Posted: October 20th, 2022

Part A (50% of the overall grade for this coursework)

Part A
(50% of the overall grade for this coursework)
Word limit: There is no word limit for Part A of the assessment. However, your answers should be as concise, precise and accurate as possible without being repetitive (see criteria below). The questions in Part A are not equally weighted.
You must not plagiarise material from the case extract. Any material taken directly from the judgment must be in quotations and refer to the appropriate paragraph number(s). You will receive very little credit if you use quotations to explain the material facts, legal issue and/or ratio decidendi. .
When answering questions relating to the material facts, legal issue and ratio decidendi of the case, you MUST confine your reading to the case extract provided. If it is apparent that you have referred to extraneous material relating to the reported decision such as law reports, case summaries, textbook or other similar material, this will be reflected negatively in your grade.
Assessment criteria for Part A
Your answers should:
. a) Be clear, concise and accurate
. b) Not be repetitive
. c) Contain only relevant information
. d) Demonstrate a comprehensive understanding of the case
. e) Demonstrate an understanding of techniques, presumptions etc. to statutory interpretation
You are required to carry out the task outlined. The examiner will mark your work according to your ability to follow the instructions and satisfy the assessment criteria.
Read carefully through the attached extracts from Blake v Chester City Council [2012] and answer the following questions:
1. What were the material facts of the case?
2. Explain, in your own words, the legal issue(s) in the case.
3. Which technique(s) of statutory interpretation do you consider that Lady Hale employed in the case? Give reasons for your answer.
4. To what aids of statutory interpretation, if any, did Lady Hale refer to in her judgment? Your answer must indicate whether such aids are ‘intrinsic’ or ‘extrinsic’.
5. Explain, in your own words, the ratio decidendi of Blake v Chester City Council [2012].
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Blake (Appellant) v Chester City Council (Respondent) [2012] 1 UKSC LADY HALE (with whom Lord Hope and Lord Walker agree)
1. As the appellant is a woman, and the majority of victims of all forms of domestic violence are women, I shall refer to the victim as “she” throughout. But of course I realise that men can be victims too. 
The evolution of the statutory scheme
2. The modern scheme of local housing authorities’ powers and duties towards homeless people dates back to the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977. That Act provided that a person was homeless if there was no accommodation which she (together with other members of her family) was entitled to occupy. Even if there was such accommodation, a person was also homeless if “it is probable that occupation of it will lead to violence from some other person residing in it or to threats of violence from some other person residing in it and likely to carry out the threats”: 1977 Act, section 1(2)(b). That provision was repeated when the 1977 Act was consolidated with other housing legislation in the Housing Act 1985: see section 58(3)(b).
3. Then came the case of R v Hillingdon London Borough Council, Ex p Puhlhofer [1986] AC 484, where the House of Lords held that a person was not homeless even if it was not reasonable for her to have to continue to occupy the accommodation to which she was entitled. In response to this, the Housing and Planning Act 1986 inserted two new subsections into section 58 of the 1985 Act. Subsection (2A) provided that “A person shall not be treated as having accommodation unless it is accommodation which it would be reasonable for him to continue to occupy”; but subsection (2B) permitted the local housing authority, when deciding whether it would be reasonable to continue to occupy, to have regard to “the general circumstances prevailing in relation to housing in the district”. No change was made to the basic definition in section 58(3), under which a person was automatically homeless if there was a risk of violence from another person living in the accommodation which she was entitled to occupy. Neither in 1977 nor in 1985 did the subsection specify who had to be the victim of such violence: it may have been assumed that it had to be the person claiming to be homeless or it may have been assumed that it would also cover the people living with her, in particular her children.
4. The scheme was recast in Part VII of the Housing Act 1996, although retaining its basic shape. The definition of homelessness, now contained in section 175 of the 1996 Act, remained the same as it had been in the 1985 Act as amended in 1986, but section 58(3)(b) dealing with violence and section 58(2B) dealing with local housing conditions were removed into section 177 (see para 5). The former “reasonable to continue to occupy” requirement in section 58(2A) is now contained in section 175(3): 
”A person shall not be treated as having accommodation unless it is accommodation which it would be reasonable for him to continue to occupy.”
5. The former section 58(3)(b) and (2B) have been translated into the new section 177, which is headed “Whether it is reasonable to continue to occupy accommodation”. The former

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section 58(2B), dealing with local housing conditions, is now contained in section 177(2), which reads as follows:
“In determining whether it would be, or would have been, reasonable for a person to continue to occupy accommodation, regard may be had to the general circumstances prevailing in relation to housing in the district of the local housing authority to whom he has applied for accommodation or for Helpance in obtaining accommodation.”
Although there was some debate about it before us, the phrase used is the “general circumstances in relation to housing” and not “the general condition of the housing stock in the area”. This strongly suggests that regard may be had, not only to the quality of housing available locally, but also to the quantity.
6. The former section 58(3)(b), dealing with the risk of violence, was recast as section 177(1) of the 1996 Act. In its original form, it read as follows: 
”It is not reasonable for a person to continue to occupy accommodation if it is probable that this will lead to domestic violence against him, or against – (a) a person who normally resides with him as a member of his family, or (b) any other person who might reasonably be expected to reside with him. For this purpose ‘domestic violence’ , in relation to a person, means violence from a person with whom he is associated, or threats of violence from such a person which are likely to be carried out.” 
