Posted: October 20th, 2022

Examination Questions

General Instructions

• It is graded on a 100 point scale; letter grades are in accordance with CGSC Bulletin 903.
• Answers must be typed, double-spaced (Times New Roman font size 12 with 1 inch margins). Also, answers must be no more than 2 pages in length per question. Clearly identify the
question you are answering.
• You must cite all sources for your answers. Refer to ST 22-2 for additional information about citations.
•
Examination Questions

1._____ (30 points): As President Obama observed, “It is in our vital national interest to send an addi-tional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan” (speech attached). What vital national interest is at risk in Af-ghanistan and how does our military involvement support the vital national interest Explain and sup-port your point of view using specific examples from official U.S. documents (NSS, NDS, QDR, etc.).

2._____ (30 points): How does the 2008 National Defense Strategy counterbalance DoD’s tendency to focus on conventional conflicts rather than irregular wars
3._____ (25 points): What are the ends and associated ways and means of the attached Report on U.S. Strategy towards Somalia
4._____ (15 points): What risk do you see in the attached Report on U.S. Strategy towards Somalia (For a discussion on risk, see Testing Strategy’s Logic and Risk, provided at the end of the exam).
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
December 01, 2009

Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Eisenhower Hall Theatre, United States Military Academy at West Point, West Point, New York
8:01 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Good evening. To the United States Corps of Cadets, to the men and women of our Armed Ser-vices, and to my fellow Americans: I want to speak to you tonight about our effort in Afghanistan — the nature of our commitment there, the scope of our interests, and the strategy that my administration will pursue to bring this war to a successful conclusion. It’s an extraordinary honor for me to do so here at West Point — where so many men and women have prepared to stand up for our security, and to represent what is finest about our country.
To address these important issues, it’s important to recall why America and our allies were compelled to fight a war in Afghanistan in the first place. We did not ask for this fight. On September 11, 2001, 19 men hijacked four airplanes and used them to murder nearly 3,000 people. They struck at our military and economic nerve cen-ters. They took the lives of innocent men, women, and children without regard to their faith or race or sta-tion. Were it not for the heroic actions of passengers onboard one of those flights, they could have also struck at one of the great symbols of our democracy in Washington, and killed many more.
As we know, these men belonged to al Qaeda — a group of extremists who have distorted and defiled Is-lam, one of the world’s great religions, to justify the slaughter of innocents. Al Qaeda’s base of operations was in Afghanistan, where they were harbored by the Taliban — a ruthless, repressive and radical movement that seized control of that country after it was ravaged by years of Soviet occupation and civil war, and after the attention of America and our friends had turned elsewhere.
Just days after 9/11, Congress authorized the use of force against al Qaeda and those who harbored them — an authorization that continues to this day. The vote in the Senate was 98 to nothing. The vote in the House was 420 to 1. For the first time in its history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization invoked Article 5 — the commitment that says an attack on one member nation is an attack on all. And the United Nations Security Council endorsed the use of all necessary steps to respond to the 9/11 attacks. America, our allies and the world were acting as one to destroy al Qaeda’s terrorist network and to protect our common security.
Under the banner of this domestic unity and international legitimacy — and only after the Taliban refused to turn over Osama bin Laden — we sent our troops into Afghanistan. Within a matter of months, al Qaeda was scat-tered and many of its operatives were killed. The Taliban was driven from power and pushed back on its heels. A place that had known decades of fear now had reason to hope. At a conference convened by the U.N., a provision-al government was established under President Hamid Karzai. And an International Security Helpance Force was established to help bring a lasting peace to a war-torn country.
Then, in early 2003, the decision was made to wage a second war, in Iraq. The wrenching debate over the Iraq war is well-known and need not be repeated here. It’s enough to say that for the next six years, the Iraq war drew the dominant share of our troops, our resources, our diplomacy, and our national attention — and that the decision to go into Iraq caused substantial rifts between America and much of the world.
Today, after extraordinary costs, we are bringing the Iraq war to a responsible end. We will remove our combat brigades from Iraq by the end of next summer, and all of our troops by the end of 2011. That we are doing so is a testament to the character of the men and women in uniform. (Applause.) Thanks to their courage, grit and perseverance, we have given Iraqis a chance to shape their future, and we are successfully leaving Iraq to its peo-ple.
But while we’ve achieved hard-earned milestones in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorat-ed. After escaping across the border into Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, al Qaeda’s leadership established a safe haven there. Although a legitimate government was elected by the Afghan people, it’s been hampered by corruption, the drug trade, an under-developed economy, and insufficient security forces.
Over the last several years, the Taliban has maintained common cause with al Qaeda, as they both seek an overthrow of the Afghan government. Gradually, the Taliban has begun to control additional swaths of territory in Afghanistan, while engaging in increasingly brazen and devastating attacks of terrorism against the Pakistani people.
Now, throughout this period, our troop levels in Afghanistan remained a fraction of what they were in Iraq. When I took office, we had just over 32,000 Americans serving in Afghanistan, compared to 160,000 in Iraq at the peak of the war. Commanders in Afghanistan repeatedly asked for support to deal with the reemergence of the Taliban, but these reinforcements did not arrive. And that’s why, shortly after taking office, I approved a longstand-ing request for more troops. After consultations with our allies, I then announced a strategy recognizing the fun-damental connection between our war effort in Afghanistan and the extremist safe havens in Pakistan. I set a goal that was narrowly defined as disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and its extremist allies, and pledged to better coordinate our military and civilian efforts.
Since then, we’ve made progress on some important objectives. High-ranking al Qaeda and Taliban leaders have been killed, and we’ve stepped up the pressure on al Qaeda worldwide. In Pakistan, that nation’s army has gone on its largest offensive in years. In Afghanistan, we and our allies prevented the Taliban from stopping a presi-dential election, and — although it was marred by fraud — that election produced a government that is consistent with Afghanistan’s laws and constitution.
Yet huge challenges remain. Afghanistan is not lost, but for several years it has moved backwards. There’s no imminent threat of the government being overthrown, but the Taliban has gained momentum. Al Qaeda has not reemerged in Afghanistan in the same numbers as before 9/11, but they retain their safe havens along the bor-der. And our forces lack the full support they need to effectively train and partner with Afghan security forces and better secure the population. Our new commander in Afghanistan — General McChrystal — has reported that the security situation is more serious than he anticipated. In short: The status quo is not sustainable.
As cadets, you volunteered for service during this time of danger. Some of you fought in Afghani-stan. Some of you will deploy there. As your Commander-in-Chief, I owe you a mission that is clearly defined, and worthy of your service. And that’s why, after the Afghan voting was completed, I insisted on a thorough review of our strategy. Now, let me be clear: There has never been an option before me that called for troop deployments before 2010, so there has been no delay or denial of resources necessary for the conduct of the war during this review period. Instead, the review has allowed me to ask the hard questions, and to explore all the different op-tions, along with my national security team, our military and civilian leadership in Afghanistan, and our key part-ners. And given the stakes involved, I owed the American people — and our troops — no less.
This review is now complete. And as Commander-in-Chief, I have determined that it is in our vital nation-al interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home. These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can al-low for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan.
