qualifications and experience of control officers as the way ahead.
The IMO sub-committee on Flag State Implementation has agreed on a global
strategy for port state control and has also the authority to deal with the training and
84
qualification of Port State Control officers as a matter of urgency in co-operation with
the Standards of Training and Watchkeeping (STW) sub-committee. A code of
conduct for Port State Control officers has also been developed in this regard.
There is an arduous task ahead. While regional Port State Control has now been
operating for 15 years, there is still room for improvement and need for review of the
agreements and minor adjustments. IMO´s work will depend on the success of the
organization’s efforts to improve flag state performances, which is the top priority of
the organization at present. However, the best way forward seems to be to continue
the process already started by increased control in the various regions and to strive
for better and more efficient implementation by the states (acting as Flag States) on
their own ships rather than as a port state acting on foreign flag ships.
But Port State Control is here to stay, and this means effective regional agreements,
common criteria for inspections, harmonised inspections and detention procedures,
internationally approved qualifications of Port State Control officers, an
internationally applied Code of Conduct and transparency through increased
information within the regions themselves and the inter-regions respectively.
In summary, the emphasis has to be on “Enhanced International Cooperation”!
Final Remarks:
Instead of being an excellent tool to eliminate the operation of substandard ships,
Port State Control Regional Agreements might well develop into a monster of
bureaucracy. Port State Control officers must put any reference in their inspection
report if they are not sure of its applicability. They must also never detain or delay
any ship unnecessarily or without any justification. Conventions are regarded as the
best medicine for curing ship deficiencies if the qualified personnel properly
prescribe it. However, and in recognition of the importance of our oceans, the PSC
officers must intensify their efforts towards effective implementation and
85
enforcement of PSC in Nigeria in order to achieve the maritime safety culture in the
next millennium.
Port State Control is a right and not an obligation. Safety culture must be imbedded
between ship owners and seafarers vis-à-vis the Administrations. Nigerian
MARADS needs dialogue with the industry in order to establish a safety culture
towards avoiding conflicts of interests in our Port State Control implementation and
enforcement. Nigeria must devise means of overcoming all available pressures on
PSC- Inspections from ship owners, seafarers, Administrations or any
union/pressure groups. A Port State Control officer needs to be aware of the
“missing links” in case of any deficiencies identified. Port State Control inspection is
not auditing. According to an ancient Greek Philosopher: “ The measure of success
is not what you were unable to achieve, it is what you are not able to loose”.
Therefore, Port State inspectors must be watchful and vigilant in carrying out Port
State Control survey or inspection particularly on board ships. However, they can
not work miracles! But should ensure that ships have priority. Progress can only be
made gradually and along the developmental axis of the desired objectives.
Excessive bureaucracy decays infrastructure. Port State Control officers must be
honest and what they can offer for safety of our ships, crews, passengers and the
protection of the environment. Safety is EXPENSIVE, but accidents are
DANGEROUS. As long as our shipping activities are across the international
territorial boundaries, ship owners and their operators must be held responsible foe
non-compliance of shipping rules and regulations as required by the International
standards.
According to Winston Churchill, “ It is wise to look ahead but difficult to look
further than you can see”. Therefore, be careful.
87
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