This made two changes of substance from the old law. First, it expressly encompassed violence against other members of the homeless person’s household: a mother for example, could not reasonably be expected to occupy accommodation where her children were at risk of domestic violence. Second, it was no longer limited to violence from someone living in the same accommodation but covered violence from an associated person, whether or not living in the same household. Section 178 spells out the “Meaning of associated person” in detail, but of course it includes spouses and former spouses, cohabitants and former cohabitants, and (since 2005) civil partners and former civil partners.
7. But these changes did not change the underlying purpose of section 177(1). It has variously been called a “deeming” or a “pass-porting” provision. The effect is, as it has been since 1977, that a person who is at risk of the violence to which it applies is automatically homeless, even though she has every right to remain in the accommodation concerned and however reasonable it might in other respects be for her to do so. Questions of local housing conditions or shortages do not come into it.
8. There was, however, another important consequence of the particular drafting technique employed in section 177. This was new to the 1996 Act and was not referred to in the argument before us. As it is automatically not reasonable for a person to continue to occupy accommodation where she is at risk of violence, she cannot be treated as intentionally homeless if she leaves. Section 191 defines when a person becomes homeless intentionally as follows: 
”(1) A person becomes homeless intentionally if he deliberately does or fails to do anything in consequence of which he ceases to occupy accommodation which is
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available for his occupation and which it would have been reasonable for him to continue to occupy.”
This result follows a recommendation of the Home Affairs Committee in their 1993 Report on Domestic Violence, to which I shall return in paragraph 21.
9. Section 177(1) was amended, and a new section 177(1A) introduced, by the Homelessness Act 2002. These now read as follows: 
”(1) It is not reasonable for a person to continue to occupy accommodation if it is probable that this will lead to domestic violence or other violence against him, or against – (a) a person who normally resides with him as a member of his family, or (b) any other person who might reasonably be expected to reside with him. 
(1A) For this purpose ‘violence’ means – (a) violence from another person; or (b) threats of violence from another person which are likely to be carried out; and violence is ‘domestic violence’ if it is from a person who is associated with the victim.” 
Once the prospect of “other violence” was introduced into this pass-porting provision, it is not easy to see why the specific reference to “domestic violence” (together with the complex definition of associated persons in section 178) was retained, unless perhaps it was thought that “domestic violence” had a special meaning. But this is quite hard to reconcile with the phrase “violence is domestic violence”. I return to this question in paragraph 31.
10. One reason may be that the phrase “domestic violence” has been in the scheme throughout, even though it was not originally used in the definition of homelessness in section 1 of the 1977 Act (see para 2 above). Section 5 of the 1977 Act dealt with responsibility for housing homeless people as between different local housing authorities. The authority first approached could in effect transfer responsibility to another housing authority if the applicant, or other members of her household, had no local connection with their area, but did have a local connection with another area, and “neither the person who so applied nor any person who might reasonably be expected to reside with him will run the risk of domestic violence in that housing authority’s area”: see section 5(1)(iii). The risk of domestic violence or threats of domestic violence was defined in terms of a risk “from any person with whom, but for the risk of violence, he might reasonably be expected to reside or from any person with whom he formerly resided”: see section 5(11). These provisions were consolidated in the 1985 Act as section 67(2)(c) and (3).
11. The same principles were carried through into section 198(2)(c) and (3) of the Housing Act 1996 in virtually identical form, save that the risk had now to come from a person with whom he “is associated”. With the introduction of “other violence” into section 177(1) by the 2002 Act, changes were also made to section 198. Section 198(2) remains in its original form, but a new section 198(2A) has been introduced and section 198(3) replaced. These now read as follows: 
”(2A) But the conditions for referral mentioned in subsection (2) are not met if – (a) the applicant or any person who might reasonably be expected to reside with him has suffered violence (other than domestic violence) in the district of the other authority; and (b) it is probable that the return to that district of the victim will lead to further violence of a similar kind against him.
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(3) For the purposes of subsections (2) and (2A) ‘violence’ means – (a) violence from another person; or (b) threats of violence from another person which are likely to be carried out; and violence is ‘domestic violence’ if it is from a person who is associated with the victim.”
As with section 177, it is not easy to see why the distinction between domestic and other violence was retained, as the consequence is the same, unless there was thought to be some difference between them.
12. There is one further provision in the homelessness scheme to which I must refer. The 1996 Act introduced a new provision in section 177(3):
“(3) The Secretary of State may by order specify – (a) other circumstances in which it is to be regarded as reasonable or not reasonable for a person to continue to occupy accommodation.”
There is no equivalent power in section 198. Thus, in theory, the Secretary of State could expand the categories of people who are automatically homeless by reference to some other risk, but they could then be sent back to a district where they would face exactly that same risk.
13. Tilsley v Manchester Council [2006] EWCA Civ 1404 concerned the meaning of non-domestic “violence” in section 198. The applicant and his family were asylum seekers who had been living for just over a year in Swansea when they were granted indefinite leave to remain and thus became eligible under Part VII of the 1996 Act. They applied to Kensington which referred them to Swansea. They complained of trouble from local youths in Swansea, shouting abuse and making insulting gestures, racist abuse on a bus, and two specific incidents of assault outside a community centre and in the city centre. The local authority took the view that the two assaults were random incidents of crime which might happen anywhere to anyone and were not part of a course of harassment against the applicant or his family. The verbal abuse did not amount to a threat of violence and accordingly there was no reason to believe that it was more likely than not that violence would result if they returned to Swansea.