I do not make this decision lightly. I opposed the war in Iraq precisely because I believe that we must exer-cise restraint in the use of military force, and always consider the long-term consequences of our actions. We have been at war now for eight years, at enormous cost in lives and resources. Years of debate over Iraq and terrorism have left our unity on national security issues in tatters, and created a highly polarized and partisan backdrop for this effort. And having just experienced the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, the American peo-ple are understandably focused on rebuilding our economy and putting people to work here at home.
Most of all, I know that this decision asks even more of you — a military that, along with your families, has already borne the heaviest of all burdens. As President, I have signed a letter of condolence to the family of each American who gives their life in these wars. I have read the letters from the parents and spouses of those who de-ployed. I visited our courageous wounded warriors at Walter Reed. I’ve traveled to Dover to meet the flag-draped caskets of 18 Americans returning home to their final resting place. I see firsthand the terrible wages of war. If I did not think that the security of the United States and the safety of the American people were at stake in Afghanistan, I would gladly order every single one of our troops home tomorrow.
So, no, I do not make this decision lightly. I make this decision because I am convinced that our security is at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is the epicenter of violent extremism practiced by al Qaeda. It is from here that we were attacked on 9/11, and it is from here that new attacks are being plotted as I speak. This is no idle danger; no hypothetical threat. In the last few months alone, we have apprehended extremists within our borders who were sent here from the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan to commit new acts of terror. And this dan-ger will only grow if the region slides backward and al Qaeda can operate with impunity. We must keep the pres-sure on al Qaeda, and to do that, we must increase the stability and capacity of our partners in the region.
Of course, this burden is not ours alone to bear. This is not just America’s war. Since 9/11, al Qaeda’s safe havens have been the source of attacks against London and Amman and Bali. The people and governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan are endangered. And the stakes are even higher within a nuclear-armed Pakistan, be-cause we know that al Qaeda and other extremists seek nuclear weapons, and we have every reason to believe that they would use them.
These facts compel us to act along with our friends and allies. Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.
To meet that goal, we will pursue the following objectives within Afghanistan. We must deny al Qaeda a safe haven. We must reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government so that they can take lead respon-sibility for Afghanistan’s future.
We will meet these objectives in three ways. First, we will pursue a military strategy that will break the Taliban’s momentum and increase Afghanistan’s capacity over the next 18 months.
The 30,000 additional troops that I’m announcing tonight will deploy in the first part of 2010 — the fastest possible pace — so that they can target the insurgency and secure key population centers. They’ll increase our abil-ity to train competent Afghan security forces, and to partner with them so that more Afghans can get into the fight. And they will help create the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans.
Because this is an international effort, I’ve asked that our commitment be joined by contributions from our allies. Some have already provided additional troops, and we’re confident that there will be further contributions in the days and weeks ahead. Our friends have fought and bled and died alongside us in Afghanistan. And now, we must come together to end this war successfully. For what’s at stake is not simply a test of NATO’s credibility — what’s at stake is the security of our allies, and the common security of the world.
But taken together, these additional American and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces, and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011. Just as we have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground. We’ll continue to advise and Help Afghanistan’s security forces to ensure that they can succeed over the long haul. But it will be clear to the Afghan government — and, more importantly, to the Afghan people — that they will ultimately be responsible for their own country.
Second, we will work with our partners, the United Nations, and the Afghan people to pursue a more effec-tive civilian strategy, so that the government can take advantage of improved security.
This effort must be based on performance. The days of providing a blank check are over. President Kar-zai’s inauguration speech sent the right message about moving in a new direction. And going forward, we will be clear about what we expect from those who receive our Helpance. We’ll support Afghan ministries, governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and deliver for the people. We expect those who are ineffective or cor-rupt to be held accountable. And we will also focus our Helpance in areas — such as agriculture — that can make an immediate impact in the lives of the Afghan people.
The people of Afghanistan have endured violence for decades. They’ve been confronted with occupation — by the Soviet Union, and then by foreign al Qaeda fighters who used Afghan land for their own purposes. So to-night, I want the Afghan people to understand — America seeks an end to this era of war and suffering. We have no interest in occupying your country. We will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those Taliban who abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens. And we will seek a partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual respect — to isolate those who destroy; to strengthen those who build; to has-ten the day when our troops will leave; and to forge a lasting friendship in which America is your partner, and never your patron.
Third, we will act with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our part-nership with Pakistan.
We’re in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through that country. But this same cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan. That’s why we need a strategy that works on both sides of the border.
In the past, there have been those in Pakistan who’ve argued that the struggle against extremism is not their fight, and that Pakistan is better off doing little or seeking accommodation with those who use violence. But in recent years, as innocents have been killed from Karachi to Islamabad, it has become clear that it is the Pakistani people who are the most endangered by extremism. Public opinion has turned. The Pakistani army has waged an offensive in Swat and South Waziristan. And there is no doubt that the United States and Pakistan share a common enemy.
In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan narrowly. Those days are over. Moving forward, we are committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust. We will strengthen Pakistan’s capacity to target those groups that threaten our countries, and have made it clear that we cannot tolerate a safe haven for terrorists whose location is known and whose inten-tions are clear. America is also providing substantial resources to support Pakistan’s democracy and develop-ment. We are the largest international supporter for those Pakistanis displaced by the fighting. And going forward, the Pakistan people must know America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan’s security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent, so that the great potential of its people can be unleashed.
These are the three core elements of our strategy: a military effort to create the conditions for a transi-tion; a civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and an effective partnership with Pakistan.
I recognize there are a range of concerns about our approach. So let me briefly address a few of the more prominent arguments that I’ve heard, and which I take very seriously.
First, there are those who suggest that Afghanistan is another Vietnam. They argue that it cannot be stabi-lized, and we’re better off cutting our losses and rapidly withdrawing. I believe this argument depends on a false reading of history. Unlike Vietnam, we are joined by a broad coalition of 43 nations that recognizes the legitimacy of our action. Unlike Vietnam, we are not facing a broad-based popular insurgency. And most importantly, unlike Vi-etnam, the American people were viciously attacked from Afghanistan, and remain a target for those same extrem-ists who are plotting along its border. To abandon this area now — and to rely only on efforts against al Qaeda from a distance — would significantly hamper our ability to keep the pressure on al Qaeda, and create an unacceptable risk of additional attacks on our homeland and our allies.
Second, there are those who acknowledge that we can’t leave Afghanistan in its current state, but suggest that we go forward with the troops that we already have. But this would simply maintain a status quo in which we muddle through, and permit a slow deterioration of conditions there. It would ultimately prove more costly and prolong our stay in Afghanistan, because we would never be able to generate the conditions needed to train Af-ghan security forces and give them the space to take over.
Finally, there are those who oppose identifying a time frame for our transition to Afghan responsibil-ity. Indeed, some call for a more dramatic and open-ended escalation of our war effort — one that would commit us to a nation-building project of up to a decade. I reject this course because it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost, and what we need to achieve to secure our interests. Furthermore, the absence of a time frame for transition would deny us any sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government. It must be clear that Afghans will have to take responsibility for their security, and that America has no interest in fighting an endless war in Afghanistan.
As President, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests. And I must weigh all of the challenges that our nation faces. I don’t have the luxury of committing to just one. Indeed, I’m mindful of the words of President Eisenhower, who — in discussing our national security — said, “Each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs.”
Over the past several years, we have lost that balance. We’ve failed to appreciate the connection be-tween our national security and our economy. In the wake of an economic crisis, too many of our neighbors and friends are out of work and struggle to pay the bills. Too many Americans are worried about the future facing our children. Meanwhile, competition within the global economy has grown more fierce. So we can’t simply afford to ignore the price of these wars.
All told, by the time I took office the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan approached a trillion dol-lars. Going forward, I am committed to addressing these costs openly and honestly. Our new approach in Afghani-stan is likely to cost us roughly $30 billion for the military this year, and I’ll work closely with Congress to address these costs as we work to bring down our deficit.
But as we end the war in Iraq and transition to Afghan responsibility, we must rebuild our strength here at home. Our prosperity provides a foundation for our power. It pays for our military. It underwrites our diploma-cy. It taps the potential of our people, and allows investment in new industry. And it will allow us to compete in this century as successfully as we did in the last. That’s why our troop commitment in Afghanistan cannot be open-ended — because the nation that I’m most interested in building is our own.
Now, let me be clear: None of this will be easy. The struggle against violent extremism will not be finished quickly, and it extends well beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan. It will be an enduring test of our free society, and our leadership in the world. And unlike the great power conflicts and clear lines of division that defined the 20th cen-tury, our effort will involve disorderly regions, failed states, diffuse enemies.
So as a result, America will have to show our strength in the way that we end wars and prevent conflict — not just how we wage wars. We’ll have to be nimble and precise in our use of military power. Where al Qaeda and its allies attempt to establish a foothold — whether in Somalia or Yemen or elsewhere — they must be confronted by growing pressure and strong partnerships.
And we can’t count on military might alone. We have to invest in our homeland security, because we can’t capture or kill every violent extremist abroad. We have to improve and better coordinate our intelligence, so that we stay one step ahead of shadowy networks.
We will have to take away the tools of mass destruction. And that’s why I’ve made it a central pillar of my foreign policy to secure loose nuclear materials from terrorists, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and to pur-sue the goal of a world without them — because every nation must understand that true security will never come from an endless race for ever more destructive weapons; true security will come for those who reject them.
We’ll have to use diplomacy, because no one nation can meet the challenges of an interconnected world acting alone. I’ve spent this year renewing our alliances and forging new partnerships. And we have forged a new beginning between America and the Muslim world — one that recognizes our mutual interest in breaking a cycle of conflict, and that promises a future in which those who kill innocents are isolated by those who stand up for peace and prosperity and human dignity.
And finally, we must draw on the strength of our values — for the challenges that we face may have changed, but the things that we believe in must not. That’s why we must promote our values by living them at home — which is why I have prohibited torture and will close the prison at Guantanamo Bay. And we must make it clear to every man, woman and child around the world who lives under the dark cloud of tyranny that America will speak out on behalf of their human rights, and tend to the light of freedom and justice and opportunity and respect for the dignity of all peoples. That is who we are. That is the source, the moral source, of America’s authority.
Since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, and the service and sacrifice of our grandparents and great-grandparents, our country has borne a special burden in global affairs. We have spilled American blood in many countries on multiple continents. We have spent our revenue to help others rebuild from rubble and develop their own economies. We have joined with others to develop an architecture of institutions — from the United Nations to NATO to the World Bank — that provide for the common security and prosperity of human beings.
We have not always been thanked for these efforts, and we have at times made mistakes. But more than any other nation, the United States of America has underwritten global security for over six decades — a time that, for all its problems, has seen walls come down, and markets open, and billions lifted from poverty, unparalleled sci-entific progress and advancing frontiers of human liberty.
For unlike the great powers of old, we have not sought world domination. Our union was founded in re-sistance to oppression. We do not seek to occupy other nations. We will not claim another nation’s resources or target other peoples because their faith or ethnicity is different from ours. What we have fought for — what we continue to fight for — is a better future for our children and grandchildren. And we believe that their lives will be better if other peoples’ children and grandchildren can live in freedom and access opportunity. (Applause.)
As a country, we’re not as young — and perhaps not as innocent — as we were when Roosevelt was Presi-dent. Yet we are still heirs to a noble struggle for freedom. And now we must summon all of our might and moral suasion to meet the challenges of a new age.
In the end, our security and leadership does not come solely from the strength of our arms. It derives from our people — from the workers and businesses who will rebuild our economy; from the entrepreneurs and researchers who will pioneer new industries; from the teachers that will educate our children, and the service of those who work in our communities at home; from the diplomats and Peace Corps volunteers who spread hope abroad; and from the men and women in uniform who are part of an unbroken line of sacrifice that has made gov-ernment of the people, by the people, and for the people a reality on this Earth. (Applause.)
This vast and diverse citizenry will not always agree on every issue — nor should we. But I also know that we, as a country, cannot sustain our leadership, nor navigate the momentous challenges of our time, if we allow ourselves to be split asunder by the same rancor and cynicism and partisanship that has in recent times poisoned our national discourse.
It’s easy to forget that when this war began, we were united — bound together by the fresh memory of a horrific attack, and by the determination to defend our homeland and the values we hold dear. I refuse to accept the notion that we cannot summon that unity again. (Applause.) I believe with every fiber of my being that we — as Americans — can still come together behind a common purpose. For our values are not simply words written into parchment — they are a creed that calls us together, and that has carried us through the darkest of storms as one nation, as one people.
America — we are passing through a time of great trial. And the message that we send in the midst of these storms must be clear: that our cause is just, our resolve unwavering. We will go forward with the confidence that right makes might, and with the commitment to forge an America that is safer, a world that is more secure, and a future that represents not the deepest of fears but the highest of hopes. (Applause.)
Thank you. God bless you. May God bless the United States of America. (Applause.) Thank you very much. Thank you. (Applause.)