14. The Court of Appeal held that in this context, “violence” involved some sort of physical contact: Neuberger LJ accepted the council’s contention that “In section 198 ‘violence’ means physical violence, and the word ‘violence’ on its own does not include threats of violence or acts or gestures, which lead someone to fear physical violence”: see para 14. He went on to give five reasons for this, to which I shall return.
15. Finally, it is worth noting another innovation made by the 1996 Act. Sections 145 and 149 amended the 1985 Act and the Housing Act 1988 by introducing for secure and assured tenancies a new ground for obtaining possession of a dwelling let to a married or cohabiting couple by, respectively, a local authority on a secure tenancy and a registered social landlord or charitable housing trust on an assured tenancy, where one partner has left because of violence or threats of violence towards that partner or a member of the family living with her and is unlikely to return. This was in response to a recommendation of a Department of the Environment Homelessness Policy Division Working Party Report on Relationship Breakdown and Secure Local Authority Tenants (December 1993). 
The facts of this case
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16. The appellant is a married woman with two young children, a girl who is now aged eight and a boy who is now aged two. They were aged respectively six and eight months in August 2008 when she left the matrimonial home in which she lived with her husband, taking the children with her, and (having nowhere else to go) sought the help of the local housing authority. The matrimonial home was rented in her husband’s sole name. In her two interviews with the housing officers, she complained that “her husband hates her and [she] suspects that he is seeing another woman. [She] is scared that if she confronts him he may hit her. [However her] husband has never actually threatened to hit her.” She went on to complain of his shouting in front of the children, so that she retreated to her bedroom with them, not treating her “like a human”, not giving her any money for housekeeping, being scared that he would take the children away from her and say that she was not able to cope with them, and that he would hit her if she returned home. The officers decided that she was not homeless as her husband had never actually hit her or threatened to do so.
17. She consulted solicitors who applied for a review which was unsuccessful. The panel noted that “your root cause of homelessness is not that you fled after a domestic incident, but it was your decision to leave the matrimonial home because you felt that your husband did not love you any more and was not close to you, in addition to suspecting that he was seeing another woman”. They believed that “the probability of domestic violence is low” and found her fear that her husband would take the children away from her to be contradictory, as she had also said that he took no interest in the children. Hence they concluded that it was reasonable for her to continue to occupy the matrimonial home while taking action to secure a transfer under the Family Law Act 1996 or alternatively seeking accommodation in the private sector.
18. Mr Dirk Ravage QC, who appears for the local authority, accepts that the housing officers and review panel applied the Tilsley meaning when they decided that the appellant was not homeless within the meaning of the Housing Act 1996. If this Court decides that there is a wider meaning, the case will have to be considered afresh. There is no need, therefore, to make any further comment on the facts or upon the reasoning in the decision and review letters. 
The meaning of “violence”
19. In Tilsley the first, and principal, reason given was that “physical violence” is the natural meaning of the word “violence”: para 15. I can readily accept that this is a natural meaning of the word. It is, for example, the first of the meanings given in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. But I do not accept that it is the only natural meaning of the word. It is common place to speak of the violence of a person’s language or of a person’s feelings. Thus the revised 3rd Edition, published in 1973, also included “vehemence of personal feeling or action; great, excessive, or extreme ardour or fervour; . . . passion, fury”; and the 4th (1993), 5th (2002) and 6th (2006) Editions all include “strength or intensity of emotion; fervour, passion”. When used as an adjective it can refer to a range of behaviours falling short of physical contact with the person: see, for example, section 8 of the Public Order Act 1986. The question is what it means in the 1996 Act.
20. The 1996 Act was originally concerned only with “domestic violence”, that is violence between people who are or were connected with one another in an intimate or familial way. By that date, it is clear that both international and national governmental understanding of the term had developed beyond physical contact. The Court is grateful to the diligence of both interveners, the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and the
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Women’s Aid Federation of England, for gathering so many of the references together. Internationally, in 1992 the United Nations Committee, which monitors the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted General Recommendation 19, which included in its definition of discrimination in relation to gender based violence “acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty”. In 1993, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, defined for this purpose as “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women . . .”
21. Nationally, in 1993 the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee in its Report on Domestic Violence adopted the definition “any form of physical, sexual or emotional abuse which takes place within the context of a close relationship” (Session 1992-93, Third Report, HC 245-I, para 5). The Home Affairs Committee report used two reports as the basis for its inquiry: the Report on Domestic Violence of a national inter-agency working party convened by Victim Support (1992) and the Report of the Law Commission on Domestic Violence and Occupation of the Family Home (1992, Law Com No 207). The Law Commission gave this explanation of domestic violence, at para 2.3: 
”The term ‘violence’ itself is often used in two senses. In its narrower meaning it describes the use or threat of physical force against a victim in the form of an assault or battery. But in the context of the family, there is also a wider meaning which extends to abuse beyond the more typical instances of physical assaults to include any form of physical, sexual or psychological molestation or harassment which has a serious detrimental effect upon the health and well-being of the victim.” 
The recommendations made in the Law Commission’s Report were embodied in the Domestic Violence and Occupation of the Family Home Bill which passed through most of its Parliamentary stages in the session 1994 – 1995 before falling at the last hurdle. The same clauses were reintroduced, with immaterial amendments, in the Family Law Bill 1995 – 1996 and became Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996.
22. It cannot be a coincidence that the definition of an associated person in section 178 of the Housing Act 1996 bears a very close resemblance to the definition of an associated person for the purpose of occupation and non-molestation orders under the Family Law Act 1996, in section 62(3) to (6) of that Act. It will be recalled that the Housing Act 1996 had shifted the focus, away from the presence of the perpetrator in the same accommodation as the victim, to the nature of the relationship between them. These are strong indications of joined up thinking on the part of the legislators. The Home Affairs Committee had also made the link between the criminal and family law remedies, with which it was concerned, and the housing law remedies, which were then the concern of the Department of the Environment; thus, it recommended that local authorities “put an end to the nonsense where a victim fleeing domestic violence is deemed to have made herself intentionally homeless” and that “appropriate priority be given to rehousing victims of domestic violence” (para 131). In fact, the Department of the Environment had already gone some way towards meeting the first point, as the 1991 version of the Code of Guidance for Local Authorities on Homelessness had stated (para 7.11) that authorities should not automatically treat an applicant as intentionally homeless because she had failed to use legal remedies to protect herself from domestic violence. The Department of the Environment’s Relationship Breakdown Working Party (see para 15 above) was well aware of the Law Commission’s Report: not only was the
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Law Commission represented upon it but the Working Party recommended implementation of the Commission’s two most relevant recommendations.
23. All of this indicates a consciousness in 1996 of the need to align housing, homelessness and family law remedies for victims of domestic violence, so that they could have a genuine choice between whether to stay and whether to go and the local authority or social landlord would not be obliged to continue to provide family sized accommodation to the perpetrator. There was also an explicit acknowledgement in the report which led to the Family Law Act 1996 and by the Home Affairs Committee that “violence” could have a wider meaning than physical contact.
24. In my view, therefore, whatever may have been the original meaning in 1977 (and, for that matter, in the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1978), by the time of the 1996 Act the understanding of domestic violence had moved on from a narrow focus upon battered wives and physical contact. But if I am wrong about that, there is no doubt that it has moved on now. In March 2005, the Home Office published Domestic Violence: A National Report, in which it was stated at para 10: 
”To support delivery across government and its agencies through a common understanding of domestic violence, we now have a common definition. This follows the definition already used by the Association of Chief Police Officers, and is: 
’Any incident of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between adults who are or have been intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality.'” 
That definition, or something very close to it, has been adopted by many official and governmental bodies, including the Association of Chief Police Officers: Guidance on Investigating Domestic Abuse (2008); the Crown Prosecution Service Policy for Prosecuting Cases of Domestic Violence (2010); the Ministry of Justice, in Domestic Violence: A Guide to Civil Remedies and Criminal Sanctions (February 2003, updated March 2007); and the UK Border Agency, in Victims of Domestic Violence: Requirements for Settlement Applications. Indeed, it is cited in Hounslow’s own leaflet, Domestic Violence: What it is and how you can get help (2009), which goes on to explain: 
”It is rarely a one off incident and it is not only about being physically or sexually abused, you may be subject to more subtle attacks, such as constant breaking of trust, isolation, psychological games and harassment. Emotional abuse is just as serious and damaging; many survivors will carry the emotional scars long after the physical injuries have healed.” 
The 2006 version of the Homelessness Code of Guidance for Local Authorities is explicit at para 8.21: 
”The Secretary of State considers that the term ‘violence’ should not be given a restrictive meaning, and that ‘domestic violence’ should be understood to include threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between persons who are, or have been, intimate partners, family members or members of the same household, regardless of gender or sexuality.” 
This was new to the 2006 Code. The fourth reason given by the Court of Appeal in Tilsley, at para 18, was that various passages in the previous, 2002, Code had given a different
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impression, for example by comparing “severe harassment” with “actual violence” (para 8.32).
25. However, it is not for government and official bodies to interpret the meaning of the words which Parliament has used. That role lies with the courts. And the courts recognise that, where Parliament uses a word such as “violence”, the factual circumstances to which it applies can develop and change over the years. There are, as Lord Steyn pointed out in R v Ireland [1998] AC 147, at p 158, statutes where the correct approach is to construe them “as if one were interpreting it the day after it was passed”. The House went on in that case to construe “bodily harm” in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 in the light of our current understanding of psychological as well as physical harm. The third reason given by the Court of Appeal in Tilsley was that it was impermissible to construe the meaning of one phrase by reference to the meaning of another. This I accept.
26. However, as Lord Clyde observed in Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd [2001] 1 AC 27, at p 49, which was concerned with whether same sex partners could be members of one another’s “family” for the purpose of succession to Rent Act tenancies, it is a “relatively rare category of cases where Parliament intended the language to be fixed at the time when the original Act was passed”. In other cases, as Lord Slynn of Hadley explained at p 35: 
”It is not an answer to the problem to assume . . . that if in 1920 people had been asked whether one person was a member of another same-sex person’s family the answer would have been ‘No’. That is not the right question. The first question is what were the characteristics of a family in the 1920 Act and the second whether two same-sex partners can satisfy those characteristics so as today to fall within the word ‘family’. An alternative question is whether the word ‘family’ in the 1920 Act has to be updated so as to be capable of including persons who today would be regarded as being of each other’s family, whatever might have been said in 1920: see R v Ireland [1998] AC 147, 158, per Lord Steyn; Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, 3rd ed (1997), p 686 
and Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed reissue, vol 44(1) (1995), p 904, para 1473.”