END 8:35 P.M. EST

Comprehensive Regional Strategy on Somalia: A Strategy for U. S. Engagement
Report to Congress
February 2007

Report on U. S. Strategy towards Somalia

This report is submitted consistent with the requirement in the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007 (P.L.109-364), that the President will submit a report on a comprehensive regional strategy toward Somalia within the context of United States policy and activities in the countries in the Horn of Africa and other relevant countries in the Arabian Peninsula.

U.S. Policy towards Somalia
For the first time in more than a dozen years, Somalis may have a real opportunity to rebuild their country and re-store effective and representative central institutions of governance. The United States is actively and purposefully working to help Somalis seize this opportunity. In January 2007, Helpant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi E. Frazer, and other U.S. officials held consultations with Somalis and other regional leaders in Kenya, Dji-bouti, Ethiopia, and Yemen in support of broader efforts to achieve lasting stability in Somalia. A key theme to emerge from these consultations was that Somalis are tired of war and ready for peace. The international communi-ty has signaled its support for the Somali people through the work of the International Contact Group on Somalia, the African Union, and the United Nations to Help in achieving a peaceful, stable, and inclusive Somalia. Although the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the components of which are known as the Transitional Federal Institu-tions (TFls), are not yet ready to stand entirely on their own, they offer a promising, though nascent way forward for Somalia.
U.S. foreign policy objectives in Somalia are to eliminate the terrorist threat and promote political stability by supporting the establishment of a functioning central government, and to address the humanitarian needs of the Somali people. Our policy interests in the region are to eliminate any platform for al-Qaida or other terrorist opera-tions, to promote and support regional stability and representative governance, to provide humanitarian Helpance in the wake of drought, flooding, and 16 years of near-constant conflict in southern/central Somalia, and to work with governments in the region to transform their countries through investing in people and good governance and promoting economic growth. The United States, in coordination with our regional and international partners is ac-tively engaged in encouraging a process of inclusive dialogue and reconciliation between the TFIs and key stake-holders in Somalia, including business leaders, clan elders, civil society, women’s groups, and moderate Islamists.
Within the policy framework articulated above, there are three priority U.S. initiatives for Somalia. First, encourage political dialogue between the Transitional Federal Institutions and other key Somali stakeholders with the goal of forming an inclusive government of national unity based on the framework of the Transitional Federal Charter. Second, achieve rapid deployment of an African stabilization force. Third, mobilize international Helpance to help build the governance capacity of the Transitional Federal Institutions. The United States does not view these objectives as distinct elements, but rather as mutually supportive elements of a comprehensive strategy, with the security· and political components functioning as two simultaneous efforts, progressing toward the same end point.

Political Dialogue
Broad-based political dialogue that will lead to reconciliation and a political consensus is crucial if Somalia is to achieve a sustainable solution to this long-running conflict. The key to long-term stability in Somalia now lies in a process of inclusive dialogue and reconciliation. The leaders of the TFG must initiate and sustain this process. To a great extent, the ability to achieve reconciliation will be determined by the governments’ willingness to reach out and create an inclusive political process. However, the creation of an inclusive political process remains the great-est challenge. The statement that President Abdullahi Yusuf Aluned made to the International Contact Group on Somalia pledging to reach out to Somali stakeholders was a positive step, but the statements of the TFG leadership must be matched by positive actions inside Somalia.
The United States continues to encourage the TFG leadership to make clear through their statements and actions that they are committed to an inclusive process of dialogue and reconciliation. The promotion of political dialogue and reconciliation is at the heart of the mandate laid out for the TFG as a “transitional government by the Transitional Federal Charter.
The Transitional Federal Charter stipulates that the TFG prepare for national elections to be held and a tru-ly representative national government to be elected in 2009. We have been clear and firm that we see a role in the future of Somalia for all those who renounce violence and extremism, and we strongly believe that the TFG must reach out to groups that have previously been excluded from the political process. We continue to urge the TFG leadership to reach out to key groups inside Somalia, including clan leaders, business and civil society womens groups, and religious leaders, among others. These groups, particularly those in Mogadishu, must also demonstrate their willingness to engage with the TFG and to work together constructively.
Additionally, The United States continues to urge the TFG leadership to reach out to traditional and moder-ate Islamists, including individuals formerly affiliated with the now-defunct Council of Islamic Courts, and moderate groups not previously incorporated into the Council of Islamic Courts. We do not believe that the Council of Islamic Courts should be reconstituted as a political entity, but the IFG should reach out to the diverse range of loca1, or-ganic courts affiliated with various clans. Political dialogue must move forward quickly to reach a sustainable solu-tion on the basis of the Transitional Federal Charter, to stabilize the situation in Mogadishu and allow all components of the TFIs to relocate to the country’s capital. In coordination with our African and international partners, the Unit-ed States will remain engaged in supporting the ongoing efforts to achieve inclusive dialogue, while also attending to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people.

Security and Stability
The most urgent U.S. policy objective is to stabilize the situation in southern Somalia and provide a secure environ-ment for political dialogue through the deployment of a stabilization force to Somalia. Peace and long term stability are objectives shared by Somalis, regional leaders, the African Union (AU), and the Arab League, as well as other international actors, and we are working together to realize this common objective. Uganda has offered to deploy 1,500 troops to Somalia pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1725, which will allow Ethiopian forces to begin withdrawing while preventing the creation of a security vacuum. On January 19, 2007, the African Union Peace and Security Council endorsed the deployment of an African Union stabilization mission in Somalia. Early deployment of this mission will be a key element in instilling in the Somali people confidence that the peace process is underway and fully supported by the international community.
As a crucial component of our policy to bring stability to Somalia, we are supporting the deployment of the African peacekeeping mission, and in particular the Ugandan contingent, which requires support with strategic transport, equipment procurement, and other logistics. Immediate U.S. support includes $2 million for strategic transportation and, $8 million for peacekeeping equipment for the Ugandan force, as well as technical Helpance. The AU is also working on plans to strengthen the Ugandan deployment, and other African countries are beginning to offer troops for this effort. The United States will also Help with force generation by training and equipping Afri-can contingents deploying to Somalia through the African Contingency Operations Training and Helpance (ACOT A) program. ACOTA has 18 partner countries and is prepared to provide expeditious predeployment training to other African contingents.
It is important to note that the Somali people must take responsibility for maintaining security at the local level without resorting to the warlordism of the past. The TFG must make development of a civilian police force a priority, along with the formation of a unified military representative of all of Somalia’s clans. TFG efforts will be supported by the deployment of a stabilization force to Somalia, which will provide a secure environment in which a political process can move forward and effective security institutions can be developed.

Building Capacity in the Transitional Federal Institutions
Developments in Somalia remain highly fluid. The fragile, nascent TFIs are only beginning to function and are only beginning to control territory, while spoilers and extremists continue to undermine stability. U.S. engagement seeks to support the TFIs and encourage reconciliation among key Somali stakeholders. Given the absence of functioning institutions in Somalia for over 15 years, the rebuilding of law enforcement, judicial, health, education, and other services will largely be starting from scratch and will require significant external Helpance. U.S. foreign Helpance is carefully targeted to simultaneously strengthen the capacity of the TFIs, develop domestic security capabilities, bol-ster civil society, promote reconciliation and peace, invest in the health and education sectors to enhance the foundation for an economically productive workforce, and respond to the humanitarian needs of vulnerable popu-lations.
Although donor support will be a critical element in building the governance capacity of the TFIs, the com-mitment of the Somali diaspora to support financially the development of effective governance institutions in Soma-lia will be equally, if not more, important than the efforts of state and institutional donors. Diaspora remittances to Somalia are estimated at $800 million – $1 billion per year, far outweighing any potential contribution from Somalia’s international donor partners. The U.S. strategy for Soma1ia includes outreach to Somali diaspora communities in the United States to urge additional financial and political support for the TFIs.
At the January 5, 2007 meeting of the International Contact Group on Somalia, Helpant Secretary Frazer signaled the Administration’s intention to take concrete steps to provide an initial (down payment” of $40.5 million in new Helpance for Somalia. As announced by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on January 4, this total includes $16.5 million in humanitarian Helpance and $24 million in reconstruction and development Helpance for the So-mali people and in support of the deployment of a peace support mission. While we continue to search for addi-tional resources for Somalia, this signaled clearly that the United States intends to remain engaged for the long term in Somalia. Other donor partners are also working to identify additional resources for Somalia. However, if interna-tional donor support is to be effective these resources must be linked to progress made by Somalis in achieving broad-based political dialogue and reconciliation on the part of clans, religious leaders, business people, civil socie-ty activists, women’s leaders, and other political groups.