27. “Violence” is a word very similar to the word “family”. It is not a term of art. It is capable of bearing several meanings and applying to many different types of behaviour. These can change and develop over time. There is no comprehensive definition of the kind of conduct which it involves in the Housing Act 1996: the definition is directed towards the people involved. The essential question, as it was in Fitzpatrick, is whether an updated meaning is consistent with the statutory purpose – in that case providing a secure home for those who share their lives together. In this case the purpose is to ensure that a person is not obliged to remain living in a home where she, her children or other members of her household are at risk of harm. A further purpose is that the victim of domestic violence has a real choice between remaining in her home and seeking protection from the criminal or civil law and leaving to begin a new life elsewhere.
28. That being the case, it seems clear to me that, whatever may have been the position in 1977, the general understanding of the harm which intimate partners or other family members may do to one another has moved on. The purpose of the legislation would be achieved if the term “domestic violence” were interpreted in the same sense in which it is used by the President of the Family Division, in his Practice Direction (Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence) (No 2) [2009] 1 WLR 251, para 2, suitably adapted to the forward-looking context of sections 177(1) and 198(2) of the Housing Act 1996:

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“‘Domestic violence’ includes physical violence, threatening or intimidating behaviour and any other form of abuse which, directly or indirectly, may give rise to the risk of harm.”
29. That conclusion is consistent with the decision of the Court of Appeal in BB (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 68. This was concerned with the meaning of “domestic violence” in para 289A of the Immigration Rules, which stipulates the requirements to be met by a person admitted as the spouse or civil partner of a person present or settled here who is the victim of domestic violence which has caused the relationship permanently to break down and who is seeking indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom. Richards LJ quoted the definitions in the 1993 Home Affairs Committee Report, the 2005 National Report (repeated in a more recent Report of the Home Affairs Committee, Domestic Violence, Forced Marriage and ‘Honour’-Based Violence, 2007-08,
6th Report, para 4), the guidance given by the UK Border Agency, and the President’s Practice Direction. He pointed out that “The general thrust of all those definitions is much the same” (para 23) and accepted that the term was not limited to physical violence, although “it must reach some minimum level of seriousness, which will depend upon context and particular circumstances” (para 24).
30. It remains to be discussed whether giving the words the meaning given them by the President of the Family Division would be inconsistent with anything in the statutory language or purpose.
The statutory language
31. The second reason given in Tilsley for preferring a narrow construction was that, in both section 177(1) and section 198(3), violence is defined as violence or threats of violence which are likely to be carried out: para 16. If the concept of violence already included conduct which puts a person in fear of physical violence there would be no need to refer to threats at all. I am not convinced of this. For one thing, there are some forms of conduct which undoubtedly put a person in fear of violence but which would not necessarily be described as threats. Silent phone calls, heavy breathing, the sorts of stalking behaviours which were the subject matter of Watts v Walford Borough Council [2000] EWCA Civ 
1444, and R v Ireland [1998] AC 147, can all put the victim in very real (and justified) fear of violence in the narrow sense. They should be covered by the concept of violence.
32. More importantly, if the concept of violence includes other sorts of harmful or abusive behaviour, then the reference to threats is not redundant. Locking a person (including a child) within the home, or depriving a person of food or of the money to buy food, are not uncommon examples of the sort of abusive behaviour which is now recognised as domestic violence. There is nothing redundant in a provision which refers to threats of such behaviour which are likely to be carried out.
33. In this Court, Mr Ravage urged an alternative solution upon us: that if there were forms of ill-treatment falling short of physical violence which ought to be included within the pass- porting provision in section 177(1), the Secretary of State could use the power in section 177(3)(a) to include them. Mr Dodger, on behalf of the Secretary of State, explained that the Secretary of State has not done so because in his view the concept of “violence” already bears the wider meaning for which the appellant contends. There is the further objection to this solution, that there is no equivalent power in section 198, so that a person might be

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accepted as homeless under section 177(1) but could then be referred to a district where she would face exactly the same risks.
34. There may also be a concern that an expanded definition is setting the threshold too low. The advantage of the definition adopted by the President of the Family Division is that it deals separately with actual physical violence, putting a person in fear of such violence, and other types of harmful behaviour. It has been recognised for a long time now that it is dangerous to ignore what may appear to some to be relatively trivial forms of physical violence. In the domestic context it is common for assaults to escalate from what seems trivial at first. Once over the hurdle of striking the first blow, apologising and making up, some people find it much easier to strike the second, and the third, and go on and on. But of course, that is not every case. Isolated or minor acts of physical violence in the past will not necessarily give rise to a probability of their happening again in the future. This is the limiting factor. Sections 177 and 198 are concerned with future risk, not with the past.
35. The introduction in 2002 of “other” violence into a statute which was previously concerned only with domestic violence also raises questions. They are readily answered, if I am right that the concept of domestic violence in 1996 was already wider than physical contact. As Miss Esther Bloom QC for the appellant points out, the introduction of “other” violence in 2002 cannot possibly have been intended to cut down the meaning which the statute already had. However, if the understanding of the conduct to which the word applies has moved on, the question of whether this also applies to “other violence” does not arise on the facts of this case, and so it is unnecessary for us to express a concluded view. Reading the statute as it now stands, there are arguments on either side. On the one hand, if “violence” has the same meaning in both “domestic violence” and “other violence”, there was no need to retain the separate concept of domestic violence, together with the complicated definition of associated persons in section 178. A person who was at risk of any violence if she stayed in or returned to the property or the locality would be protected. Retaining them as separate concepts suggests that “domestic violence” is limited by the relationship between the victim and the perpetrator, rather than by the nature of the conduct involved. “Other violence”, having no such limitation and lacking the connotations of an intimate or familial relationship, might relate to a narrower set of behaviours. On the other hand, providing in sections 177(1A) and 198(3) that “violence is ‘domestic violence'” suggests that “violence” has a constant meaning. Hence, I would incline towards the view that it does. Nor would that be surprising. People who are at risk of intimidating or harmful behaviour from their near neighbours are equally worthy of protection as are those who run the same risk from their relations. But it may be less likely that they will suffer harm as a result of the abusive behaviour of their neighbours than it is in the domestic context. In practice, the threshold of seriousness may be higher. 