U.S. Diplomatic Efforts
The United States is actively engaged in a range of bilateral, regional, and multilateral efforts to support positive developments inside Somalia. On a bilateral basis, the United States continues to interact with TFG representatives to achieve U.S. policy goals, both through the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya which maintains responsibility for U.S. engagement in Somalia, as well as in Washington. From our diplomatic base in Kenya, USG representatives meet and communicate regularly with President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Ghedi, and other members of government and parliament, as well as key segments of Somalia society.
On a regional basis, we continue to meet and discuss Somalia with regional leaders. The U.S. embassies in Djibouti and Ethiopia regularly call on host-nation counterparts to review developments in Somalia. The U.S. Ambas-sador to the AU is actively engaging with the AU leadership on its plans in Somalia. The U.S. Ambassador to Yemen also regularly meets and consults with high-level Yemeni officials on this issue, and U.S. officials are making an effort to reach out to key Arab League member-states on Somalia. In January 2007, Helpant Secretary Frazer traveled to Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Yemen to participate in a series of high-level diplomatic meetings and convey the USG’s position on Somalia-related issues. As part of the United States diplomatic initiatives, Helpant Secretary Fra-zer met with Foreign Minister Raphael Tuju of Kenya, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen, and repre-sentatives of the African Union in Ethiopia. Helpant Secretary Frazer has also briefed African Ambassadors and Ar-ab League Ambassadors resident in Washington on Somalia.
On a multilateral basis, the United States continues to work with its international and donor partners both bilaterally and through the International Contact Group on Somalia, which includes the AU, the Arab League, Kenya, the European Union, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Tanzania, United Kingdom, and the United Nations. Since the formation of the International Contact Group on Somalia by the United States and Norway on June 15, 2006, the Contact Group has served as a forum for policy and diplomatic coordination among key international actors on Somalia.
On January 5, 2007, Kenyan Foreign Minister Raphael Tuju and Helpant Secretary Frazer co-chaired a meeting of the International Contact Group on Somalia in which the international community demonstrated its strong commitment to supporting a sustainable political solution in Somalia. At the end of the meeting the Contact Group issued a communiqué recognizing the historic opportunity the Somali people now have to reach a sustaina-ble political solution based on the framework of the Transitional Federal Charter. The Contact Group reaffirmed its readiness to provide immediate support to stabilize Somalia based on United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1725, to build the governance capacity of the Transitional Federal Institutions, and to provide immediate humanitarian and development Helpance.
The Contact Group recognized that this window of opportunity could narrow quickly, however, and called for inclusive governance and the urgent need for funding to facilitate the deployment of a stabilization force in So-malia, consistent with UNSCR 1725. The communiqué and the other sentiments expressed by members of the Con-tact Group that day demonstrate the unity and common priorities of the international community on Somalia.

U.S. Strategy on Transnational Security Threats
The United States is committed to helping the people of Somalia achieve lasting peace and political stability. To achieve this objective, the United States and its international partners must adopt a long-term, integrated approach to addressing the challenges posed by a Somalia that has lacked a central governing structure for more than 16 years. Foreign terrorists are able to exploit the continued lack of governance and find a safe haven in Somalia, while the continued flow of arms and crimina1ity into and out of the country threatens the security of the broader region. Key components of our approach include restoring in Mogadishu effective governance that is representative of all aspects of Somali society, providing humanitarian Helpance to the Somali people, and confronting security threats in Somalia and throughout the Horn of Africa. We continue to work with regional and international partners to counter the threat of terrorism and eliminate Somalia as a safe haven and platform for terrorists, including al, Qaida operatives responsible for attacks on U.S. interests in the region. We work with Somalia and other East Africa, states – including Kenya., Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia, as well as Yemen and international organizations like the AU, and the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to help build better counterterrorism capabilities that will protect U.S. interests as well as the people of the entire region.

Economic and Political Response
In responding to the underlying causes of conflict in Somalia, we will continue to leverage U.S. Helpance programs to support new and expanded programming in the areas of security sector reform, employment and income gener-ation of high-risk youth, and activities providing quick-impact peace dividends in strategic geographic areas. U.S. Helpance programs will also continue to support conflict resolution activities and peace-building efforts in collabo-ration with institutions of higher learning. The United States will help to build the capacity of TFG governance struc-tures at the executive, legislative, and local levels, as well as build confidence in the TFG by strengthening its ability to provide social services through an integrated health and education program. As the security situation permits and as the basic TFG governance structure emerges, U.S. capacity-building efforts in the area of health and water and sanitation will facilitate delivery of primary, health care through an integrated health and education program including, through training for nurses and community health workers to prevent and treat diseases that cause the most morbidity and mortality such as malaria, diarrhea diseases, and acute respiratory infections. The provision of safe water and latrines to the communities, health posts, and schools linked with social mobilization and education will significantly aid in the prevention of diarrhea and common skin infections.
While seeking to support the establishment of effective governance at the national level, there remains a need to build and consolidate effective governance at the regional and local level. In this regard, the United States will also continue to support positive efforts towards democracy and economic development at the regional level, including the regional administration of Puntland and in the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. At the regional level, U.S. programs are designed to promote stability, democracy, reconciliation, civil society participation, and effective governance, as well as help address the long-term governance challenges exploited by terrorists in the region.

Counterterrorism Response
Al-Qaida and its affiliates have had an active presence in Somalia and East Africa since the 1990s. Several al-Qaida operatives have found a safe haven in Somalia, including several of the individuals who perpetrated the 1998 bombings at the United States embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, as well as the 2002 attacks against an Israeli airliner and hotel in Mombasa, Kenya. These individuals pose an immediate threat to both Somali and international interests in the Horn of Africa. American counterterrorism concerns are directly related to the presence of these, foreign terrorists and individuals willing to offer them safe haven within Somalia. We will there-fore take strong measures to deny terrorists safe haven in Somalia, as well as the ability to plan and operate from Somalia. The USG remains committed to neutralizing the threat that al-Qaida poses to all Americans, Somalis, and citizens in neighboring Horn of Africa countries. The USG will continue working with Somalis, regardless of clan, reli-gious, or secular affiliation to eliminate this common threat. Consistent with United States policy globally, there has been an effort to reach out and develop relationships with individuals who can provide useful data with regard to locating terrorists. The primary, guiding imperative for all of these interactions is combating terrorism.
The United States continues to work with East African countries to build their capacity to counter terrorism and criminality that originates in Somalia. These efforts promote increased stability and safety within the Horn of Africa through the development of specific follow-on measures to the President’s East Africa Counterterrorism Ini-tiative (EACTI), which was announced in 2003. In this regard, we have continued to coordinate our regional counter-terrorism efforts through a field-driven process known as the East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI), which facilitates coordination among U.S. embassies from Yemen to Sudan to Tanzania and is one of several Regional Stra-tegic Initiatives (RSIs) established by the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT). The EARSI is a network of coordinated country teams, led by regional ambassadors, bringing all agencies and instru-ments of national power to bear against the regional terrorist threat. The first EARSI strategy session was held May 23-24, 2006, in Nairobi, Kenya, and a second strategy session is planned for early March 2007. The EARSI, support-ed by the Washington interagency, has identified several areas, for the application of strategic resources to en-hance the capabilities of host country governments to contain and defeat the terrorist threat emanating from Soma-lia. These include enhanced coastal security, border security, special operations training, and civic affairs activities. EARSI supports expedited efforts to promote reconstruction, and stabilization in Somalia, and ethnic Somali-inhabited border regions of Kenya and Ethiopia, as well as regional port .security training to include Somali port ad-ministrators. EARSI is responsible for the February 12, 2007 resumption of Voice of America (YOA) programming in Somalia, suspended in 1995. Through S/CT, the United States administers anti-terrorist Helpance (ATA) training to regional governments, particularly Kenya’s in-country program, Counterterrorist Finance (CTF) Helpance to Kenya and Tanzania, and Terrorist Interdiction Programs (TIP) in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Yemen.

Humanitarian Response
The United States also continues to respond to the humanitarian needs. of the Somali people by supporting interna-tional and non-governmental organizations (IOs and NGOs) like the UN World Food Program (WFP) and CARE Inter-national that provide food Helpance inside Somalia. In FY 06, the United States provided more than $92 million in humanitarian Helpance in response to a severe drought following several seasons of failed harvests and warnings of potential famine. To date, in FY 07, the United States has provided $ll.5 million in food Helpance, with the majori-ty of Helpance concentrated on responding to the needs of vulnerable groups in the central and southern regions of Somalia. Major activities include general food distributions, food for work, support to nutritional rehabilitation centers, school feeding, and support for chronically vulnerable groups such as orphans, the disabled, and the elder-ly. Since 1993, the United States has provided more than $557 million in humanitarian Helpance to Somalia -including $335 million in emergency food Helpance – making the United States the largest bilateral food aid con-tributor to Somalia. Through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the United States is continuing to focus on malnutrition in Somalia this year to look at improving nutritional surveys to better target those in need and to provide a balance of food and non-food interventions.
In addition, the United States continues to focus on meeting the basic needs of vulnerable groups in Soma-li, including water, sanitation and hygiene, nutrition, health, and livelihoods. U.S. Helpance activities will also focus on protection programming needed for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and those made vulnerable due to con-flict activities, such as child soldiers. A cross-cutting theme for all humanitarian stakeholders is the need to strengthen the capacity of national, regional, and local governments in social service delivery and to improve their ability to respond to natural and conflict-related disasters.
In responding to the needs of Somali refugees, our immediate goals are to Help countries of asylum, par-ticularly Kenya and Ethiopia, in dealing with new and existing Somali refugee caseloads, and to maintain the right of first asylum while also addressing border security concerns of Somalia’s neighbors. Through the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), the United States will continue to support the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross, which provides protection and Helpance to conflict victims in Somalia. PRM also supports the Office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), as well as a number of NGOs that provide protection and services to approximately 320,000 Somali refugees in countries of asylum. To date in FY 07, the USG has provided $7.575 million in earmarked Helpance to UNHCR and NGOs providing assis-tance to Somali refugees in the Horn of Ashcan. Additionally, in FY 06, the United States resettled 10,357 Somali refugees from countries of first asylum, and will likely offer resettlement to a commensurate number in FY 07.

U.S. Public Affairs Strategy
The Administration’s public affairs strategy for Somalia focuses on educating both domestic and international audi-ences about our integrated policy approach on Somalia. Outreach to the U.S. domestic audience (including Somalis) is particularly important in reaching the Somali diaspora to encourage political and financial support for TFIs. In communicating with U.S. domestic audiences, we emphasize key policy goals by disseminating our core messages through a variety of media interviews, speaking engagements (particularly in areas with large Somali diaspora popu-lations) and the drafting and placement of opinion pieces in influential newspapers and magazines.
Helpant Secretary Frazer has conducted frequent press conferences on Somalia most recently giving three overseas press briefings during two trips to East Africa in January 2007. Frazer appeared on CNN’s “American Morning,” CNN International, National Public Radio (NPR), AllAfrica.com, BBC World News Service, and al-Jazeera television. On January 17, 2007, Frazer gave a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that was widely covered by domestic and international media. Speech excerpts also were promptly translated into French, Arabic, and Somali and posted to www.usinfo.gov and disseminated by posts to key overseas audiences.
To reach overseas audiences, particularly in the Horn of Africa, the State Department Bureau of African Af-fairs Public Diplomacy office has been working in concert with U.S. embassies overseas to execute a coordinated media plan. Echoing the three primary messages, U.S. ambassadors· in Nairobi, Ethiopia, and Djibouti lave participat-ed in a series of press conferences· and media interviews to provide up-to-date intonation on U.S. policy and hu-manitarian Helpance efforts in Somalia. Audiences include international media (especially journalists from Horn countries); the Somali people; the Somali diaspora in the Horn, sub-region and the Middle East; foreign government and military officials; Muslim communities globally; and donor partners.
Accomplishments thus far include press briefings and several appearances in local media by U.S. ambassa-dors in Kenya and Ethiopia; an op-ed in Kenya’s largest and most influential paper, “The Nation,” under the U.S. am-bassador’s byline; and interviews in Brussels by the Deputy Helpant Secretary of State for East African Affairs with European journalists. In addition, a permanent Foreign Service Officer position has been assigned to the U.S. embas-sy in Nairobi as a Public Diplomacy officer who will focus solely on Somalia, which will undoubtedly prove a critical tool in advancing our messages. The Public Affairs Section of the U.S. embassy has recently hired a Somali-speaking employee to augment our Somalia team efforts. Among other duties, he is charged with increasing his contact base among Somalis living in the remote northern areas of Kenya and to develop grant proposals for public diplomacy programming in Somalia.
To complement our efforts to reach overseas audiences, the VOA Somali Service officially launched its So-mali broadcast on February 12. Media interviews were conducted with Administration officials during its first week in operation. Plans are being made for Helpant Secretary Frazer to travel to U.S. cities with key Somali diaspora populations to engage those audiences, and more media interviews and briefings are being scheduled for the Assis-tant Secretary and other officials to continue telling the U.S. story on Somalia. Any additional humanitarian assis-tance projects that are announced also will be given ample attention to attract positive media coverage of American efforts in this vein.