Conclusion
36. As the housing officers and review panel adopted a narrow view of domestic violence in this case, it is agreed that it must be remitted to the authority to be decided again. I accept that these are not easy decisions and will involve officers in some difficult judgments. But these are no more intrinsically difficult than many of the other judgments that they have to make: for example, as to the circumstances in which it is reasonable to continue to occupy the accommodation; as to whether a person has rendered herself intentionally homeless; and as to the suitability of accommodation provided by the local authority. Was this, in reality, simply a case of marriage breakdown in which the appellant was not genuinely in fear of her husband; or was it a classic case of domestic abuse, in which one spouse puts the other in
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37. I would therefore allow this appeal …

Part B is on the following page
End of case extract
Legal Method Referred coursework 2016-17 (Approved by EE Dec 2016)
fear through the constant denial of freedom and of money for essentials, through the denigration of her personality, such that she genuinely fears that he may take her children away from her however unrealistic this may appear to an objective outsider? This is not to apply a subjective test (pace the fifth reason given in Tilsley). The test is always the view of the objective outsider but applied to the particular facts, circumstances and personalities of the people involved.
Page 13 of 17
Legal Method Referred coursework 2016-17 (Approved by EE Dec 2016)
Part B
(50% of the overall grade for this coursework)
Assessment Criteria for Part B
Your answers should:
1. Demonstrate your ability to research primary law.
2. Demonstrate accurate factual understanding and analysis of the scenario
3. Demonstrate recognition of legal issues arising from the facts of the scenario
4. Demonstrate clear, accurate and concise statements of law fully supported by 
comprehensive and accurate legal authority with specific emphasis on primary sources
5. Demonstrate clarity and accuracy in the English language
6. Comply with the OSCOLA referencing guide – details can be found on NOW – which includes 
a requirement to produce a bibliography
Word Limit for Part B: 2,000 WORDS (you must include a word count for Part B. Please check your course handbook carefully to see what is included in the word count).
Students are advised to utilise the full word count of 2000 words, but in any event are strongly encouraged to use no less than 400 words per question.
Read the following scenario and the answer the questions at the end.
Harry Smith, Jeannette Dupree and Pervez Patel are uniformed police officers who are members of a Local Community Beat Team. One of their policing responsibilities is the prevention and detection of low level drugs activity in the local community. For the last three days, as a result of information from anxious local shopkeepers on the High Street, they have been conducting covert observations in plain clothes (i.e. non police uniform) concerning the supply of illegal drugs in the vicinity of a local betting shop.
Over their period of observation a pattern of suspicious behaviour has been emerging.
A man exits the betting shop at approximately 3pm each day, walks around the corner and sits on a wall on the edge of a public car park slightly away from, and hidden from the High Street. The man is always wearing a hoodie which covers the majority of his face. He is also wearing large sunglasses. The police officers are only able to identify that he is a male of athletic appearance. There is no police intelligence on the identity of the man. What always appears to happen next is that over a period of about 30 minutes up to ten people, mainly aged in their early twenties, emerge from either the adjacent housing estate or the High Street, and approach the man wearing the hoodie. This man then removes something from his mouth and passes it to the individuals in exchange for

Page 14 of 17
Legal Method Referred coursework 2016-17 (Approved by EE Dec 2016)
what appears to be money that he puts in a pocket in his tracksuit bottoms. Pc Smith, Pc Dupree and Pc Patel make a written record of all the suspicious transactions and take covert photographs.
That evening Pc Jeannette Dupree is off duty and is with her new boyfriend, Simeon, enjoying a romantic meal at a local restaurant. Just as they were ordering their dessert a woman approaches their table and pours a glass of red wine over Simeon. She calls Jeannette a ‘slut’. The woman is Simeon’s wife. Jeannette had no idea that Simeon was married. Jeannette is very embarrassed and distressed so she leaves the restaurant immediately. Unfortunately, whilst trying to manoeuvre her car from its parking space in the restaurant car park Jeannette crashes into Kevin’s Lamborghini which was parked in the adjacent space. The damage caused to the Lamborghini is estimated to be between £10,000 – £12,000.
The next day, whilst Pc Dupree is still off duty, Pc Smith and Pc Patel decide that they will do a ‘stop and search’ on the man to see if any further action is needed.
As the man they observed the previous day leaves the betting shop and walks towards the wall of the car park, they approach him. Despite being in plain clothes the man recognises Pc Patel and changes direction, slightly quickening his pace as he does so. The two police officers catch up with him and confront him. At that point Pc Patel recognises the man as David Waller. Waller is a local man aged 22 years whom Pc Patel has arrested in the past.
Pc Patel says, “Hello David, you know me don’t you?”
Waller replies sheepishly, “Hello Pc Patel, how are you?” He attempts to keep his mouth closed whilst speaking.
Pc Patel replies, “I’m fine David, but Pc Smith and I wish to do a drugs search under Section 23 (2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. We have been observing you for a while. Please spit out what you have in your mouth.”
Waller then appears to be about to swallow something, at which point Pc Patel puts his right hand on Waller’s neck, squeezes his throat tightly and says again, “Spit out the stuff in your mouth now.” Gasping for air Waller does as instructed, and ten small folded pieces of paper (‘wraps’) are spat out. They also find approximately £50 in his tracksuit pocket in various denominations.
Forensic analysis later confirmed the wraps contain illegal ‘Class A’ drugs.
Waller is arrested under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and detained at the local police station. He makes ‘no comment’ under interview when questioned by the police officers in the presence of his legal advisor.
Waller has no past convictions for drug offences. However he has numerous previous convictions for offences such as theft, burglary and theft of dwellings, criminal damage, and minor offences of violence. He has one conviction for breach of bail although that offence was committed as a juvenile when he was 15 years old. He served a 3 month term of imprisonment for that conviction. He lives with his grandmother; his parents, with whom he has no contact, having split up years ago. The police intelligence suggests he is a member of a local ‘street gang’ that is criminally active in the neighbourhood.
Page 15 of 17
Legal Method Referred coursework 2016-17 (Approved by EE Dec 2016)
Question one
Kevin decides to sue Jeannette Dupree in respect of the damage to his Lamborghini. Last year Kevin was involved in a highly publicised successful legal action with his ex-business partner and is known to be very stubborn and litigious.
. (a) With reference to primary authority, advise Kevin in which court(s) he should commence his claim.
. (b) Jeanette is very alarmed when she receives the claim form and decides to ignore it hoping that Kevin will change his mind. Kevin, however, is determined to proceed with the claim. Explain, with reference to primary authority, what Kevin can do in this situation.
. (c) Ignore the facts in (b) above. Jeanette is anxious to settle to proceedings as soon as possible. She spoke to Kevin on the telephone and offered him £11,000 to settle the claim on a ‘without prejudice’ basis. Kevin immediately rejected her offer and said that he would ‘see her in court’. With reference to primary authority, explain what Jeannette can do in this situation and the possible ‘costs’ implications of your recommendations if the matter does eventually go to trial.
Question two
The Police wish to charge Waller with an offence under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and approach the Crown Prosecution Service for a decision to prosecute.
Taking account of the specific features of this scenario only, explain fully in your own words, with reference to the Code for Crown prosecutors the factors the CPS would have to consider before commencing a prosecution against Billy.
Note
• Assume all the actions taken by the police officers were lawful they are lawful under the relevant surveillance legislation.
• The local shopkeepers have not made statements. Question three 
Waller is charged by the police on the recommendations of the Crown Prosecution Service of possession of Class A drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. This is an either way offence. At his first court appearance his defence lawyer requests an adjournment of two weeks in order to fully prepare a defence. His client intends to plead not guilty to the charge. 
Explain in your own words, with reference to the relevant primary law, and any case law that may be appropriate, what criteria the Magistrates will take into account in their consideration whether to grant him bail, either conditionally or unconditionally, over that two week period. 
Note. Waller was drug tested under the relevant legal authority after charge. There is no evidence of Class A drugs in his system.

Page 16 of 17
Question four
Legal Method Referred coursework 2016-17 (Approved by EE Dec 2016)
Waller is remanded in custody and sent for trial to the Crown Court at a date to be decided. However in the meantime he re-applies for bail to a Crown Court judge and is granted conditional bail. One week later, in a large operation conducted by the Police Major Drugs Unit, he is arrested in possession of a substantial amount of Class A drugs and subsequently charged and remanded in custody. Six months later Waller appears at court, pleading ‘not guilty’ to all charges against him.
Waller is convicted at his Crown court trial, and is sentenced to three years imprisonment. Soon afterwards his barrister receives a letter from one of the jurors complaining that there was some racial bias in the jury deliberations against his client because Waller is a Muslim. Waller’s barrister intends to appeal against the conviction on the grounds of the racial bias by the jury.
a. With reference to the relevant primary law in this area fully explore what issues of law concerning jury bias this scenario raises. Ensure you support your application of the law with reference to the relevant case law and legislation where appropriate. Support your answer with conclusions where possible.
b. Assume that the facts in (a) above are changed in that instead of racial bias within the jury room, Waller’s barrister is told that one of the members of the jury was a solicitor specialising in commercial contracts. Waller is convicted.
With reference to the relevant primary law in this area fully explore what contentious issues of law concerning an appeal to the Court of Appeal this scenario might raise. Ensure you support your application of the law with reference to the relevant case law and legislation where appropriate. Support your answer with conclusions where possible.
Note
• You are not required to discuss the procedural aspects of the appeal process or Criminal Appeal Act 1995 in any of your answers to question 4.
• Failure to fully explore the relevant primary law including case law and legislation where relevant in your answers will be penalised.

Page 17 of 17

Legal Analysis
Student’s Name
Institutional Affiliation

Legal Analysis
Part A: Blake v Chester City Council [2012]
1.
The facts of the case include an appellant woman who was married and she had two children. In 2008, she had left her matrimonial home and took her children. The matrimonial was rented using the sole name of his husband. In interview with housing officials, she explained that her husband did not like her and was suspecting that she was seeing another lady (R v Hillingdon London Borough Council, Ex p Puhlhofer [1986). She was concerned that if she confirms the husband, he will hit her. No any instance has the husband hit her. However, she complains that his husband has been shouting at her at the presence of the children (Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd [2001). The housing officers ruled that she could be judged to be homeless as the husband has never threatened or hit her. She sought help from solicitors seeking for the review of the decision.
2.