Interagency Coordination
The Africa Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) continues to serve as the interagency framework for planning, co-ordinating, and executing United States policy and activities in Somalia and throughout the countries of the Horn of Africa. The PCC also oversee policy and program implementation. The Executive Branch is engaged at the highest levels of government, and key policy issues concerning Somalia are reviewed and discussed at the Principals and Deputies committee level consistent with National Security Presidential Directive-l (NSPD-l).
In Nairobi, we have assembled a strong interagency team on Somalia. Embassy Nairobi’s Somalia Working Group meets on a weekly basis and includes representatives from 18 USG agencies and State Department offices dealing with political, counterterrorism and national security, humanitarian and development issues in Somalia. The Somalia Working Group serves as a conduit for information sharing, planning and strategizing, and the most effec-tive means for coordinating activities and actions on Somalia, Embassy Nairobi coordinates regularly with our other embassies in the region, as well as with the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and appropriate elements of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

Implementation
The Comprehensive Regional Strategy on Somalia will be implemented by the Department of State, in coordination with appropriate USG agencies and, departments. The U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, retains field responsibility for U.S. engagement in Somalia and win coordinate with the U.S. Embassies in Djibouti, Addis Ababa, Sana’a, and others as appropriate. The U.S. Ambassador to Kenya oversees the interagency Somalia Working Group activities at Embas-sy Nairobi as well as the Counsel for Somali Affairs and other support staff dedicated to evaluating and analyzing events in Somalia. In addition to the 18 agencies arid offices at the Mission that collaborate on Somalia issues, two additional permanent positions have been established at Embassy Nairobi to expand the implementation of this comprehensive strategy
The implementation of the strategy is subject to careful and regular review and monitoring of the situation on the ground and is subject to examination and adjustment as needed through the interagency process at the PCC, DC, and PC level. The Department of State and other appropriate government agencies will provide regular updates to Congress. * * *
Testing Strategy’s Logic and Risk*
All strategy has its own inherent logic which can be assessed to determine validity and risk. The identification of resources in the development process is a good starting point for testing a strategy’s internal logic. The strategist should think backward through the process to ensure the resources provided are adequate to implement the con-cepts, that the concepts envisioned can achieve the stated objectives in an acceptable manner, that the accom-plishment of the objectives will create the strategic effects to satisfy the policy aims and promote and protect the national interests, and so forth. Thus, the strategist questions suitability ‐ will the strategy’s attainment accomplish the effect desired; he questions feasibility ‐ can the action be accomplished by the means available; and he ques-tions acceptability ‐ are the effects as well as the methods and resources used to achieve those efforts justified and acceptable to the body politic In this process, the strategist considers tangibles, such as resource availability, weapons capability, and geography, and intangibles, such as national will, public opinion, world opinion, and ac-tions/reactions of U.S. allies, adversaries, and other nations and actors. A strategy that clearly can be labeled as un-suitable, infeasible, or unacceptable is not valid. However, if an appropriate strategy formulation process has been adhered to, this will rarely be the case. The strategy is likely to be assessed as valid with qualifications ‐ the qualifica-tions being the measure of risk.

Risk is an assessment of the balance among what is known, assumed, and unknown, as well as the correspond-ence between what is to be achieved, the concepts envisioned, and resources available. Risk assessment is not just a measure of the probability of success or failure. It is also an assessment of the probable consequences of success and failure. The strategic environment responds as a complex system ‐ acting successfully, acting unsuccessfully, and failing to act must be anticipated and weighed. Since there are seldom enough resources or a clever enough concept to guarantee absolute success, there is always some risk in a dynamic strategic environment. Complexity, friction, and freedom of choice of other actors also guarantee some element of risk. Risk weighs the potential ad-vantages and disadvantages of adopting the strategy.

Risk assessment examines the strategy in its en‐tire logic ‐ ends, ways, and means ‐ in the context of the envi-ronment and seeks to determine what effects are created by the implementation of the strategy. It seeks to deter-mine how the equilibrium is affected, and whether the environment is more or less favorable for the state as a re-sult of the strategy. It asks how other actors will react to what has been attempted or achieved; how they will react to the way in which the strategy was pursued; what the balance is between intended and unintended consequenc-es; how chance or friction will play in this strategy. The strategist must assess how the assumptions made or factors that might change could impact on success or effects. He must ask how much flexibility is inherent to the strategy, how it can be changed or recovered, and at what cost; what are the elements of the strategic environment the strategy is relying on for success; and what are the consequences if these change, and is the strategy flexible or adaptable enough to accommodate these changes. Risk assessment is an integral part of the strategy formulation process and should lead to acceptance, modification, or rejection of the strategy.

The strategist seeks to minimize risk through his development of the strategy ‐ the relationship or balance of ends, ways, and means. But ultimately the strategist informs the decision makers of the risks in the strategy so the leaders can decide if the risks are acceptable or not. The strategist continuously con‐templates the possibilities as the future unfolds.

* These excerpts are taken from Harry R. Yarger’s monograph Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy. Strategic Studies Institute, pp. 15‐16 and 47‐64.

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