The legal issue raised from the case was whether the women could be legally judged to be homeless because of feeling threatened by his husband? The legal question sought to determine whether when a woman feels uncomfortable at her matrimonial home she has the right to be judged to be homeless based on violence (Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd [2001].
3.
In the case, Lady Hale employed an in-depth statutory interpretation to the meaning of violence. She argued that any potential threats or feeling of uncomforted should be substantial to justify be claimed to be homeless(R v Ireland [1998]. It is because there was no significant evidence to show that the husband was violent towards her and the children as well.
4.
In statutory interpretation, Lady Hale referred intrinsic guidelines of the Family Act that prohibits any form of violence including psychological torture. The in-depth interpretation by Lady Hale sought to ensure that the plaintiff did not feel any threats or undermined in the matrimonial home (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010]. She furthers demands that the woman should be respected and treated with dignity. Thus, the intrinsic view of the family law helped Lady Hale to form her statutory interpretation.
5.
The ratio decidendi of Blake v. Chester City Council was judicial precedent set by past cases and the amended Housing Act 1988. The Housing Act 1988 provided for new guidelines that stated that introduced secure tenancies for new way of getting the possession of dwellings for married persons by a local authority within a secure tenancy whereby one party fled away because of violence from one partner and she is not likely to return (Watts v Walford Borough Council [2000].
Part B:
Question One
(a)
Based on the Civil Procedures Rules, it is advisable for Kevin to commence his claim at the county court. Civil Procedures Rules states any civil action seeking damages in excess of $15,000 should be started at the high court. However, any civil lawsuit below $15,000 should start at the county courts. In terms of the legal guidelines, Kevin should have launched the legal suit at the county level. It is because only on the county courts had the jurisdiction to adjudicate such civil matters. The magnitude of the damages was lower to be started at the high court.
(b)
Based on the Civil Procedures Rules, Kevin, the claimant is supposed to issue a claim form to the defendant. After serving the claim form, the defendant is given a period of 28 days in which to decide whether to counter the claims or prepare defense. Kevin had followed the stipulated procedures in issuing claimant, Jeanette with a claim form. However, Jeanette ignored to respond to the claims. It is recommendable for Kevin to wait until the period of 28 days has elapsed and he would win the case through default. In spite of all, additional court documents could be served at the court to clarify the position of both parties involved in the civil action. The court documents mainly include claim form, details of the claims, and any potential counterclaim issued.
(c)
If the matter goes to trial, Jeannette would have to suffer increases costs in the settling of the claims. Even though Kevin rejected the offer of £11,000, Jeannette cannot compel Kevin to accept the offer. However, she can state that she was willing to settle the dispute out of court. The judge listening to the civil lawsuit could compel Kevin to accept the offer or provide specific damages that Jeannette should pay to Kevin. In terms of the legal costs, Jeannette will be required to cover for 60%-65% of the total legal costs and expenses. Therefore, Jeannette should try to convince Kevin to settle out of court as when the case goes to trial, the legal costs and damages would increase the cost of the overall case.
Question Two
Based on the Code for Crown prosecutors, the prosecutors will consider the various factors before starting a prosecution against Billy. One of the critical factors is to consider whether the evidence provided is adequate to proceed with the prosecution. The prosecutors will check whether the evidence provided is admissible in the court. To determine admissibility of the evidence, the prosecutors will review the possibility of the evidence of being inadmissible in the court and the significance of the evidence to the overall evidence. They also consider the reliability and credibility of the evidence provided. They also review whether the evidence is of public interest. Other critical factors that the prosecutors consider is determining whether the offence committed are serious, assessing the level of culpability, and the situations that could hurt the victims among others.
Question Three
Based on the Crown Prosecution Service procedures, the Magistrates will consider the risks of the offendant commuting the same crimes after being granted bail within the two weeks period. Evidence shows that Waller has been convinced for various crimes in the past and that would lead to the magistrates limiting the potential of granting him bail. Waller does not use drugs and thus, he does not need any medical intervention. The criteria will lead to the magistrates denying granting Waller bail over the two week period.
Question four
a.
Based on the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the jury is expected to act without prejudice and bias. Jury bias can rise in various scenarios including when the legal evidence is not followed in the final decision process. In addition, when the jury’s decision clearly violates the law, bias can be determined to have occurred in the jury process. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 recommends that the jury should remain independent and objective at all times. If it is determined that the jury were biased, Waller might get reprieve through the review of the sentence by an independent panel.
b.
In the case of one jury being a solicitor in commercial contracts, the jury’s decision would not be changed or reviewed because the specialization of a jury member is not significant to the courts’ proceedings. A jury member cannot be disqualified for specializing in commercial contracts. The barrister of Waller must justify his claims against the solicitor through stating matters of conflict of interests or any potential involvement in business with his client.

References
Blake (Appellant) v Chester City Council (Respondent) [2012] 1 UKSC LADY HALE
Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd [2001] 1 AC 27, at p 49
Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed reissue, vol 44(1) (1995), p 904, para 1473.”
Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 68.
Practice Direction (Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence) (No 2) [2009] 1 WLR 251, para 2,
R v Hillingdon London Borough Council, Ex p Puhlhofer [1986] AC 484.
R v Ireland [1998] AC 147, 158, per Lord Steyn; Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, 3rd ed (1997), p 686.
Section 23 (2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.
Tilsley v Manchester Council [2006] EWCA Civ 1404.
Watts v Walford Borough Council [2000] EWCA Civ 
1444, and R v Ireland [1998] AC 147.

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